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Abstract 
 
This dissertation examines the engagement of civilian designers in United States Army 
post architecture and planning between 1917 and 1948.  During those years, the built 
environment of the Army was fundamentally transformed, as troops relocated from frontier posts 
and coastal fortifications to large permanent military bases.  First conceived of as “soldier cities,” 
by the end of World War II these posts had come to resemble garden suburbs.  At the same time, 
the architecture and planning of civilian communities also changed.  Turn-of-the-century 
affection for the industrial city had, by 1920, given way to a preference for suburban living 
among the upper classes.  After World War II, suburbia would become ubiquitous, as federally-
supported tract-house developments sprung up around the nation. 
These changes in civilian and military architecture and planning were, I argue, tightly 
connected, in part through the movement of civilian designers back and forth between civilian 
and military commissions.  For architects and planners, the Army post was a kind of laboratory 
in which to experiment with design concepts outside the constraints of the real estate 
market.  For Army officials, meanwhile, the involvement of outside experts in post design helped 
to convince potential recruits and the public alike that military life was not so different from 
civilian life.  As the built environments of military and civilian America mutually influenced one 
another, the distinction between the two narrowed, and the Army effectively hid itself in plain 
sight. 
   iv 
I track the exchange between civilian and military design ideals in five chronological 
chapters, each highlighting a particular episode in Army post design, and each connecting to 
broader themes in American urban and suburban history.  The first two chapters take place 
during World War I and look at the planning of the Army’s training camps, and the architecture 
of the YMCA and YWCA buildings therein.  The third chapter focuses on the permanent post-
building program of the 1920s and 1930s.  The fourth chapter recounts the Army’s pre-World 
War II experiments in prefabrication, and the final chapter examines the re-planning of the 
atomic town of Oak Ridge, Tennessee, in 1948. 
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Introduction 
 
Between the end of the nineteenth century and the close of World War II, the built 
environment of the United States Army changed radically.  During the 1880s and 1890s, soldiers 
lived in squalor on isolated frontier posts and obsolete coastal fortifications.  The training camps 
of World War I, in contrast, were conceived of as small cities, and were constructed according to 
the latest urban planning and sanitation principles.  The permanent Army bases of the 1930s and 
the temporary atomic towns of the 1940s, in turn, were modeled on recent developments in 
suburban residential design. 
During the same period, America’s civilian communities were likewise transformed.   
The landscape of the early-twentieth-century United States could still be clearly partitioned into 
“urban” and “rural” spaces.  As of the 1910 census, nearly half of the country’s population lived 
in cities,1 close to centers of industry and commerce as well as to the profound poverty decried 
by Jacob Riis and other contemporary observers.  One decade later, the suburban exodus that had 
begun years earlier reached a tipping point, with the new neither-urban-nor-rural areas growing 
faster than the urban core for the first time.2  If the iconic architectural image of America in 1900 
was the skyscraper, in 1950 it was the single-family suburban tract home. 
                                            
1 U.S. Census Bureau, Geography Division, “United States: 1790 to 1990,” Urban and Rural Classification, 
http://www.census.gov/geo/www/ua/urbanruralclass.html (accessed November 24, 2012). 
2 Gwendolyn Wright, Building the Dream: A Social History of Housing in America, paperback edition (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1983), 195; Robert Fishman, Bourgeois Utopias: The Rise and Fall of Suburbia (New York: Basic 
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The evolutions of the United States’s military and civilian built environments during the 
first half of the twentieth century were not unrelated.  To the contrary, developments in military 
and civilian architecture and planning were closely tied, in large part due to the movement of 
individual designers between private practice and work for the federal government.  Far from 
operating within a military vacuum, the men and women who built America’s modern Army 
facilities brought their experience working within civilian communities to bear on almost every 
aspect of military post design. 
Nor was the exchange between civilian and military architectural and planning ideals 
unidirectional.  Architects and city planners working for the Army did not just translate existing 
civilian design principles into military terms; they also took advantage of their military 
commissions to realize ideas that might have remained theoretical in a civilian context.  The 
Army, after all, was in many ways a unique client.  It had the legal power to assemble large, 
continuous tracts of land without restrictions on use.  It operated as the sole owner or lessee of 
these reservations, simplifying coordination across all aspects of the built environment, from 
roads and utilities to land-use planning and architecture.  And it made decisions about building 
projects based on a combination of military strategy and Congressional budgetary constraints, 
not the ups and downs of the real estate market. 
In the following chapters, I will explore a series of episodes between World Wars I and II 
during which Army officials tapped civilian design experts to re-imagine America’s military 
posts.  For the designers themselves—who ranged from well-known city planners and architects 
to the men who would become the Master Builders of the postwar suburban housing boom—I 
argue, Army work constituted a kind of laboratory within which they could articulate and 
                                                                                                                                             
Books, Inc., 1987), 16; Kenneth T. Jackson Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 175. 
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explore contemporary architecture and planning ideals.  The men and women who designed 
America’s twentieth-century Army posts did so not in the service of narrow military goals, but 
with an aim to advance community development more generally. 
The exchange in design ideals between military and civilian spaces had implications 
beyond the individual projects discussed in this dissertation.  As military officials increasingly 
relied on civilian experts to define the spatial character of the American military base, the 
distinction between the nation’s “military” and “civilian” spaces became less and less clear.  
Thus even as the United States’s military capabilities expanded beyond what the Founding 
Fathers could possibly have imagined, the material reminders of this expansion—the military 
posts at which soldiers train and live—became not more alien, but rather more familiar.  
Intentionally or not, the Army effected an architectural camouflage that, I suggest, aided its 
acceptance by a public historically predisposed against a standing military. 
 
The United States’s eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century Army posts were of two 
types:  the coastal fort and the frontier fort.  Coastal forts, arrayed along the nation’s Atlantic 
coast and designed to protect against sea attack, were built primarily of earth until after the War 
of 1812, when the so-called “Third System” of fortification design introduced all-masonry 
constructions.  With the Army budget forever tight, soldiers were housed within the forts’ damp, 
dark casemates, or gun portals.3 
About as many soldiers as manned the eastern coastal fortifications lived on western 
frontier posts.  These were temporary, often unfinished, posts, built of local materials by the 
                                            
3 R. Christopher Goodwin and Associates, Inc., National Historic Context for Department of Defense Installations, 
1790-1940 (Baltimore, MD: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1995), 1:11-12, 
http://aec.army.mil/usaec/cultural/docs.html (accessed November 24, 2012). 
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soldiers themselves.4  The earliest western forts were defensive structures, complete with 
blockhouses and palisades, but after 1812, as protection against attack proved less important than 
providing a staging ground for offensive action and other, non-military, activities including 
farming, only those posts near plentiful lumber supplies were built with a surrounding wall.5 
During the pre-Civil War period, the Army issued no official instructions for the laying-
out of western posts, so most were designed by the local commanding officer.6  As Alison K. 
Hoagland points out in an article on fort design, in most cases the post’s top officer replicated on 
the western prairies a New England village, complete with a village green (the fort’s parade 
ground) surrounding by houses (quarters).  Architectural cues including picket fences and front 
porches reinforced the identity of the western post as a civilized, even a civilianized, space.7 
Throughout this period and during the first couple of decades following the Civil War, 
Army-post construction remained decentralized and thus resistant to standardization.  In a 
different article, Hoagland explains that the obstacles to standardization of Army architecture 
and planning included not just variations in climate and the expense of transporting building 
materials long distances, but also the obstinacy of line officers (i.e. those working in the field), 
                                            
4 Charles Morse Stotz, “The Reconstruction of Fort Ligonier: The Anatomy of a Frontier Fort,” Bulletin of the 
Association for Preservation Technology 6, no. 4 (1974): 6, 18. 
5 R. Christopher Goodwin and Associates, Inc., National Historic Context, 1:6-7; Alison K. Hoagland, “Village 
Constructions: U.S. Army Forts on the Plains, 1848-1890,” Winterthur Portfolio 34, no. 4 (Winter 1999): 218-9. 
6 Paul Chattey and others, Context Study of the United States Quartermaster General Standardized Plans 
(Quartermaster General Standardized Plans), 1866-1942 (Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD: U.S. Army 
Environmental Center, Environmental Compliance Division, 1997), 28, http://aec.army.mil/usaec/cultural/docs.html 
(accessed November 24, 2012). 
7 Hoagland, “Village Constructions,” 223, 7. 
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who remained unconvinced that staff officers in Washington knew better when it came to 
designing frontier forts.8 
Nonetheless, the Quartermaster Corps did issue two sets of design regulations prior to 
1880.  The first, put out in 1860 or 1861, seem merely to have recorded existing practices, and 
did not represent an attempt to radically change post-building methods.9  In 1872 Quartermaster 
General Montgomery C. Meigs issued a second set of plans, which he called “model” plans and 
which were accompanied by relatively little explanatory text.  Meigs’s plans were used widely in 
the field, though selectively and with much local variation.10 
Two developments during the 1870s and 1880s contributed to an eventual shift in the 
attitude toward design standardization.  First, the American Indians became less of a threat to 
European-American settlers as they were contained within reservations.11  Second, observers 
became increasingly vocal about the poor living conditions at both coastal and western forts.  In 
1875 the Surgeon General issued a report blaming bad construction and the lack of decent water 
supplies for diseases on Army posts.12  The Inspector General surveyed housing conditions at 
military posts at about the same time.  He wrote of an earlier visit to Ft. Randall in the Dakota 
Territory: 
None of the quarters, either for officers or men, are inhabitable; they are filled with bed-
bugs, fleas, rats, mice, &c.  The lower logs of the quarters are rotten, and many of the 
buildings are falling.  During the warmer months the officers move out of the quarters 
                                            
8 Alison K. Hoagland, “‘The Invariable Model’: Standardization and Military Architecture in Wyoming, 1860-
1900,” Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians 57, no. 3 (September 1998): 299-300. 
9 Chattey, Quartermaster General Standardized Plans, 38; R. Christopher Goodwin and Associates, Inc., National 
Historic Context, 1:154. 
10 Hoagland, “‘The Invariable Model,’” 304-7. 
11 R. Christopher Goodwin and Associates, Inc., National Historic Context, 1:23-24. 
12 Ibid., 25. 
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and live in tents, and the men sleep on the parade to avoid being devoured alive by 
vermin.  While sitting in the commanding officer’s quarters two bugs dropped from the 
ceiling upon me.13 
 
It took some time, but Congress and the Army finally responded to the desperate need for 
better military housing.  In the 1880s the Quartermaster Corps began constructing permanent 
facilities with water and other utilities; in 1882 General Sherman proposed consolidating those 
troops scattered among hundreds of no-longer-needed western posts.14  By this time, moreover, a 
couple of the obstacles to standardization cited by Hoagland had disappeared:  railroad shipment 
of building materials was now an affordable option; and post quartermasters realized that they 
did not have the expertise necessary to design structures with internal plumbing, or to comply 
with the Army’s new bidding system.15 
During the years between 1890 and 1917, the Office of the Quartermaster General issued 
hundreds of standardized building plans, many of which Bethanie Grashof catalogued in a six-
volume report for the Army.16  This explosion of design activity included many different plans 
for each building type:  Grashof counted 82 distinct designs for family housing, for example, 
with between one and fifteen variations each.17  The designs also varied stylistically, with 
Quartermaster Corps staff applying a number of popular architectural styles to their buildings, 
including—according to an Army study—Victorian, Colonial Revival, Spanish Revival, 
                                            
13 Inspector General quoted in Ibid., 25. 
14 Chattey, Quartermaster General Standardized Plans, 6. 
15 Hoagland, “‘The Invariable Model,’” 310-12. 
16 Bethanie C. Grashof, A Study of United States Army Family Housing Standardized Plans (Army Family Housing), 
6 vols. (Atlanta Georgia: Georgia Institute of Technology, 1986), http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/ (accessed November 24, 
2102). 
17 Grashof, Army Family Housing, 1:1. 
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Neoclassical, Romanesque, Queen Anne, Georgian Revival, and Italianate.18 In general, 
however, the buildings’ exteriors were simpler than their civilian counterparts, to save money.19 
Army-post planning remained relatively undefined up until the start of World War I; the 
Army Regulations of 1904 specified only that posts should look nice.20  Most post planners 
relied on a grid layout, to monotonous effect.21  The post parade ground remained its central 
element, with barracks and officers’ quarters arrayed to either side of it.22  This would change 
only after World War I, with the inauguration of the War Department Housing Program (see 
chapter 3).23 
The Army’s reliance on civilian designers accelerated during the final years of the 
nineteenth century.  According to an Army study of Quartermaster Corps standardized plans, 
civilian architects received contract commissions for urban posts during the mid-nineteenth 
century.  The military’s adoption of popular civilian architectural styles was, this same study 
argues, at least in part based on the involvement of these architects in Army work.24  During the 
1880s and 1890s even more civilian designers accepted work with the Army.  These included:  
William Goding (Ft. Riley); Gustav Freibus (Ft. McPherson); Holabird and Roche (Ft. 
Sheridan); E. T. Carr (Fort Leavenworth); F. J. Grodavent (Ft. Logan); and Alfred Giles (Ft. Sam 
                                            
18 Chattey, Quartermaster General Standardized Plans, 31. 
19 Ibid.. 
20 R. Christopher Goodwin and Associates, Inc., National Historic Context, 1:181. 
21 Chattey, Quartermaster General Standardized Plans, 54. 
22 Ibid., 293. 
23 Ibid., 56-7. 
24 Ibid., 33, 39. 
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Houston).25  At least three of these architects’ plans were later reinvented as standard 
Quartermaster Corps designs.26 
In the late 1890s and early 1900s, the Office of the Quartermaster General moved away 
from signing contracts with civilian architects in order to lower costs, and instead issued standard 
plans from its Washington office.27  To support its new centralized building program, the 
Quartermaster Corps hired a number of professional architects for permanent work in the office, 
the first of whom was Francis B. Wheaton, a former employee of McKim, Mead & White.28  
Wheaton and other Quartermaster Corps staff would remain in charge of most stateside design 
work until World War I, when the Army again hired outside designers to assist in laying out its 
training camps (see chapter 1). 
 
Army officials repeatedly turned to civilian architects and city planners in part to mitigate 
the apparent conflict between a standing army and a decentralized democracy.  Because 
Congress controls the military’s building budget, the Army’s built environment has historically 
been the stake as well as the site of the broader contest to define the role of the military in 
American society.  On Congress’s side, ambivalence toward a standing Army manifests itself in 
meager appropriations for Army construction.  On the side of the Army, a preference for 
architecture and planning that mimicked—rather than distinguished itself from—civilian design 
                                            
25 R. Christopher Goodwin and Associates, Inc., National Historic Context, 1:175-6. 
26 Grashof, Army Family Housing, 1:34-6. 
27 Grashof, Army Family Housing, 1:30. 
28 Hoagland, “‘The Invariable Model,’” 313. 
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can be understood as an attempt to naturalize the military, reassuring Americans who come in 
contact with it that life in the Army is not so different from civilian life, after all. 
In more practical terms, the fact that in peacetime the United States Army is an all-
volunteer force means that military recruiters must compete with private-sector employers for 
personnel, especially officers.  Thus the quality of life on military installations must be perceived 
as equivalent to that in civilian communities.  The built environment, and particularly housing, is 
a big part of the quality-of-life equation; Army officials work to create a favorable architectural 
impression on soldiers and their families. 
Underlying much of the discussion, historic and contemporary, of Army base design is an 
unnamed referent:  the European standing army.  Relatively little has been published in English 
on twentieth-century European military space, with Jean-Louis Cohen’s recent work on the 
architecture of World War II being an important exception.29  What has been written tends to 
focus on defensive structures including the Atlantic wall, for example Paul Virilio’s Bunker 
Archeology and Keith Mallory and Arvid Ottar’s 1973 Architecture of Aggression: A History of 
Military Architecture in North West Europe, 1900-1945.30  But the historian’s understanding of 
European military-base design may be of little importance in this case, as the architects of 
America’s mid-twentieth-century Army posts seem to have themselves not known very much 
about what their counterparts across the Atlantic were doing.  Rather, the focus, as we shall see, 
was largely internal, on creating an American Army architecture that Americans would 
                                            
29 Jean-Louis Cohen, Architecture in Uniform: Designing and Building for the Second World War (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press; Canadian Centre for Architecture, 2012). 
30 Paul Virilio, Bunker Archeology, trans. George Collins (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 2008); Keith 
Mallory and Arvid Ottar, Architecture of Aggression: A History of Military Architecture in North West Europe, 
1900-1945 (n.p.: Architectural Press, 1973). 
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understand as something that they had themselves created, and not as a European import that 
fitted poorly into the local context. 
 
An interdisciplinary work at the intersection of architectural history and military history, 
this dissertation engages several sets of literature.  First, it challenges our understanding of the 
impact on American civilian culture of the spaces of war.  Much of the existing literature on 
twentieth-century American military installations is focused on the United States’s bases 
overseas.  These works tend to frame the conflicts taking place in and around military posts in 
terms of American versus indigenous, rather than military versus civilian, cultures.  In America 
Town: Building the Outposts of Empire (2007), for instance, Mark Gillem decries the export of 
sprawling automobile suburbs to countries with a different planning tradition, notably Japan, 
without examining how America’s military bases came to take the shape they did in the first 
place.31  Katherine T. McCaffrey’s study of the United States Navy in Vieques, Puerto Rico, 
Military Power and Popular Protest (2002), is much more nuanced, but likewise focuses on the 
military’s projection of power, via its bases, outside rather than inside the United States.32 
Catherine Lutz’s ⁠ research on Fort Bragg (2001) is an exception to this concentration on 
external rather than internal imperialism.33 Lutz introduces a concept she calls “civilian 
camouflage,” by which she means that the apparently straightforward distinction between 
“civilian” and “military” conceals the profound economic and social impact military installations 
                                            
31 Mark Gillem, America Town: Building the Outposts of Empire (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2007). 
32 Katherine T. McCaffrey, Military Power and Popular Protest: The U.S. Navy in Vieques, Puerto Rico (New 
Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2002). 
33 Catherine Lutz, Homefront: A Military City and the American Twentieth Century (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001). 
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make on their surrounding communities. I extend the kinds of questions Lutz asks about Fort 
Bragg to a national level, illuminating the relationship between the mid-twentieth-century 
expansion of the Army and the shaping of America’s cities and suburbs. 
Other studies of military space have had a more explicit architecture or planning focus. 
The 1995 collection of essays World War II and the American Dream, ⁠ for instance, includes 
essays on how wartime commissions, materials restrictions, and demographic shifts affected 
individual designers as well as architectural and planning practices. ⁠
34
  Jean-Louis Cohen’s 
abovementioned Architecture in Uniform: Designing and Building for the Second World War 
(2011) is a remarkable study of the various activities engaged in by architects worldwide 
between 1941 and 1945.  Cohen reminds us that professional designers’ work for the warring 
governments included not just fortifications and military camps, but also war housing 
communities, camouflage, and the development of new materials and building methods.  My 
dissertation extends these analyses in two important ways.  First, I study the peacetime building 
projects of the 1920s and 1930s as well as the extraordinary circumstances of wartime 
construction.  In addition, I understand the relationship between military programs and civilian 
design practices as one of mutual influence, in which Army spaces simultaneously created and 
were created by ideas about the modern American city and suburb. 
In addition to the literature on architecture and war, this dissertation also draws on 
histories of the American state.  Here two themes are particularly relevant.  The first is the 
question of American exceptionalism.  Like political scientist Stephen Skowronek (Building a 
New American State, 1995), I understand the American state to differ from its European 
                                            
34 Donald Albrecht, ed., World War II and the American Dream: How Wartime Building Changed a Nation 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995); Similar themes are addressed in the slender 1945: Creativity in Crisis, Chicago 
Architecture and Design, the publication for a 2005 Art Institute of Chicago exhibition. [John Zukowsky and Others 
(Chicago: The Art Institute of Chicago, 2005).] 
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counterparts most noticeably in its separation of power and distribution of functions.35  But I 
disagree with Skowronek and other historians of early-twentieth-century Army reform with 
respect to the relationship between this unique state structure and the development of the Regular 
Army.  Skowronek et al. have emphasized the extent to which the division of power between 
Congress and the Executive Branch has limited the expansion of an American standing army.  
My dissertation, in contrast, shows how the tension between America’s decentralized, 
democratic polity, and the centralized state apparatuses championed by progressive reformers, 
resulted in a drawing-together of the nation’s civilian and military cultures—rather than a 
wholesale rejection of the latter by the former. 
In its focus on the extent to which the Regular Army was integrated into, rather than 
rejected by, civil society, this project most closely follows John Whiteclay Chambers, II’s history 
of the draft in America (1987).36  In Chambers’s story, proponents of the draft carried the day 
only after they successfully redefined the Selective Service Act as inherently democratic.  In this 
dissertation, the forces at work shaping military bases and civilian communities into simulacra of 
one another were far less direct.  Nevertheless, its conclusion—that by their constant reference to 
civilian spatial ideals, Army post architects and planners helped to ease Americans’ discomfort 
with the standing army in their midst—echoes Chambers’s conviction that the question is not 
                                            
35 Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); 
Skowronek’s predecessor, Samuel Huntington, located the origins of the Constitution’s emphasis on liberty over 
order in the circumstances of its creation.  Because its framers were tasked with protecting Americans from the 
perceived monarchical tendency towards tyranny, rather than with creating political order where there had been 
none before, they concentrated on the limitation of authority and division of power, rather than on the creation of 
authority and accumulation of power.  [Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1968).] 
36 John Whiteclay Chambers, II, To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes to Modern America (New York: Free Press, 
1987). 
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why the draft has not been employed more often in American history, but how it conquered 
public resistance the few times it was. 
Second to the theme of American exceptionalism is the relationship of the military to 
American society more generally.  Charles Maier (Among Empires, 2006) ⁠ argues against a 
characterization of American empire (or hegemony) as based exclusively on “soft” (economic) 
power.37  Instead, he insists that concerns over physical territory are irreducible in any scenario 
of dominance, and that soft power cannot function without the backing of hard (military) power. 
In the American case, the nuclear bomb and Fordist production techniques were equally 
important to the United States’s post-World War II imperial agenda. And just as the United 
States depends on its military supremacy to extend its social and economic influence, Maier 
argues, so was America’s own politico-economic development dependent on its quest for 
military might.38  This dissertation constitutes a prologue to the story Maier tells. It shows how 
even before the development of its nuclear arsenal, the growth of the United States military 
played a crucial role in configuring the spatial, as well as the social and economic, structures so 
important to the nation’s postwar identity. 
 
One of the broadest claims this dissertation makes is that space matters.  Architecture and 
planning do not merely fulfill functional requirements.  Rather, both builders and users tend to 
endow spaces with meaning.  In the context of Army posts, I argue, military officials hired 
experts in civilian community design in part to normalize the Army, to neutralize its perceived 
                                            
37 Charles Maier, Among Empires: American Ascendancy and its Predecessors (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2006). 
38 Here Maier’s argument is reminiscent of Charles Tilly’s.  In Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-
1992, Tilly situates the quest for military supremacy at the very center of the state-building process, explaining the 
development of the nation-state in terms of the mechanics of building and maintaining a standing army.  
[Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1992.] 
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threat to democracy and individualism.  But while I suggest that the planning and architecture of 
American Army posts does reflect certain ideas about how the military should function in 
society, this is not to say that these ideas automatically imply specific forms.  Instead, the 
architects and planners working for the military created new forms based not just on instructions 
from Army officials, but also on a variety of precedents (both military and civilian), practical 
concerns (such as material and labor shortages), and social theory.  The built environment of the 
Army base, therefore, has the capacity to create new ideas about the American military, even as 
it substantiates existing ones. 
In The Production of Space (1974) sociologist Henri Lefebvre ⁠ developed a theory of 
“social space,” which may be understood as an extension of Marx’s theory of the fetishism of 
commodities.39 That is, just as Marx ⁠ showed the commodity (the principal output of the capitalist 
system of production) to be tied to (social) labor relations, so Lefebvre demonstrated that 
physical space (the principal output of the post-industrial system of production) has embedded 
within it the social dynamics responsible for its emergence. Thus space is neither preexisting nor 
absolute, but produced over time and relative. 
Lefebvre explained the production of space as a dialectical relationship among the 
members of the following conceptual triad: spatial practice; representations of space; and 
representational space. The first concept, spatial practice, refers to the ways by which a society 
both produces physical space, and engages with already-produced physical space. 
Representations of space and representational space have to do with how social relationships are 
contested in, and in relationship to, social space. Representations of space are conceptualizations 
of space propagated from the top down by the society’s technocrats. Representational space is 
                                            
39 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1991); 
Karl Marx, “The Commodity,” chap. 1 in Capital, vol. 1 (1867; repr. New York: Penguin Classics, 1990), 125-177. 
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the space within which representations of space are passively received, but also might be 
appropriated or reconfigured through symbolic manipulation. 
In Lefebvrian terms, this project will illuminate both the spatial practice responsible for 
the production of Army space, and the representations of space employed, whether intentionally 
or not, to hide it in plain sight.  The story of the built environment of the United States Army is, 
on one level—the level of spatial practice—the story of the military posts themselves, of why 
and how they were built.  On another level—that of representations of space—the same story 
shows how the designers involved used the Army post as a laboratory, a space in which to refine 
or transform ideas about community before reintroducing them to civilian architecture and 
planning.  
In addition to Lefebvre, this dissertation was informed by the work of Michel Foucault, 
and in particular his concept of  “heterotopia.”40  A heterotopia is a real-life utopia, a space that 
represents either the perfection or inversion of all other, non-heterotopic, spaces.  In his lecture 
on the topic (1967; published in English in 1986), Foucault suggested that heterotopias could be 
divided into two categories:  heterotopias of crises, that is, sacred spaces in which people in crisis 
are segregated from the rest of the society; and heterotopias of deviation, or spaces within which 
people who challenge cultural norms are similarly isolated.  Whether of crisis or of deviation, 
Foucault argued, all heterotopias share certain characteristics.  Among these are the heterotopia’s 
ability to combine in one place otherwise incompatible spaces; the association of heterotopias 
with chronological breaks; the fact that heterotopias are always in some ways gated and thus 
exclusive; and the way in which heterotopias relate to other spaces, either by revealing the 
                                            
40 Foucault, “Of Other Spaces,” trans. Jay Miskowiec, Diacritics 16, no. 1 (Spring 1986): 22-27. 
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constructed nature of those sites, or by compensating for what these other places are understood 
to lack. 
The American Army base corresponds to a Foucauldian heterotopia as I understand it.  
While Foucault pointed to compulsory military service as a heterotopia of crisis, the American 
military post, I suggest, can best be understood as a heterotopia of deviation, in that it cordons 
off and conceals the machinery of war during times of peace.  As for the qualities of heterotopia 
named above, the Army post has all of these.  The military base combines both destructive and 
constructive spaces, both armories and children’s classrooms, firing ranges and officers’ clubs.  
Army bases, moreover, are associated with a particular temporal rupture—what we call 
“wartime.”  Third, the military post is literally fenced in, with armed sentries directing entrance 
and egress. 
The final aspect of Foucault’s heterotopias forms the crux of the argument I make below.  
That is: the military post is intimately related to other spaces, namely civilian cities and suburbs.  
America’s Army bases were consciously constructed as ideal communities, according not to 
military strategy but to architectural and city planning principles whose basis lay in civilian 
settlements.  Because the men and women who designed these spaces regularly translated their 
lessons back to non-military America, the military base is a model community in both senses of 
the term:  in that it represents an unattainable ideal; and in that it served as the prototype for later, 
civilian, cities and suburbs. 
 
The first two chapters of this dissertation look at Army architecture and planning during 
World War I.  Chapter 1, “The Army Post as Model City,” focuses on the group of architects and 
landscape architects who laid out sixteen National Army Camps during 1917.  These men, all of 
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whom were leaders in America’s nascent city planning movement, used their experience 
planning the training camps to work out certain questions that were central to their discipline.  
First, they affirmed in their Army work the definition of planning as the preparation of a flexible 
program to guide future growth.  Second, they looked at the relationship between aesthetics and 
function in city planning, their different conclusions foreshadowing a split between adherents of 
the City Beautiful and City Practical modes of community design.  Finally, the cantonment 
planners re-imagined their work as a cooperative enterprise, rather than as a solitary art.  Despite 
the fact that their creativity was constrained by Army regulations as well as a short timeline, the 
men who laid out the training camps used the experience to argue in favor of the 
professionalization of city planning after the war. 
In the second chapter, “Building a Moral Army,” I examine the in-camp building 
programs of both the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) and the Young Women’s 
Christian Association (YWCA) within the context of their prewar work with single men and 
women in industrial cities.  Both organizations used architecture to identify their recreation 
centers as soldiers’ homes away from home, as specifically domestic spaces opposed to the 
surrounding Army environment.  Both the YMCA’s and the YWCA’s wartime programs, in 
addition, influenced their postwar building projects.  The YMCA’s World War I hut program led 
directly to its focus during the 1920s on smaller, more flexible community recreation centers.  It 
may also have influenced the centralization of the YMCA’s architectural program.  The 
YWCA’s hostess house program also impacted that organization’s later building design, as these 
too morphed into multipurpose facilities and even stylistically reflected the wartime buildings. 
Chapters 3 and 4 focus on the Army’s building activities during the interwar years.  In 
chapter 3, “Civilianizing Army Housing,” I examine the War Department Housing Program, a 
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post renovation project begun in 1926.  The Army hired a prominent city planner, George B. 
Ford, to alter the layout of many of its permanent bases.  Ford advocated a different conception 
of the Army post as city, one in which the base’s elite—its officers—were housed not at its 
center, but in peripheral residential enclaves.  Ford’s treatment of officers’ housing, as 
exemplified in his plans for Governors Island and Fort Lewis, mirrored the contemporary 
popularity of the automobile suburb.  The architectural side of the housing program, meanwhile, 
created a hierarchy of housing types, at the top of which sat the single-family home.  In thus 
privileging the suburban single-family home, the Army’s War Department Housing Program 
foreshadowed federal support for suburban homeownership during the New Deal and the late 
1940s. 
Chapter 4, “How Best to Build,” considers how Army housing was built during the 1930s 
and 1940s.  Over the years immediately preceding World War II, Army construction experts 
examined a number of prefabricated housing systems in order to determine their suitability for 
either permanent or temporary construction.  They objected to all of the factory-fabricated 
products on several grounds, including their high cost and the fact that most required additional 
labor on-site.  When it came time to build training camps for the Second World War, Army 
officials decided against prefabrication in favor of a time-tested alternative:  wood construction 
using mass-production methods on site.  The Army’s disapproval of prefabricated housing, I 
suggest, helps explain private builders’ rejection of the same.  William Levitt and the other 
Merchant Builders of the postwar housing boom would make on-site mass-production famous, 
but its origins lay elsewhere. 
In chapter 5, “The Atomic City is a Suburb,” I look at the redesign of Oak Ridge, 
Tennessee, a Manhattan Project town, after World War II.  In 1948, the Army asked Skidmore, 
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Owings & Merrill, whose earlier plan for the community had been rendered obsolete by a 
population boom, to revisit the site and consider its future as a self-governed town.  SOM’s 
Master Plan for Oak Ridge, I argue, epitomized contemporary anti-urban sentiment.  For one 
thing, the Master Plan followed the Garden City model of urban planning, in which metropolitan 
regions are replaced by decentralized networks of low-density, size-limited communities.  For 
another, SOM proposed protecting its plan through deed or lease restrictions, which were 
developed specifically within residential suburbs to counter the urban tendencies of densification 
and heterogeneity.  I conclude by looking at the 1960s New Town of Columbia, Maryland as the 
logical successor to the Oak Ridge Master Plan. 
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Chapter 1:  The Army Post as Model City: World War I Cantonments and 
Contemporary Town Planning 
 
Introduction 
“This is the biggest construction job New England has ever known,” a newspaper reporter 
wrote during the July 1917 construction of Camp Devens, a National Army cantonment in 
Massachusetts.  “The creation of a magic city by a force of civilians is one of the wonders of the 
world.  When Chicago raised the great ‘White City’ on the shores of her lake the world 
wondered, but Chicago had years to accomplish the undertaking,” he went on, referring to the 
architectural centerpiece of the 1893 World’s Columbian Exposition.  “[The Chicago fair’s] 
buildings were only for temporary display.  [Camp Devens] is being built for permanent 
habitation.  It is doubtful if anywhere in the world was so great a work accomplished in so short 
a time.”41 
This newspaperman was just one of many contemporary observers to characterize the 
training camps of World War I as complete cities, magic or otherwise.42  Among the most vocal 
proponents of the analogy were the civilian architects and landscape architects hired by the Army 
to lay out the cantonments during the first summer of America’s involvement in the war.  These 
                                            
41 “Building a City for 50,000 Almost ‘Overnight,’” Boston Herald, July 29, 1917 (emphasis mine). 
42 Herbert J. Kellaway, “Camp Devens: The Cantonment at Ayer, Mass.,” Landscape Architecture 8 (January 1918): 
69, http://books.google.com/books?id=2vfmAAAAMAAJ (accessed September 9, 2012); Nelson Lloyd, “Our 
Soldier Towns,” Scribner’s Magazine 62 (September 1917): 332. 
   21 
men, who together constituted the leadership of the nascent city planning movement in the 
United States, drew on earlier, primarily theoretical, research in community design to plan the 
Army camps.  After the war they pointed to their Army work as evidence of the efficacy of 
comprehensive planning, in a bid to establish the legitimacy of city planning as a profession.  
Three aspects of the civilian planners’ work for the Army connect their wartime 
experience to the history of American city planning more generally.  First, in attending to Army 
officials’ concern for the expansibility of the training camps, the designers solidified their 
definition of planning as the preparation of a flexible program to guide a city’s future physical 
development.  These men looked to the City Beautiful plans of the recent past, including Daniel 
Burnham’s and Edward Bennett’s 1909 plan for Chicago, as models for the centralized, 
expandable cities they imagined the training camps to be. 
Second, and quite apart from the Army program, the cantonment planners wrestled with 
the relationship of aesthetics to function in the city plan.  Different designers arrived at different 
solutions to the problem:  some, as befit their background as landscape architecture, relied on 
nature—in the form of existing trees and new plantings—to relieve the monotony of the training 
camps.  Others, per the City Beautiful mandate, considered aesthetics and function 
simultaneously in making their plans.  Still others, heralding the arrival of the City Practical 
movement, argued that beauty would necessarily follow from an efficient layout, and thus did 
not need to be consciously applied by the designer. 
Finally, the city planners engaged in Army work began to reimagine their practice in 
terms of cooperation, rather than as a solo artistic endeavor.  The men responsible for laying out 
the cantonments of World War I were never without the assistance of experts from other fields, 
be they sanitation engineers or Army men familiar with training requirements.  The definition of 
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the city planner as coordinator would be the prevailing one after the war’s end, another important 
departure from the City Beautiful model of urban design. 
This chapter begins with a brief introduction to the World War I cantonment planners, 
with special attention to their professional affiliations and past planning experience.  It then turns 
to the cantonment plans themselves, and looks at how the planners dealt with three particular 
problems:  planning for future development; the aesthetics of the Army camp; and the role of the 
city planner vis a vis experts from other fields.  Next it considers the revised set of typical 
cantonment plans prepared by the Quartermaster Corps in early 1918, which marked the 
transformation of the cantonments from temporary Army camps into centralized communities.  
The chapter concludes with an overview of how the cantonment planners’ experience contributed 
to the professionalization of city planning, especially with respect to the founding of the first 
graduate program in the field in 1922. 
 
The Cantonment Planners 
The camp planning program was as much under civilian as under military direction.  The 
official head of cantonment construction was Col. Isaac W. Littell, chief of the newly-formed 
Cantonment Division of the Army Quartermaster Corps.43  But from the very beginning of his 
tenure, Littell worked closely with a number of prominent civilian designers.  These included the 
members of the Council of National Defense’s44 Committee on Emergency Construction of 
                                            
43 Office of the Construction Division of the Army, Report of the Chief of the Construction Division to the Secretary 
of War, 1919 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1920), 1.  The Cantonment Division was created May 
19, 1917.  Littell was formerly head of the Construction & Repair Division of the Quartermaster Corps. 
44 Lloyd, “Our Soldier Towns,” 331.  Created by the Army Appropriation Act of August 19, 1916, the Council of 
National Defense consisted of the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor, who 
were charged with the coordination of industries and resources for national security. 
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Buildings and Engineering Structures, and the architects and landscape architects recruited to 
help with field planning. 
Two of the members of the Committee on Emergency Construction were leaders in the 
fields of construction and landscape architecture, respectively.  William A. Starrett, the chair of 
the committee, went to school at the University of Michigan before joining the George A. Fuller 
Co., a major New York City contracting firm.  He left the firm and, with his brother Theodore, 
founded a competing construction company, Thompson-Starrett.  In 1913, the year Thompson-
Starrett built the Woolworth Building,45 Starrett left the business and joined the architectural firm 
of Starrett & van Vleck, which specialized in department-store design.46 
The second member of the Committee on Emergency Construction, Frederick Law 
Olmsted, Jr.,47 was past president of the American Society of Landscape Architects; past chair of 
the National Conference on City Planning; and, as of May 1917, the first president of the 
American City Planning Institute (later the American Institute of Planners).  Olmsted’s father, 
Frederick Law Olmsted, Sr., had played a pivotal role in the design and operation of the park 
systems of New York City, Boston, Rochester, and elsewhere.  As an apprentice to Olmsted, Sr., 
Olmsted, Jr. worked on the Chicago World’s Columbian Exposition (1893).  Two years later, 
upon their father’s retirement, Olmsted and his half brother John Charles Olmsted took over the 
                                            
45 Alan Michelson, “Thompson-Starrett Company, Building Contractors,” Pacific Coast Architecture Database, 
https://digital.lib.washington.edu/architect/partners/3637/ (accessed September 8, 2012). 
46 George Martin, “Maj. Starrett Took Pains to Prevent Graft,” Taunton Gazette (Taunton, MA), September 20, 
1917. Goldwin Starrett was a partner in Starrett & van Vleck.; 
47 Olmsted first connected with Starrett as a member of a three-person commission sent to Washington, DC in May 
1917 by the National Conference on City Planning.  Olmsted, with architect George B. Ford and engineer E. P. 
Goodrich, delivered several NCCP resolutions first to the chairman of the General Munitions Board, then to the 
Committee on Emergency Construction.  Olmsted was soon asked to join the latter subcommittee.  In its resolutions, 
the NCCP urged the federal government to use city planning principles in building Army camps and workers’ 
housing, and to seek advice on the same from its membership.  Meeting minutes reproduced in Office of the 
Construction Division of the Army, Report of the Chief of the Construction Division to the Secretary of War, 1918 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1919), 7-8. 
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practice, implementing comprehensive landscape plans for a number of university campuses, as 
well as private estates and public parks and park systems.  Olmsted also mentored a number of 
American landscape architects and city planners, both at the family firm and as a professor at 
Harvard University (1900-1914), where he developed the first landscape architecture curriculum 
in the nation.  At various times throughout his career he worked for the federal government, most 
significantly as a member of the 1901 Senate Park Commission tasked with preparing plans for 
the expansion of Washington, DC (the McMillan Plan), and in an advisory capacity as a member 
of the Commission of Fine Arts.48 
The Committee on Emergency Construction sent a call to civilian engineers, architects, 
and landscape architects, asking them to consider consulting for the Cantonment Division.49  
Many of the men at the forefront of the city planning movement responded.  Taken together, 
their experience in community planning illustrates the breadth of the profession in its earliest 
decades. 
At least nineteen individuals were responsible for planning the sixteen cantonments, from 
preliminary inspections to the start of construction.  (See table for a full list of the planners and 
their camp affiliations.)  All but four had trained as landscape architects; Edward H. Bennett and 
Owen Brainard were architects, and L. V. Sheridan and E. N. Noyes were engineers.  Of the 
fifteen landscape architects, only one, Harlan Kelsey, was not made a fellow of the American 
                                            
48 Rolf Diamant, “Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr., 1870-1957,” National Park Service Discover History Cultural 
Resources, http://www.cr.nps.gov/history/online_books/sontag/olmsted.htm (accessed September 8, 2012); Jon A. 
Peterson, “The Birth of Organized City Planning in the United States, 1909-1910,” Journal of the American 
Planning Association 75, no. 2 (Spring 2009): 129; “Frederick Law Olmsted Dies; Landscape Architect Was 87,” 
New York Times, December 27, 1957. 
49 George Gibbs, Jr., “Exhibit 2-C Historical Statement Section of Advisory Engineer on Camp Planning, 
Engineering Division, Construction Division of the Army,” 1, Frances Loeb Library, Harvard University; Warren H. 
Manning, “Planning the Cantonments: The Work of the American Society of Landscape Architects in Their 
Design,” American City 18, no. 4 (April 1918): 331.  Before leaving the NCCP for Washington, Olmsted, Goodrich, 
and Ford had sent telegrams containing a similar message to their professional contacts. 
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Society of Landscape Architects.  Like Olmsted, most also held leadership roles in the ASLA at 
some point during their careers.50  Many of the men, in addition, were affiliated with the 
National Conference on City Planning and/or the American City Planning Institute either before 
or after the war.  For instance, Edward H. Bennett, Henry V. Hubbard, George Kessler, and 
James S. Pray, together with Olmsted, were all charter members of the American City Planning 
Institute.51 
In addition, many of the cantonment planners had connections to Olmsted, the 
acknowledged father of American city planning.  Warren H. Manning apprenticed with Olmsted, 
Sr., during which time he oversaw the final planting scheme for the 1893 World’s Columbian 
Exposition.52  J. S. Pray chaired the Department of Landscape Architecture at Harvard, which 
curriculum Olmsted, Jr. had helped develop.53  S. Herbert Hare was a student of Olmsted’s at the 
same university.54  And Thomas W. Sears worked for the Olmsted Brothers firm for two years.55 
 
 
                                            
50 American Society of Landscape Architects, “Leadership & Governance,” 
http://www.asla.org/Leadershiphandbook.aspx?id=3754&ItemIdString=eeb11f839_34_110_3754 (accessed 
September 8, 2012). 
51 Mel Scott, American City Planning since 1890 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971): 164. 
52 Robin Karson, “Warren H. Manning: Pragmatist in the Wild Garden,” in Nature and Ideology: Natural Garden 
Design in the Twentieth Century, ed. Joachim Wolschke-Bulmahn, Dumbarton Oaks Colloquium on the History of 
Landscape Architecture (Washington, DC: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, 1997), 
http://www.doaks.org/resources/publications/doaks-online-publications/garden-and-landscape-
studies/nature/natur007.pdf (accessed September 8, 2012). 
53 J. S. Pray, “The Dept. of Landscape Architecture in Harvard University,” Landscape Architecture 1, no. 2 
(January 1911): 53-70. 
54 The Cultural Landscape Foundation, “S. Herbert Hare,” http://tclf.org/content/s-herbert-hare (accessed 
September 8, 2012). 
55 Thomas Warren Sears Collection, “Biographical Note,” Smithsonian Gardens, http://gardens.si.edu/collections-
research/aag-sears-collection.html (accessed September 8, 2012). 
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Table of World War I Cantonment Planners56 
Cantonment Location Preliminary Planner Field Planner (if 
different) 
Camp Custer Battle Creek, Michigan Thomas W. Sears  
Camp Devens Ayer, Massachusetts H. J. Kellaway  
Camp Dix Wrightstown, New Jersey Charles W. Leavitt, Jr.  
Camp Dodge Des Moines, Iowa Robert Wheelwright  
Camp Funston Fort Riley, Kansas J. S. Pray J. S. Pray, S. Herbert Hare 
Camp Gordon Atlanta, Georgia A. F. Brinkerhoff, C. N. Lowrie Charles N. Lowrie 
Camp Grant Rockford, Illinois Edward H. Bennett  
Camp Jackson Columbia, South Carolina 
Richard Schermerhorn, 
Jr.  
Camp Lee Petersburg, Virginia James L. Greenleaf  
Camp Lewis American Lake, Washington C. F. Pilat  
Camp Meade Admiral, Maryland  Owen Brainard 
Camp Pike Little Rock, Arkansas George E. Kessler, L. V. Sheridan  
Camp Sherman Chillicothe, Ohio Warren H. Manning Warren H. Manning 
Camp Taylor Louisville, Kentucky Harlan P. Kelsey  
Camp Travis Fort Sam Houston, Texas 
George E. Kessler, E. 
N. Noyes  
Camp Upton Yaphank, Long Island, New York Owen Brainard F. Vitale 
 
Finally, the men responsible for planning the World War I Army cantonments were 
engaged in the kinds of projects that constituted the lodestones of early-twentieth century 
American city planning.  The German-born George Kessler was best known for his park and 
                                            
56 Sources: Gibbs, “Exhibit 2-C,” 6; “War Records of Those Who Were Fellows and Members,” in Transactions of 
the American Society of Landscape Architects, eds. Carl Rust Parker, Bremer W. Pond, and Theodora Kimball 
(Amsterdam, NY: The Recorder Press, 1922), 75-80 http://books.google.com/books?id=wKTNAAAAMAAJ 
(accessed September 8, 2012); Report of the Chief of the Construction Division to the Secretary of War, 1918. 
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parkway systems, including designs for Kansas City, Missouri; Dallas; Houston; St. Louis; 
Denver; Cincinnati; and Indianapolis.57  Edward Bennett, who received a diploma in architecture 
from the École des Beaux-Arts in 1902, partnered with Daniel Burnham on the 1909 plan for 
Chicago, a major landmark in the history of American urbanism58.  Warren H. Manning planned 
a number of company towns or workers’ housing settlements, including for the Cleveland-Cliffs 
Iron Company in the Upper Peninsula of Michigan59, the Arizona and Calument Mining 
Company in Arizona60, and Goodyear Tire and Rubber in Ohio.61  S. Herbert Hare would plan 
the new town of Longview, Washington shortly after the war.62  And concurrently with their 
work for the Army, a number of the cantonment planners—including A. F. Brinkerhoff, James 
Greenleaf, H. J. Kellaway, George Kessler, Charles Lowrie, Warren Manning, E. N. Noyes, and 
J. S. Pray63—laid out housing developments for war workers for the United States Housing 
                                            
57 Jane Roy Brown, “Restoring Kessler’s Legacy,” Landscape Architecture 97, no. 9 (September 2007):70.  During 
his four-decade career, Kessler also planned some 26 residential communities, 49 parks, and 26 school campuses.. 
58 Francis S. Swales, “Master Draftsmen, XIV: Edward H. Bennett,” Pencil Points 6, no. 3 (August 1925): 43, 49. 
59 Arnold R. Alanen and Lynn Bjorkman, “Plats, Parks, Playgrounds, and Plants: Warren H. Manning’s Landscape 
Designs for the Mining Districts of Michigan’s Upper Peninsula, 1899-1932,” Journal of the Society for Industrial 
Archeology 24, no. 1 (1998): 42-46. 
60 Dixie Legler, “The Forgotten City Beautiful,” American Bungalow, no. 40 (Winter 2003): 125-130. 
61 “Goodyear Heights, Akron, Ohio,” Architectural Forum 28, no.4 (April 1918): 140-142. Warren H. Manning was 
the landscape designer for the project.  George H. Schwan (or Schwann) was the architect. 
62 S. Herbert Hare, “The Planning of the Industrial City of Longview, Washington,” Transactions (American 
Society of Civil Engineers), paper no. 1671, reprinted from Transactions 92 (1928), 756.  Though the development 
of Longview was funded by the Long-Bell Lumber Company, its owners claimed not to be creating a company 
town, and instead opened the community to other industries. 
63 “War Records,” in Transactions of the American Society of Landscape Architects, 75-80.  Brinkerhoff was Town 
Planner for the USHC projects at Staten Island, NY and Elizabeth NJ.  Greenleaf was Town Planner at Charleston, 
WV.  Kellaway was Town Planner for Quincy, MA and Port Penn, PA.  Kessler was the Project Town Planner for 
the USHC’s midwestern projects.  Lowrie was the Landscape Architect and Town Planner at New London, CT, 
Groton, CT, New Brunswick, CT, and Alton, IL.  Manning was Landscape Architect and Town Planner at Lowell, 
MA.  Noyes was Assistant Town Planner at Davenport, IA, Moline, IL, East Moline, IL, and Rock Island, IL.  Pray 
was Landscape Architect and Town Planner at Seven Pines, VA and Ernston, NJ. 
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Corporation (USHC).64  In addition, H. V. Hubbard was assistant manager to the Town Planning 
Division of the USHC, and S. Herbert Hare worked as a district planner for the agency.65 
 
Planning the Training Camps 
The cantonment planners’ primary responsibility was to translate the typical training-
camp plan prepared by the Quartermaster Corps into a particular plan for each site.  The 
Quartermaster Corps had first mapped out an ideal cantonment in April 1917.  In this plan (see 
figure 1.1), based on recent experience on the Mexican Border and at active Army posts,66 the 
personnel comprising a single infantry division of about 26,000 troops are arrayed by unit in a U 
around a central parade ground. A main road and railroad running in parallel describe the U, and 
additional service roads run from the main road between columns of barracks, terminating in a 
circle facing the parade ground. Cutting across the mouth of the U is another road, at the center 
of which is the division headquarters. 
                                            
64 Scott, American City Planning Since 1890, 172. The USHC’s initial program called for government-funded 
construction of 67 housing settlements in 47 cities.  The armistice reduced the number of projects completed to 27, 
with a total of 6,000 housing units.  None of the houses were occupied prior to the end of the war.  The homes were 
sold to individual homeowners beginning in July 1919.  The housing settlements, which after sales and salvage cost 
the government $25,000,000, were praised for the quality of their planning.   
65 United States Department of Labor, Organization, Policies, Transactions, vol. 1, Report of the United States 
Housing Corporation (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1920), 64 
http://books.google.com/books?id=4GwAAAAAYAAJ (accessed September 9, 2012).  Olmsted was the first 
manager of the USHC’s Town Planning Division. 
66 Office of the Construction Division of the Army, Report of the Chief of the Construction Division to the Secretary 
of War, 1919. 
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Figure 1.1:  Typical Cantonment Scheme, April 1917.  Published in George Gibbs, Jr., 
“Exhibit 2-C: Historical Statement, Section of Advisory Engineer on Camp Planning, 
Engineering Division, Construction Division of the Army,” Frances Loeb Library, Harvard 
University. 
 
In this scheme, the soldiers are housed in long one-story barracks arranged in columns 
parallel to the main road, each with a separate mess building between it and its nearest track-side 
neighbor. At one end of each barracks building is a separate lavatory building laid perpendicular 
to the barracks and kitchens. Specialty companies sleep and eat in shorter buildings between the 
other enlisted men and the railroad tracks. On the opposite side of the tracks are storehouses, also 
parallel to the road, and, beyond the road itself, rows of stables and shops. Non-infantry units 
have additional storage or shop facilities beyond these. The officers’ buildings are arranged 
between the enlisted men’s barracks and the parade ground, each with a separate, square lavatory 
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building. Between the officers’ and enlisted men’s housing for each unit are service buildings: a 
guard house; a medical building; a school or assembly hall; a post exchange; and, in the center, 
an administration building. 
As pictured in the Quartermaster Corps’s April 1917 drawings, each division comprises 
primarily infantry units (three brigades, or nine regiments), with in addition a single artillery 
brigade (two regiments), one regiment of cavalry, and, situated along the bottom of the U, a 
supply train, an engineer train, an ammunition train, and one regiment of engineers. To either 
side of the division headquarters are a sanitary train and a signal field battalion and aero squad.67 
Though the drawings are marked as “suggestion only”, with a note advising modification 
according to topographic conditions, they nonetheless make clear the relationship among units, 
as well as the relationship between officers and men, considered by the Construction and Repair 
division to be most productive to the task at hand—the conversion of hundreds of thousands of 
civilian men into soldiers. Besides the attention to sanitation evidenced by the separation of 
kitchens from sleeping quarters, sleeping quarters from lavatories, and animals from men, what 
is most remarkable about the April 1917 camp design is its combination of hierarchy and 
uniformity. While the officers and men are separated both spatially and in terms of their housing 
typology, the regularity of the camp as a whole affirms the Progressive vision of the standing 
army as a leveler of difference. 
The Construction Division published a second set of typical cantonment plans in June 
1917 (see figure 1.2), based on revisions made by Quartermaster Corps staff in collaboration 
with Starrett and Olmsted’s Committee on Emergency Construction.  The revised plans reflected 
the new, much higher, construction cost estimates released at the end of May.  To keep expenses 
                                            
67 “Temporary Buildings for Mobilization Camps” sheets 1 and 2, dated April 1917. Published in Gibbs, “Exhibit 2-
C,” following page 2. 
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within the bounds of the pending $77 million Congressional appropriation, the Secretary of War 
had reduced the total number of wooden cantonments from 32 to 16.  The National Guard would 
be housed in tent camps.  In addition, Secretary Baker instructed camp planners “to economize 
on design, so far as possible.”68 
                                            
68 Office of the Construction Division of the Army, Report of the Chief of the Construction Division to the Secretary 
of War, 1918; Plans published in Gibbs, “Exhibit 2-C.” 
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The typical cantonment plans dated June 1917 are still defined by the U shape, though a 
second main road has been added to the camps between each unit and the brigade headquarters 
buildings. The crosswise service roads remain, cutting between the two main roads to slice the U 
into rectangular blocks. A second railroad track, a siding, parallels the main line between it and 
the outermost main road. 
Though the June scheme houses almost twice as many soldiers as the April one, it is at 
the same time more compressed, with only two-thirds the distance between service roads. Like in 
the preliminary plans, the June layouts show each regiment of infantry inhabiting one and one-
half blocks, with two columns of barracks between each pair of service roads. In the June 
diagram, however, the soldiers are housed in two-story barracks with attached kitchens. The 
lavatory buildings are parallel, rather than perpendicular, to the barracks.  The machine gun, 
supply, and headquarters companies are situated in a row between the infantry barracks and the 
main road, as in the April diagrams. But the June scheme has the machine gun company in a 
combined barrack-mess building identical to that housing the other soldiers, and the headquarters 
and supply companies are in square buildings attached to one another, also with interior kitchens. 
The post exchange is in the same row of buildings, with lavatories for the specialty companies 
between their barracks and the outer main road, rather than parallel to them. Storehouses are 
lined up against the siding track, and opposite the main track are stables, troughs, a wagon shed, 
a guard house, and a shop within a fenced corral. Opposite the inside main road from the 
infantrymen are the remaining community buildings (only the post exchange has moved to the 
outside of the barracks area since the April drawings), then a row of officers’ quarters. Like the 
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enlisted barracks, the officers’ buildings have interior kitchens, with smaller lavatories (two per 
building) between them and the parade grounds. 
As in the April plans, in the June typical cantonment scheme the regiments of infantry 
(seven) and artillery (three) are ranged along both arms of the U, grouped into brigades. The 
brigade headquarters group—expanded to five buildings, excluding the latrines, from the single 
battalion headquarters building shown in the Construction and Repair Division plans—is located 
on the parade side of the group, at the end of one of the service roads. Also unchanged from the 
earlier scheme is the location of the supply and ammunition chains at the base of the U. But the 
engineers train has been relocated from the bottom of the U to the nearest end of one arm, 
directly adjacent to the brigade of artillery. The sanitary train is immediately opposite. The other 
groups, the aero squadron, the field signal battery, and the division headquarters, were located on 
a road connecting the two arms at the top of the U in the April diagram. In the second set of 
plans, these three units are halfway down one arm of the U, adjacent to one another and to one 
brigade of infantry. No road now cuts across the mouth of the U. 
In all, besides the substitution of two-story for one-story barracks, the typical cantonment 
scheme changed little between April and June of 1917.  Among the more noticeable revisions 
was the relocation of the headquarters group from a ceremonial to a central location; and, with 
the addition of a second major roadway, the clear division of the camp into city-type blocks. 
But while their definition of city planning as the prediction of future development 
dovetailed nicely with Army requirements, the cantonment planners of World War I were also 
concerned with aesthetics, an aspect of camp planning to which Army officials paid little 
attention.  Different planners defined the relationship between function and form in the military 
training camp differently:  the more landscape-oriented planners concerned themselves with the 
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relationship of the built environment to nature; other planners argued for compositions that took 
aesthetics into account from the very beginning; and still another group of designers insisted that 
beauty would naturally follow from a carefully-ordered plan.  In their various approaches to 
urban aesthetics, the cantonment planners proved themselves to be very much of their time.  As 
Jon Peterson and others have shown,69 the years just before and after World War I were a time of 
great intellectual turmoil for the burgeoning city planning profession, as proponents moved the 
practice away from its origins in landscape architecture and park planning; and as Olmsted and 
others effected a shift from the City Beautiful to the function-based City Practical approach to 
urban design. 
L. V. Sheridan and Warren H. Manning looked to their training as landscape architects to 
bring a greater degree of beauty to their cantonment designs, advocating minimal tree removal, 
and encouraging the Army to consider planting schemes for the camps.  Sheridan emphasized the 
link between the presence of shade trees and soldiers’ comfort.  “Under the stress of emergency 
construction, it is almost impossible to give careful thought to just what trees should be 
preserved,” he acknowledged.  But this did not let camp planners off the hook:  “It is therefore 
strongly recommended,” he concluded, “that the slogan adopted at the start of work at Camp 
Pike—that a tree can be cut down at any time but that it takes years to grow one—be followed at 
other camps.”70  According to Manning, the order to preserve trees where possible was soon 
confirmed by the War Department.71 
                                            
69 Peterson, “The Birth of Organized City Planning.” 
70 Lawrence V. Sheridan, “Planning a War Cantonment,” in Proceedings of the Tenth National Conference on City 
Planning (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1918), 134-5. 
71 Manning, “Planning the Cantonments,” 336. 
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Manning suggested that officers and draftees could execute planting plans at low cost, 
thus reducing “the extreme bareness of most of the cantonments.”72  Sheridan went in a different 
direction:  he hoped to use Camp Pike as a demonstration project for the War Department.  A 
successful planting scheme enacted there might convince officials to hire another group of 
consultants, these landscape architects, “to supervise the preparation of plans for the 
beautification of all the cantonments.  Under such a policy,” Sheridan explained, “the roughly 
built cities would finally be developed into really beautiful communities.”  Any less coordinated 
approach to the landscape architecture of the camps, such as putting each regiment in charge of 
the planting of its own area, would not have the same long-term effects on soldiers’ health and 
happiness.73 
Edward Bennett took a different approach to cantonment beautification.  Camp aesthetics 
should be a primary consideration of the camp planner, not an afterthought as in the landscape 
architects’ method, Bennett argued.  His insistence that the achievement of beauty required 
conscious application on the part of the city planner was not surprising given Bennett’s status as 
City-Beautiful icon; the City Beautiful movement, as its critics have pointed out, elevated the 
importance of monumental architecture and the framing of views to such an extent that it ignored 
certain social problems, including housing. 
Bennett articulated his position on cantonment aesthetics at the tenth National Conference 
on City Planning, in a critique of Sheridan’s design for Camp Pike.  Sheridan had missed “a very 
fine opportunity to maintain the principles of city planning and to maintain the finer elements in 
distinction from those which were purely utilitarian,” Bennett argued.  Specifically, Sheridan had 
                                            
72 Ibid. 
73 Sheridan, “Planning a War Cantonment,” 142. 
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located the quartermaster’s distribution center at the center of the plan, where “its growth will 
more than ever tend to break up the central area, your drill ground, and disturb the order of the 
whole cantonment.”  Yes, the location of the distribution hub at the very center of the 
cantonment made the most practical sense, but Bennett speculated “that this might have been 
placed to one side and still been the center of distribution.”  He concluded:  “I simply want to 
make the point that as city planners I think we should recognize that the utility idea is not 
necessarily inclusive of the form idea, or of fineness of form and arrangement.”74 
Yet another view with respect to the role of beauty in cantonment design was articulated 
by James S. Pray.  Outsiders had criticized the uniformity of the camps as lacking in aesthetic 
merit:  “It is not what you would call lovely from an architectural view-point,” a reporter wrote 
of the Navy training camp at Quantico, Virginia.  “Row on row of frame houses, one story high, 
ninety-eight feet long by twenty wide, stretching away from you with such monotony as to seem 
endless are, in fact, rather unlovely to the eye.”75  But Pray argued that this man and others had 
seen the camps while they were still under construction, with the attendant chaos of materials 
and crews, while the buildings still “suffer[ed] in appearance from a certain rawness inevitable 
with their newness.”  “When all this is allowed for, and it is borne in mind that these towns, 
instead of being built to enduring for many years . . . , are frankly temporary creations,” Pray 
went on: 
it remains notable that some of these cantonments already have a considerable measure of 
organic beauty.  When these strongly and clearly organized communities are really 
complete and have been subject to a few months of systematic use, they will be visually 
                                            
74 Bennett’s comments were published in Sheridan, “Planning a War Cantonment,” 145;  Goodrich disagreed.  In 
comments following Bennett’s, he called the location of the quartermaster’s distribution facilities “paramount.”  “I 
think the matter of form should be thrown to the wind.  Very largely I believe not enough attention was given to this 
particular location, nor was enough care given to the location of main traffic ways.” 
75 Lloyd, “Our Soldier Towns,” 331. 
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even more satisfying as to reasonableness in design and construction, fit better with their 
surroundings, and indeed possess a surprising amount of functional interest and ordered 
beauty.76 
 
Even Sheridan, focused though he was on the potential of skilled landscaping to improve 
the cantonments’ appearance, observed that successful functional planning could result in 
pleasing forms.  In the rush to make the training camps ready for the soldiers’ arrival, he wrote, 
“there is little time left for deliberate study of its aesthetic possibilities.  Utility is the dominant 
objective of the design, and economy, particularly in times of excessive expenditures for war 
purposes is the second consideration.”  Sheridan concluded:  “But, as in many other designs 
primarily adapted to the uses to be made of them, a considerable beauty follows as a result of 
fitness to purpose.”77 
Pray and Sheridan’s assessment of the relationship between form and function had been 
summarized several years earlier by another cantonment planner, Richard Schermerhorn, Jr.  In 
an address to the Brooklyn Engineers’ Club, Schermerhorn asked which of the two competing 
planning orientations, the City Beautiful or the City Practical, was most important.  “By all 
means should City Practical come first,” he concluded.  Without considering the uses to which 
groups of buildings, parks, and boulevards would be put, the city’s beauty would be reduced to 
“scattering examples of decorative architecture, attractive sculpture and imposing monuments.  If 
the City Practical is first realized there is no doubt that the City Beautiful will follow as a matter 
of course.”78 
 
                                            
76 James Sturgis Pray, “Planning the Cantonments,” Landscape Architecture 8, no. 1 (October 1917): 16-17. 
77 Sheridan, “Planning a War Cantonment,” 141. 
78 Richard Schermerhorn, Jr., “City Planning,” Proceedings (Brooklyn Engineer’s Club) 16 (1912):102-143, 
http://www.library.cornell.edu/Reps/DOCS/schermer.htm (accessed September 9, 2012; emphasis Schermerhorn’s). 
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Planning for Future Growth 
With the Quartermaster Corps’s typical cantonment plans in hand, the civilian planners 
set out in city planner-engineer pairs to inspect the training camp sites chosen by the Army.79  
After reporting back to Washington on the conditions at each location, they began preparing 
particular plans for their assigned sites.  Per instructions issued by the Cantonment Division, the 
planners laid out each cantonment according to one overarching requirement:  the anticipation of 
future expansion. 
For the Army, expansibility was an important practical consideration given the 
uncertainty surrounding the American military mission in Europe.  Growth would come in one of 
two forms:  as the addition of personnel to an existing unit; or as the addition of new units to the 
division as a whole. Thus the camp plan had to be flexible both as a whole and on the level of the 
individual module.80 
For the cantonment planners, on the other hand, preparing for future development was not 
just a stop-gap acknowledgment of how much about their project remained undetermined; it was 
the very definition of the practice of city planning.  In his introduction to the 1916 volume City 
                                            
79 Gibbs, “Exhibit 2-C,” 3, 6.  The first field team left Washington on May 21, 1917.; Olmsted and the training-
camp planners complained that the sites chosen by Army officers gave little consideration to aesthetic or even 
practical engineering requirements.  Wrote L. V. Sheridan:  “[The site selection] boards did not in all cases consider 
the adaptability of the sites to the organization of an intelligent city plan.  Some of the plans were forced to be 
cramped or not capable of expansion on account of the natural confines of the tracts.  Others had to be content with 
excessive grades on the main traffic arteries, or else sacrifice orderliness in their arrangement.  The appointment of 
Boards composed of city planners and engineers as well as army officers would have eliminated many of these 
difficulties.”  Sheridan also had a problem with the way community boosters affected site selection.  In the case of 
his own project, for Camp Pike, Sheridan estimated that the Army would have saved “several hundred thousand 
dollars” in grading costs, had officers located the cantonment away from the site gifted by the town of Little Rock.  
The distance from the site to the nearest  rail line, moreover, delayed construction.  Crews moved materials by truck 
almost five miles from track to camp, when a different location would have eliminated this intermediary transport—
and negated the need to build a spur line to the cantonment.  “Competition [between localities] was to be expected 
and viewed from the standpoint of civic enterprise, it cannot be strongly censured,” Sheridan summarized, “but the 
fact remains that such influences should have had not weight whatever in the determination of location.”  Sheridan, 
“Planning a War Cantonment,” 127. 
80 Gibbs, “Exhibit 2-C,” 3-7. 
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Planning, edited by John Nolen, Olmsted wrote:  “The new and significant fact for which this 
new term, ‘city-planning,’ stands is a growing appreciation of a city’s organic unity, of the 
interdependence of its diverse elements, and of the profound and inexorable manner in which the 
future of this great organic unit is controlled by the actions and omissions of today.”81 
The training-camp planners articulated this vision of city planning in their work outside 
the Army.  In his 1910 plan for Cincinnati, for instance, George Kessler complained that 
American cities had in the past been laid out only to meet the needs of the present, “leaving to 
the holder of real estate or land the actual planning for the future city”; in particular, city-builders 
failed to consider communication lines “and the possible need of reaching further out into the 
country as the city grows, and still less in tying new things into the old.”  Thus much of Kessler’s 
work, like that of his contemporaries, was an effort at rebuilding rather than building from 
scratch.82  For those city planners commissioned to lay out new towns, proper planning meant 
avoiding such reconstruction.  B. L. Lambuth83 praised S. Herbert Hare’s postwar plan for the 
city of Longview on the basis of his use of a “skeletal” plan as recommended by developer J. C. 
Nichols.  In this kind of plan “the entire city site is completely planned and zoned and the actual 
development of each district is started in a small way in its proper relationship to a finished 
whole,” Lambuth explained, thus saving the town’s residents a substantial sum of money in the 
long run.84 
                                            
81 Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr., “Introduction,” in City Planning: A Series of Papers Presenting the Essential 
Elements of a City Plan, ed. John Nolen (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1916), 1, 
http://www.library.cornell.edu/Reps/DOCS/olmst_16.htm (accessed September 9, 2012). 
82 George E. Kessler, “The Plan of Cincinnati,” American City 2, no. 1 (January 1910): 3. 
83 Lambuth ran the Real Estate Department of the Longview Company, the town’s developer. 
84 Lambuth’s comments were published in Hare, “The Planning of the Industrial City of Longview,” 763. 
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In terms of cantonment planning, achieving expansibility meant doing away with the 
Quartermaster Corps’s U-shaped plan in favor of a radial scheme along the lines of Burnham and 
Bennett’s 1909 proposal for Chicago.  Several planners adopted the typical U shape almost 
exactly in their particular plans.85  At Camp Upton, Yaphank, Long Island, Owen Brainard and 
Ferruccio Vitale replicated the U precisely, altering the typical plan only by relocating the 
division headquarters from one arm of the U to a hilly road connecting the two arms at their 
midpoints.  Carl F. Pilat’s plan for Camp Lewis also shows a high degree of fidelity to the typical 
U, though its two arms flare outward at their ends, probably to accommodate the site’s 
topography.  At other cantonments the layout resembles less a U than two parallel bars of units:  
see Camps Dix, Jackson, Meade, Sherman, and Travis.  At Camp Pike, George E. Kessler and L. 
V. Sheridan came up with a similar plan, arranging the camp’s units into two side-by-side lines, 
one straight and one with a diagonal arm, again an adjustment for the local topography.  Camp 
Funston, at Fort Riley, Kansas, was laid out by J. S. Pray and S. Herbert Hare according to what 
might be called a three-bar scheme. 
Harlan P. Kelsey’s plan for Camp Zachary Taylor in Louisville, Kentucky would also 
have fallen into the U or double-bar category had not the circumstances of the site’s acquisition 
been so unusual.  The site, which was donated to the federal government by the Audubon Park 
Realty Company, nestles around the developer’s recently-completed Audubon Country Club and 
Audubon Park residential community.  Kelsey, faced with the challenge of fitting a U-shaped 
typical plan into a U-shaped site, arranged double rows of infantry units at right angles to one 
another at the eastern corner of the site.  The other facilities he wrapped around the north and 
west sides of the residential development. 
                                            
85 All sixteen plans were published in National Army Cantonments: Plans and Photographs, June 1918 (U.S.A.: 
Construction Division, War Department, 1918). 
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Planners at two other camps adopted what came to be known as the “shoe-string” 
configuration, arranging the units in one long line. At Camp Custer, Battle Creek, Michigan, T. 
W. Sears arrayed the cantonment’s units along a line curved to approximate the course of the 
Michigan Central Railroad, and the Kalamazoo River beyond.  Camp Lee, at Petersburg, 
Virginia (J. L. Greenleaf), is either a very open U or a very curved shoe-string. 
But the U, double-bar, and shoe-string plans had their drawbacks, particularly with 
respect to future growth.  Units could be added to the shoe-string plans at either end, but doing so 
would make the distance between the start and finish of the camp—already three miles under the 
typical scheme86—so large as to make intra-camp communication and movement difficult. 
Similarly, a U or double-bar plan could only be expanded horizontally without recourse to 
stacking units (as at Camp Funston).  As Sheridan explained in reference to Camp Pike’s double-
bar:  “In one way in particular the . . . plan failed.  That was in the provision for expansion.  
Compactness and orderliness were well developed but the addition of more units would have 
disrupted its organization.”87 
Thus, at the remaining camps the planners departed from the U plan and instead projected 
rows of units from a central point.  The L-shaped plans at Camps Gordon and Dodge represent 
half-measures in this respect.  One can imagine that A. F. Brinckerhoff and C. N. Lowrie built a 
right a right-angle into the plan for Camp Gordon, near Atlanta, not out of a concern for 
extensibility so much as for practical reasons having to do with the arrangement of the railroad 
lines or the site’s topography; otherwise, the headquarters group would be located at the apex of 
the angle rather than at the end of one of the arms.  In Robert Wheelwright’s plan for Camp 
                                            
86 Kellaway, “Camp Devens,” 71. 
87 Sheridan, “Planning a War Cantonment,” 136. 
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Dodge, in Des Moines, Iowa, the hospital group, the arrangement of the various groups seems 
more deliberate.  There, the field signal battalion, the supply, ammunition, and sanitary trains, 
and the infantry regiments are arrayed along three lines extending out from or parallel to the 
main railroad tracks, roughly centered on the camp’s civic center. 
Two cantonment schemes, H. J. Kellaway’s for Camp Devens at Ayer, Massachusetts, 
and Edward H. Bennett’s for Camp Grant, at Rockford Illinois (see figures 1.3 and 1.4), departed 
most radically from the typical U plans in their concern for expansibility.  At first glance, 
Kellaway’s layout looks like a cross between a double-bar plan and a shoe-string plan, with most 
of the infantry units set in two parallel rows, the remaining units forming a broad W from the end 
of the infantry bars in the west to Robbin’s Pond in the south.  But Kellaway’s arrangement, 
which was born of Devens’s complicated topographical situation, in fact exploded the logic of 
the Quartermaster Corps’s ideal scheme.  Kellaway explained:   
In making the study it was at once evident that the typical open-end horseshoe layout 
would be impossible, and that a new scheme was needed to fit the topography.  With this 
in mind, the units, plotted on plan at the scale of the topographic map, were cut up into 
strips like city blocks and fitted like a picture puzzle about the topography until a simple 
arrangement could be obtained relating to the circulating railroad (afterward abandoned by 
the Cantonment Office in all camps) and to the highways.88 
 
                                            
88 Kellaway, “Camp Devens,” 72. 
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Figure 1.3:  Herbert J. Kellaway, Plan of Camp Devens.  Published in National Army 
Cantonments: Plans and Photographs, June 1918 (War Department, Construction 
Division, 1918). 
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Figure 1.4:  Edward H. Bennett, Plan of Camp Grant.  Published in National Army 
Cantonments. 
 
In Kellaway’s plan for Camp Devens, the location of the headquarters group at the center 
of the W is crucial:  it transforms the plan from an amalgamation of other types into an entirely 
radial scheme in which rows of infantry buildings (to the west and northwest) and columns of 
artillery buildings (to the east and northeast) extend out from a single point, the camp’s 
institutional and geographical center. 
In Edward H. Bennett’s plan for Camp Grant, at Rockford, Illinois, the symbolic import 
of the headquarters group as cantonment center was even more well defined, as he situated it 
between the Rock River and a traffic circle uniting the two branches of the camp.  To the north 
of the headquarters group stretch the engineers, supply, ammunition, and motor pool groups, 
capped by the base hospital; to the southwest is a U-shaped arrangement of infantry brigades 
around a secondary center and traffic circle.  In Bennett’s design, the two-dimensional scheme 
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proposed by the Quartermaster Corps is transformed into a complete city plan with possibilities 
for expansion in every direction. 
Bennett and Kellaway’s solution to the expansibility problem—the combination of an 
urban grid with diagonal streets connecting the city center to the outermost sections of the city—
was not an on-the-spot innovation.  Rather, the radial plan was a defining characteristic of the 
City Beautiful tradition within which most of the cantonment planners were trained.  
Contemporary observers, including camp planner Richard Schermerhorn, Jr., traced the 
inspiration for the City Beautiful’s diagonal boulevards to Baron Haussmann’s 1850-1870 
renovation of Paris under Napoleon Bonaparte89.  In the United States, the first radial plan for a 
major city was the 1901 McMillan Plan for Washington, DC, on which Olmsted and Daniel 
Burnham collaborated with architect Charles McKim and sculptor Augustus St. Gaudens.90  The 
decade that followed saw an explosion of City Beautiful proposals for urban areas all over the 
United States, among them:  Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, for which Warren Manning served as 
landscape architect; Detroit, on which Olmsted and C. M. Robinson reported; Baltimore, on 
which Olmsted collaborated with two others; Kansas City, Missouri, in a plan by George 
Kessler; Cincinnati, also planned by George Kessler; and Columbus, Ohio, for which C. N. 
Lowrie served as landscape architect.91 
The 1909 plan for Chicago, prepared by Daniel Burnham and E. H. Bennett (see figure 
1.5), was the culmination of these early efforts and served as the model for later plans, including 
perhaps Bennett’s plan for Camp Grant.  In fact, the plan for the Illinois cantonment resembles a 
                                            
89 Schermerhorn, “City Planning.” 
90 Peter Hall, Cities of Tomorrow, updated edition (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, Inc., 2000), 177-8. 
91 Schermerhorn, “City Planning.” 
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much-reduced version of the Chicago plan, stretching as it does along a waterway, with a grand 
circle at its center.  The transfer of the City Beautiful approach from bustling metropolis to built-
from-scratch Army city made a certain amount of sense, as it did the same things for each place:  
it connected the inner- and outermost sections of the city and organized its future growth; it set 
the community’s ceremonial center apart from the rest of the city; and it established a spatial 
hierarchy between city center and periphery, and along and between the major boulevards. 
 
Figure 1.5:  Daniel H. Burnham and Edward H. Bennett.  Plan of Chicago, 1909.  
Published in Plan of Chicago (Chicago: The Commercial Club, 1909). 
 
Planning as Process, Not Product 
The cantonment planners heralded a third, less visible aspect of their war work as a 
defining feature of the profession of city planning:  the cantonment plans were the products not 
of a single master designer, but of a collaboration of experts in architecture and landscape 
architecture, engineering, sanitation, and military protocol.  This shift away from the 
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understanding of urban design as artistic product and towards planning as process was again part 
of the transition out of the City Beautiful era.  Olmsted in particular had by the start of World 
War I developed a sophisticated critique of aesthetically-oriented planning, and the extent to 
which it assigned a single expert—the master planner—responsibility for solving the complex 
physical, social, and economic problems the modern city faced.92 
The success of the cantonment planning process appeared to vindicate exactly the kind of 
cooperative enterprise that Olmsted promoted.  From the beginning of their engagement in the 
Army program, the camp planners were never alone; they made their preliminary site visits, for 
example, in the company of a civilian engineer, and the execution of their plans was overseen by 
an Army officer, the camp Constructing Quartermaster.  “In this way,” wrote Pray, “by 
cooperation from the start between men of different special trainings, many mistakes which 
would have been made by any one of them alone were avoided, and particularly was it possible 
in the problem as a whole to reach quicker decisions, thus speeding up the whole preliminary 
investigation and planning, and hastening the beginning of construction.”93 
Within two decades of the Great War’s end, the definition of city planning as a 
cooperative endeavor had been cemented, at least at Harvard University, home of the first 
graduate school program in city planning.  In 1934 Henry Hubbard, a cantonment planner who 
taught in that department and who one decade earlier had co-founded the journal City 
Planning,94 wrote that city planning was “broader than” architecture, landscape architecture, or 
engineering, “and is the result of their cooperation with one another and with many other 
                                            
92 Peterson, “The Birth of Organized City Planning,” 129-131. 
93 Pray, “Planning the Cantonments,” 3. 
94 Eran Ben-Joseph, “Henry V. Hubbard, 1875-1947,” Workers’ Paradise: The Forgotten Communities of World 
War I, http://web.mit.edu/ebj/www/ww1/Biography-Hubbard.html (accessed September 9, 2012). 
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professions and businesses.”  “City planning is a cooperative enterprise in which no man is likely 
to succeed unless he possess in marked degree the ability to work in harmony with others,—
professional men, citizens, political leaders, and others,” Hubbard went on.  “The task of a city 
planner is inevitably that of a coordinator.”95 
 
Defining the Ideal Cantonment 
The cantonment planners, many of whom continued to work for the Army until war’s 
end, did not just infuse their individual designs with concerns drawn from their broader 
experience in city planning.  In early 1918, they had an opportunity to influence the future of the 
camp-planning program as a whole.  Beginning February 11, Lowrie, Kelsey, Hare, 
Wheelwright, Kessler, Kellaway, Carl R. Parker and W. D. Cook, Jr.96 travelled to all thirty-two 
Army cantonments and National Guard camps on a tour of inspection for the Cantonment 
Division.  (The National Guard tent camps were laid out by Army staff according to typical 
plans, but without the advice of civilian planners.)  The eight men, called “supervising planners” 
by the Army, issued reports on particular issues related to expansion, and provided the 
Cantonment Division staff with feedback that would be used to compile a new typical 
cantonment scheme.97 
                                            
95 Henry V. Hubbard and Howard K. Menhinick, “City Planning as a Professional Career,” City Planning 8, no. 2 
(1932): 82. 
96 Carl Rust Parker worked for the Olmsted Brothers firm both before and after World War I.  During the war, he 
spent six months as principal civilian assistant to the Camp Planning Section of the Construction Division.  He was 
then a manager for the Town Planning Division of the USHC.  Theresa Mattor, “Biography of Carl Rust Parker,” 
The Cultural Landscape Foundation, http://tclf.org/pioneer/carl-rust-parker/biography-carl-rust-parker (accessed 
September 9, 2012); W. D. Cook, Jr., was president of the Pacific Coast Society of Landscape Architects, a chapter 
of ASLA, after the war, “Notes and Comments,” Architect and Engineer 63, no. 1 (October 1920): 112. 
97 Gibbs, “Exhibit 2-C,” 12-13.  The supervising planners were asked to determine locations for additional 
Quartermaster Depot storehouses, and to report on the status of the hospital group at each camp.  They were also 
asked to propose a course of expansion for what was now being called the camp’s “civic center,” the cluster of 
recreation and service buildings largely staffed by outside agencies. 
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The resulting typical cantonment plan (see figure 1.6) was a double-bar scheme, and thus 
was not very different in terms of overall arrangement from the previous year’s plan.  But while 
the Cantonment Division may not have adopted a radial plan like Bennett’s for Camp Grant, it 
did leave the final form of the camp almost entirely to the discretion of the planner.  The new 
instructions to planners published in April 1918 read:  “[T]he typical plan for the layout of the 
camp can be modified . . . to any extent, provided the minimum dimensions are not reduced, and 
provided the military units are kept  and not separated by part of any other unit.”98  In addition, 
like the instructions with which the cantonment planners had originally entered the field in mid-
1917, the April 1918 edition privileged expansibility over other concerns.  The directive that 
“Ample space for expansion should be available” appears early on in the list of instructions, and 
is repeated several times thereafter.99 
                                            
98 Gibbs, “Exhibit 2-C,” 14;  The “General Note” on the February 27, 1918 typical cantonment plan begins 
similarly:  “The number and arrangement of units will of course vary for each cantonment and it is likely that in no 
case will they correspond closely to this plan.”  Plan published in Gibbs, “Exhibit 2-C.” 
99 Gibbs, “Exhibit 2-C,” 14. 
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Sheridan’s and Manning’s concern for careful clearing also made it onto the revised 
instructions to planners. Note 29, titled “trees,” explains:  “Existing trees should be preserved 
among the buildings and along the roads especially . . . .  Shade is absolutely necessary to the 
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health and comfort of the soldiers in the Summer time.  All trees designated to be preserved are 
to be protected by the contractors and by the camp guard.”100 
The 1918 instructions to planners differ most noticeably from those issued the previous 
year in their emphasis on the camp as a centralized community.  To what extent this change was 
due to the influence of the supervising planners, or to the practical experience of the officers and 
draftees in the camps is unclear, but the result is the same:  from February 1918, Army camps 
were to be planned as communities with a definable center, rather than as simple aggregations of 
units and services.  In other words, over the period of time during which civilian city planners 
were involved in shaping the Army’s training camps, those camps came more and more to 
resemble the civilian communities that were the planners’ typical subjects. 
In keeping with both the Army program and the City Beautiful model of urban 
redevelopment, the 1918 instructions to planners highlighted two kinds of central spaces:  a park-
like parade ground; and a “civic center” comprising the camp post office, post exchange, theater, 
library, gymnasium, and YMCA auditorium.  The open space at the center of the camp, located 
in the typical plans between the two bars, served first as a fire break—a crucial consideration in a 
city built entirely of wood.  But it was second “ . . . a parade ground and general public open 
space, and no public buildings should be placed in this area.”  Only the Division Headquarters, 
the equivalent of a civilian community’s government buildings, could occupy part of the parade 
ground.101 
City planners during this era prioritized the location of a civic center, a monumental 
group of buildings intended for use by the entire city, at the geographical center of any 
                                            
100 Ibid., 17. 
101 Ibid., 14. 
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community plan.  Per the City Beautiful’s brand of environmental determinism, a civic center did 
not just constitute the apex of a city’s organizational scheme, the plaza at which all roads met; it 
also defined the character of its residents’ public discourse and comportment.  As Bennett and 
William E. Parsons, in their postwar plan for Joliet, Illinois pointed out, planners typically 
located city and county buildings adjacent to one another not just for convenience, but also “as 
an expression of civic unity.”102   
The training-camp planners were at least partly responsible for the Army’s inclusion of a 
civic center in its 1918 typical cantonment plans.  The June 1917 Quartermaster Corps scheme 
had suggested that the Division Headquarters should be centrally located; many of the planners 
went further, giving the headquarters group a particular architectural treatment.  C. W. Leavitt, 
for instance, placed the Division Headquarters inside a traffic circle between the two rows of 
infantry units at Camp Dix.  Other planners similarly arranged the YMCA and other welfare 
buildings together in a central location:  see Owen Brainard’s plan for Camp Meade, and 
especially the Headquarters Hill Road group at Camp Upton (Brainard and Ferrucio Vitale; see 
figure 1.7).  In an address to the 1918 National Conference on City Planning, Sheridan remarked 
upon how many recreational and other community buildings had been added to the training 
camps over the course of the war.  “Grouped together in a central location,” he concluded, “they 
would serve their purposes most efficiently, and at the same time would add to the appearance of 
the camp.”103 
                                            
102 Edward H. Bennett and Wm. E. Parsons, Plan of Joliet Illinois: A Report on a City Plan, preliminary copy, 29, 
Frances Loeb Library, Harvard University.  Though such an arrangement was not possible at the current time in 
Joliet, Bennett and Parsons advocated setting aside land for a future municipal civic center. 
103 Sheridan, “Planning a War Cantonment,” 134. 
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Figure 1.7:  Plan of Camp Upton, Showing Headquarters Hill at Center.  Published in 
National Army Cantonments. 
 
The revised plans published by the Quartermaster Corps in the spring of 1918 included a 
scheme for a typical camp civic center, with welfare and recreation buildings arranged on all four 
sides of a rectangular open space.  The revised typical cantonment plan recommended situating 
the civic center at the center of one of the two rows of infantry and artillery units.  Coincidentally 
or not, this simple arrangement was replicated almost exactly by S. Herbert Hare in Longview, 
his 1923 Washington state new town.  “The first step in the planning of Longview was to create 
a civic center in the heart of the city,” explained a brochure for the town.104  Photographs taken 
across the rectangular civic center green (see figure 1.8) show a YMCA building and a library, 
                                            
104 Longview, Washington: A Wonder City in a Wonderland, Frances Loeb Library, Harvard University. 
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among other structures—permanent versions of the same facilities visited by soldiers in Army 
training camps. 
   56 
 
Figure 1.8:  Page of Longview, Washington Brochure Showing Civic Center.  In 
Longview, Washington: A Wonder City in a Wonderland, Frances Loeb Library, 
Harvard University 
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The 1918 typical cantonment plans and instructions to planners reveal the maturation of 
the concept of the Army camp as “city,” complete not just with industrial facilities for the 
manufacture of soldiers, but also the open space, recreational facilities, and even shade trees 
important to the inhabitants’ well-being. The new heart of the cantonment, the civic center and 
parade ground, would pump life to the cells of the city, the self-contained units of officers and 
men. Creating an Army cantonment, by implication, was more than just a technical challenge, 
fitting a typical plan to varied local conditions; it was an exercise in community building. 
 
World War I and the Professionalization of City Planning 
Both Army officials and the planners themselves were satisfied with the results of the 
cantonment-planning experiment.  In a postwar report, the head of the Cantonment Division’s 
Section on Camp Planning compared the work of the camp designers to other great construction 
projects of the time, both military and civilian.  The result, he thought, boded well for the 
cantonment’s position in history.  “With the [smaller wartime camps] the great army camps may 
compare unfavorably, and this may be in part due to the layouts adopted,” he wrote, 
but on the other hand, if the great camps are compared with large concentration centres 
built before the cantonments were planned, such as the camps for army and navy 
recruiting, the average contractors’ camp, the ordinary mining or factory town, and the 
undirected plan of city suburbs, they show the advantages of systematic planning, 
reasonable grouping of buildings, concentration of specialized activities, and a general 
attempt to design and produce a well balanced and orderly community.105 
 
 Cantonment planner James Pray, writing during the war, had similarly concluded, “The 
employment of civilian experts as planners has been altogether justified by the results.”106  An 
                                            
105 Gibbs, “Exhibit 2-C,” 22 
106 Pray, “Planning the Cantonments,” 17. 
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identical claim undergirded the formation of the first graduate program in city planning, at 
Harvard University, in 1922.  According to a notice in the school’s Official Register:   
During the period of our war emergency, the economic value of the landscape architect’s 
training in the large-scale adaptation of land for use was demonstrated more clearly than 
ever before, —in residential developments for industrial workers and in the laying-out of 
military and naval camps and cantonments.107 
 
Cantonment planner (and head of Harvard’s School of Landscape Architecture) J. S. Pray 
laid out the case most systematically in an April 1919 editorial in Landscape Architecture:  The 
wartime work by America’s architects and landscape architects did not create the new field of 
city planning.  Rather, the sheer amount of construction carried out during the war with the 
guidance of America’s planning experts “has brought strikingly before the public some of those 
principles which peacetime work in town planning has been more gradually evolving.”  The 
cantonment planners had furthermore demonstrated—to themselves as well as to the people of 
the United States—that cooperation among specialists of different backgrounds was fundamental 
to solving any large-scale planning problem.  The cooperation of architects, landscape architects, 
and engineers “in the design of large areas was not new but the continuance of a practice which 
some of our American cities had already adopted,” the Pray argued.  “The fact that this 
cooperation is essential, however, and the fact that a comprehensive grasp of the larger principles 
of town planning is necessary for all those cooperating, are among the important lessons of the 
war to professional practitioners” in the building arts.108 
                                            
107 “School of Landscape Architecture, 1922-23,” Supplement to Official Register of Harvard University 19, no. 39 
(June 28, 1922): 9-10, http://books.google.com/books?id=RJA4AAAAMAAJ (accessed September 9, 2012).  
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108 J. S. Pray, “Training in the Planning and Development of Town and Country,” Landscape Architecture  9, no. 3 
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Referencing the new course in city planning at Harvard, Pray assured Landscape 
Architecture’s readers that the school would “take full advantage of the lessons drawn from the 
war-time experience of its staff, nearly all of whom were in the service of the Government in 
emergency design and construction work.”  The library of Harvard’s School of Landscape 
Architecture, moreover, was already stocked with “a most interesting collection of material 
relating to problems on which practitioners of town planning have been engaged in the United 
States, and to problems of European Reconstruction.”109  The Great War, in other words, would 
literally constitute the lessons and texts of the next generation of American city planners. 
 
Conclusion 
Upon the United States’s entry into World War I, military officials turned to civilian 
design professionals to lay out the draft Army’s training camps.  The cantonment designers—
trained in architecture, landscape architecture, and engineering, and with a shared interest in the 
burgeoning city-planning movement—brought recently-formulated theories of civilian 
community design to bear on their Army work.  Specifically, the camp planners considered the 
necessity of planning for future development, the relationship between function and form, and 
the nature of city planning as a cooperative enterprise in combination with the Army program. 
As the war progressed and recruits filled the training camps, the planners contributed to 
the redefinition of the Army cantonment as a community whose shared sense of purpose could 
be influenced by its physical surroundings.  The preparation of a new set of typical cantonment 
plans in early 1918 offered the civilian designers not just an opportunity to review their own 
experience in the camp planning, but also to influence the design of future cantonments. 
                                            
109 Ibid., 172. 
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For the civilian planners of America’s Great War training camps, the success of the 
cantonment-planning program was evidence of the economic and social usefulness of city 
planning more generally.  They used their experience working for the Army to argue in favor of 
the professionalization of city planning through the establishment of graduate programs and the 
publication of disciplinary journals.  Thus the cantonments of the Great War were the training 
grounds not just of soldiers, but also of the designers of America’s twentieth-century cities. 
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Chapter 2:  Building a Moral Army: The Training-Camp Architecture of the 
YMCA and YWCA 
 
Introduction 
Writing just after World War I in praise of the YMCA at Fort Leavenworth, Army 
chaplain Frank C. Rideout surmised, “It has been for many months a slogan with the Recruiting 
service that ‘The Army Builds Men,’ but that slogan cannot be applied to any organization, 
either in the army or in civilian life, any more truly than it can be applied to the Army YMCA in 
Fort Leavenworth.”  Rideout continued:  “[The YMCA has] been true to the best traditions of 
that glorious organization in striving to ‘Build men’ along the three-fold lines of ‘Body Mind and 
Spirit.’”110 
As Rideout’s letter suggests, the Progressive-Era missions of the Young Men’s Christian 
Association (YMCA) and its sister organization, the Young Women’s Christian Association 
(YWCA),111 did to a certain extent resemble that of United States Army.  Like Army officers, the 
leaders of the YMCA and YWCA were charged with molding early-adult men and, in the case of 
the YWCA, women, in a particular image, and with defending a set of prescribed values against 
outside attack.  But while the Army focused on physical training, members of the YMCA and the 
                                            
110 Frank C. Rideout to James Taylor, April 1, 1921.  Army Camps--Miscellaneous ca. 1918.  Armed Services: 
World War I (Y.USA.4-1).  Kautz Family YMCA Archives.  University of Minnesota Libraries. 
111 The YWCA was not affiliated in any official way with the YMCA, but its late-nineteenth century founders 
modeled the women’s organization on the men’s group.  Daphne Spain, How Women Saved the City (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2001), 191. 
   62 
YWCA understood themselves to be building character, encouraging young men and women to 
hold themselves to Victorian moral standards in the face of rapid social change.112 
The programs of the YMCA and the YWCA were also literally constructive, in that both 
organizations designed and built facilities for young people’s education and recreation in cities 
across the United States.  As adherents of the Social Gospel, members of the YMCA and the 
YWCA understood urban problems, and specifically urban poverty, to be born of structural 
conditions rather than personal failings.113  Social problems, accordingly, could be addressed by 
altering the physical environment in which vulnerable populations lived.114  The key to the 
Progressive-Era building programs of both organizations was reproducing within the city the 
moral and physical characteristics of the middle-class suburban home.115 
During World War I, at the invitation of President Wilson’s anti-prostitution agency, both 
the YMCA and the YWCA transferred their attention from urban spaces to the Army training 
camps.  Within the cantonments both welfare agencies constructed buildings designed by their 
own architects to house their recreational programs.  The YMCA huts and YWCA hostess 
houses differed substantially in terms of both architecture and the activities taking place within 
them.  But their builders shared a conviction that the spaces they created provided a necessary 
antidote to the physical and aesthetic severity of Army life. 
As sites of a project to shore up traditional moral values against a social and physical 
environment that appeared to threaten the same, the YMCA huts and YWCA hostess houses 
                                            
112 Paula Lupkin, Manhood Factories: YMCA Architecture and the Making of Modern Urban Culture (Minneapolis: 
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113 Spain, How Women Saved the City, 63. 
114 Wright, Building the Dream, 117. 
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deserve a place in the architectural history of social reform.  But while historians have begun to 
examine the built environments of both organizations,116 these studies have so far neglected the 
wartime building projects of the YMCA and YWCA.  This chapter fills in this gap, and 
furthermore shows that the experience of the two welfare agencies during World War I 
significantly impacted their postwar building programs.  More specifically, the YMCA drew on 
its work with soldiers during the Great War to reshape the content and character of its work with 
young men in America’s cities.  Its wartime experience may also have speeded the 
standardization of the YMCA building program under its Building Bureau.  The YWCA 
similarly designed its postwar urban buildings not according to its prewar standards, but 
according to the lessons learned in hostess-house work. 
This chapter begins with an examination of the YMCA’s hut-building program within the 
context of the organization’s architectural history.  It describes the YMCA’s attempt to create a 
homelike space for soldiers within its rustic, serviceable camp buildings, primarily through 
decoration and the programming of activities within them.  It then examines the impact of the 
cantonment program on the YMCA’s postwar projects and on its administrational structure.  The 
chapter then turns to the YWCA’s hostess house program, situating it within the broader history 
of the design of spaces for women.  It examines the architecture of the hostess houses, which 
were designed in popular domestic architectural styles but which also had ties to theories of 
social control and Taylorist planning methods.  It finally considers the legacy of the hostess 
house program in postwar YWCA design. 
 
  
                                            
116 See especially Lupkin, Manhood Factories, and Spain, How Women Saved the City. 
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The Architecture of the YMCA Hut 
The YMCA’s stateside work with draftees during World War I closely paralleled the 
organization’s work with young men in American cities during the prewar period.117  In both 
cases, the YMCA served as a bridge between the homes the men had left and the alien 
environment in which they currently resided.118  The organization’s principal means of attracting 
members and residents was its recreational facilities; over the period between the Civil War and 
the turn of the twentieth century, the typical urban YMCA building had evolved to incorporate a 
gymnasium, swimming pool, locker rooms, and spaces for bowling and billiards.119  In its bid to 
create a space for young men halfway between the middle-class suburbs and the boardinghouses 
and commercial amusements favored by working-class singles, the YMCA increasingly looked 
to contemporary apartment hotels as architectural examples.120  Thus the YMCA of the nineteen-
teens (see figure 2.1) was both explicitly domestic and explicitly masculine, a combination of the 
supposedly separate spheres of (female) home and (male) work.121  
                                            
117 The YMCA also had a history of Army work.  The organization had been present in Civil War Camps with the 
U.S. Christian Commission; during the Spanish-American War, it operated 113 tents in American training camps.  
After the Spanish-American War, the YMCA established a department for Army/Navy work and built permanent 
recreational centers for soldiers and sailors in the U.S. and U.S. territories.  Hard at It (Young Men’s Christian 
Associations of North America, n.d.), pamphlet.  Miscellaneous Red Triangle Materials, ca. 1918.  Armed Services: 
World War I (Y.USA.4-1).  Kautz Family YMCA Archives.  University of Minnesota Libraries.. 
118 Lupkin, Manhood Factories xviii. 
119 Ibid., 111-112. 
120 Ibid., 121-123. 
121 Lupkin xvii. 
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Figure 2.1: Lobby of Brooklyn YMCA (Built 1913-14).  Published in Paula Lupkin, 
Manhood Factories: YMCA Architecture and the Making of Modern Urban Culture 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010).  
 
The architecture of the YMCA’s cantonment huts drew on the urban YMCA’s definition 
of a home for young men.  The YMCA huts, with their exposed beams and dirt floors, were 
nearly as rustic as the Army buildings surrounding them.  But they also incorporated markers of 
middle-class domesticity, including a fireplace and a piano.122  “Your building is the one 
‘Homey’ influence within the Post, where the enlisted men may write their letter, enjoy their 
                                            
122 Contemporary middle-class housing—both single-family homes and apartments—typically also had fireplaces, 
though they were no longer used for heat.  Wright, Building the Dream, 109, 145. 
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social chats and games, and sing around the piano, or sit by the cozy open fireplace and dream of 
home if they want to,” Army chaplain Rideout wrote.123 
YMCA huts, one per regiment of soldiers, were built according to standardized plans 
developed by the wartime manifestation of the organization’s new Building Bureau.  New York 
architect Neil McMillan, Jr. oversaw the YMCA’s training-camp building program.  McMillan, 
born in Scotland in 1878, received a BS in architecture from the University of Illinois before 
holding various positions with the YMCA.  In 1915 he was appointed head of the Building 
Bureau, at which time he commenced a planning study of the United States’s existing YMCA 
buildings.  After the war he transformed the Building Bureau from an advisory board into a 
comprehensive architectural service.124 
The YMCA huts, like urban YMCAs before them, prioritized space for soldiers’ 
recreation.  The large “Type E” hut (see figure 2.2) consisted of an auditorium and social room 
laid parallel to one another and connected by an entry hall, in which the information desk was 
located.  The smaller social room was furnished with writing desks around its edges, a fireplace 
and standing heater, bookracks, and a drinking fountain.  The edges of the auditorium were 
occupied by more writing desks and bookracks; the center was filled with benches or chairs that 
could be moved to make room for indoor athletics.  At either end of the stage and in the far 
corner of the auditorium opposite the entry hall were enclosed classrooms. Nearer the entry hall 
                                            
123 Rideout to Taylor, April 1, 1921. 
124 “2161. Neil McMillan, Jr.,” in The Alumni Record of the University of Illinois, ed. James Herbert Kelley 
(University of Illinois, 1913), 330, http://books.google.com/books?id=PDNOAAAAMAAJ (accessed September 9, 
2012); Charles C. May, “A Post-War Construction Program: The Building Bureau of the International Committee of 
the Y.M.C.A., Part I, ” Architectural Record 45, no. 3 (March, 1919): 217-241, 
http://books.google.com/books?id=BnEXAQAAIAAJ (accessed September 9, 2012); Lupkin, Manhood Factories, 
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opposite the stage were several secretaries’ bedrooms, a store room, a lavatory, and a women’s 
rest room. Behind the information desk was another storage room and a small office.125 
 
Figure 2.2: Plan of Type E YMCA Hut.  Published in “Recreation Buildings for 
Officers and Men at the National Army Cantonments,” Architectural Forum 29, no. 
2 (August 1918): 48. 
 
Also like urban YMCA buildings, the YMCA’s training-camp buildings were designed 
for easy surveillance and control by a limited staff.  Historian Paula Lupkin points to the 
influence on YMCA architecture of Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon, which was disseminated to 
                                            
125 Type E plan reproduced on p. 12 of Manual of Camp Work (The National War Work Council of the Young 
Mens Christian Association of the United States, n.d. [ca. 1918]), 5th edition. Manual for Camp Work (Editions 1, 2, 
3, 4, & 5), National War Work Council, 1917-1918.  Armed Services: World War I (Y.USA.4-1).  Kautz Family 
YMCA Archives.  University of Minnesota Libraries.; Plans for other types could not be found, but lists of hardware 
in the YMCA archives indicate other standard plans lettered F, G, and J.  See folder National War Work Council--
Bureau of Construction 1917-1918.  Armed Services: World War I (Y.USA.4-1).  Kautz Family YMCA Archives.  
University of Minnesota Libraries. 
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evangelical churchgoers through the popular Akron Plan for Sunday Schools.  The Akron Plan 
arranged classrooms in a semicircle around a rotunda containing a raised platform for the school 
superintendent.126  In the Type E YMCA hut, similarly, the YMCA secretary standing at the 
building’s front counter had a clear view not just of the front door, but of the entirety of both the 
social room and auditorium wings, including the doors to the classrooms and the women’s 
lavatory.127 
The YMCA hut (see figure 2.3) was distinguished from the rest of the camp’s built 
environment primarily by its decoration and by the activities taking place within it.  The exterior 
of every hut was painted green, thus setting them apart from the unpainted military buildings and 
the buildings of the other in-camp welfare organizations, which had their own color schemes.128  
A YMCA hut’s interior decorations were also important to its identity as a place apart from the 
rest of camp, as the organization recognized early. At a conference on YMCA huts held in May 
of 1917, Major Birks, who had done YMCA war work in Canada, England, and France, 
“emphasized the necessity of making the interior of the buildings as attractive as possible, and 
suggested the staining of the interior of the building, the use of bunting, and other inexpensive 
but attractive hangings for decorations.”129 
                                            
126 Lupkin, Manhood Factories, 66-7; On the Akron Plan see, Marion Lawrance, Housing the Sunday School, or A 
Practical Study of Sunday School Buildings (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1911), 
http://books.google.com/books?id=MncKuo9dwakC (accessed September 9, 2012). 
127 See Type E plan in Manual of Camp Work, 5th edition, 12. 
128 The Red Triangle at Camp Zachary Taylor, the Army YMCA, pamphlet.  Home Camps: St-Ta (end) 1918.  
Armed Services: World War I (Y.USA.4-1).  Kautz Family YMCA Archives.  University of Minnesota Libraries. 
129 “Notes on Conference on Association Huts Held at Atlantic City,” May 12, 1917.  National War Work Council--
Bureau of Construction 1917-18.  Armed Services: World War I (Y.USA.4-1).  Kautz Family YMCA Archives.  
University of Minnesota Libraries. 
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Figure 2.3: YMCA Hut at Camp Taylor.  Published in National Army Cantonments. 
 
The YMCA regimental huts were fitted out with standard equipment, including not just 
benches and writing desks, but also a graphophone and board games.130  But according to the 
Manual of Camp Work, published in five editions over the course of the war, “Every building 
will have an individuality of its own. Its ‘atmosphere’ is created by the secretaries in charge.”131   
Creating “atmosphere” meant, in part, applying decorative touches to the building’s interior.  
Local churches helped with this aspect of hut design.  At the Eagle Hut in Detroit, for instance, 
                                            
130 Manual of Camp Work, 1st edition (National War Work Council of the Young Men’s Christian Associations of 
the United States, n.d. [ca. 1917].  Manual for Camp Work (Editions 1, 2, 3, 4, & 5), National War Work Council, 
1917-1918.  Armed Services: World War I (Y.USA.4-1).  Kautz Family YMCA Archives.  University of Minnesota 
Libraries. 
131 Manual of Camp Work, 1st edition.  Repeated in subsequent editions. 
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it was the business of the Secretaries to make it as homelike as possible and by the 
help of the ladies of the Fort Street Presbyterian Church and the Brewster 
Congregational Church, the windows were adorned with very beautiful curtains 
and old rose drapes; combined with these were two very fine baskets of ferns 
given by the young men of the Brewster Congregational Church.132 
 
In addition, some women from the Woodward Avenue Baptist Church brought in a cookie jar, 
and for twenty-two weeks running the Eastern Star ladies filled it with sixty homemade cookies 
each Sunday. “[I]f you could see the boys go to that cookie jar as they did at home,” an observer 
concluded, “you would feel sure it was well worth all the trouble to make them.”133 
 
Life in the YMCA Hut 
More important to the soldiers than the hut’s decorations were the activities they could 
participate in there.  According to the Summary of World War Work of the American YMCA, 
published in 1920, the hut was “the aim and apex of the whole [YMCA] organization.” 
“Everything was centered in the desire to make the Y camps both at home and abroad take the 
place of the American home, school, club, stage, and church,” the authors of the Summary 
explained.134  During the first year of the YMCA’s involvement in war work, the organization 
spent $5,566,220.09 to construct and equip 720 buildings in the stateside training camps. It spent 
even more—$6,555,461.77—on the activities that took place within those buildings, providing 
stamps ($100,000 worth), writing paper (2 million sheets daily), and wrappings for parcels to be 
shipped home; reading materials (including 9.6 million pieces of religious literature), games, and 
songbooks (1,150,000); equipment and staff for games of baseball, basketball, football, soccer, 
                                            
132 “History of Detroit Camp.”  Army Camps—Miscellaneous ca. 1918.  Armed Services: World War I (Y.USA.4-
1).  Kautz Family YMCA Archives.  University of Minnesota Libraries. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Summary of World War Work (International Committee of the Young Men’s Christian Association, 1920), 120, 
http://books.google.com/books?id=WeMMAAAAYAAJ.  
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volleyball, and boxing; educational programs, including classes in French, English, history and 
math, religious meetings and bible classes, and lectures on sexual hygiene; and concerts, 
vaudevilles, and motion picture exhibitions (1400 a week, for 1.2 million soldiers).135 
The YMCA’s religious orientation was on clear display at its in-camp huts—perhaps 
even more so than in its city buildings.  In fact, YMCA secretaries identified spiritual longing as 
among the primary needs of soldiers away, often for the first time, from home. “For the first time 
in many a man’s life, religion begins to take its place in the Army,” wrote a contributor to 
Wisconsin State Work. “In his quiet hours the soldier thinks of home and of his parents and their 
hopes for him. It is at those periods that he seeks out the Y. M. C. A. Secretary or Camp Pastor 
of his denomination and talks over his problems frankly. It is easy and natural to talk religion in 
the army.”136  Soldiers could participate in both worship services and Bible studies at their 
                                            
135 National War Work Council of the Young Men’s Christian Associations of the United States, “Financial 
Statement From April 26, 1917, to July 31, 1918.”  National War Work Council—Minutes and Documents.  Armed 
Services: World War I (Y.USA.4-1).  Kautz Family YMCA Archives.  University of Minnesota Libraries.  Number 
for activities calculated for total for Camp Operation and Other Activities, United States, with certain sums 
subtracted, for example:  uniform, traveling expenses for secretaries; automobile costs; office supplies, etc., see 
schedule 2. 
136 Wisconsin State Work (State Young Men’s Association) 29, no. 1 (March 1918).  Home Camps: C ca. 1918.  
Armed Services: World War I (Y.USA.4-1).  Kautz Family YMCA Archives.  University of Minnesota Libraries. 
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regimental huts.137  These gatherings were led not only by YMCA secretaries, but also by Army 
chaplains, camp pastors, and Christian laymen from the surrounding towns.138 
Other YMCA hut activities had little to do with religion.  The YMCA huts and 
auditoriums were best known as entertainment venues.  Motion pictures, shown either inside or 
outdoors on portable screens, were especially popular. A veteran YMCA worker at Camp Lewis, 
for instance, calculated that 300 miles of distinct film were shown by the YMCA at his 
cantonment alone over the course of eighteen months; many of these movies were put on four or 
five times each.139  In addition, the YMCA hosted traveling entertainers, and staged musical and 
theatrical shows featuring the soldiers themselves.140 
Some of the activities orchestrated by the cantonment YMCAs were explicitly 
coordinated with military goals, while of a nature that nonetheless set them apart from military 
drill.  Military authorities, the CTCA, and the YMCA all promoted athletics as a component of 
                                            
137 Services for various dominations were held weekly on Sundays; on Sunday, June 23, 1918 at Camp Mills, for 
instance, the main Y.M.C.A. building hosted Catholic Confession at 6 a.m., followed by Catholic Mass at 8 a.m., 
Union Protestant Communion at 9 a.m., a Christian Science Service at 9:30 a.m., a morning (Protestant) service at 
10:30 a.m., and an evening song service (also Protestant) at 7:30 p.m. The training camp’s five YMCA tents, as well 
as the YMCA facilities in the detention camp, featured reduced schedules of additional services.  Programs for 
Camp Mills religious services.  Home Camps:  Merritt, Mills, March, Pike, ca. 1918.  Armed Services: World War I 
(Y.USA.4-1).  Kautz Family YMCA Archives.  University of Minnesota Libraries.; Program, “Welcome Service to 
New Men of the 1st Regiment, 159th Depot Brigade, Camp Zachary Taylor,” July 1, 1918.  Home Camps: St-Ta 
(end) 1918.  Armed Services: World War I (Y.USA.4-1).  Kautz Family YMCA Archives.  University of Minnesota 
Libraries; During a September 1918 Bible study drive at Camp Lewis, for instance, 13,606 men attended over 250 
classes, most of them meeting in the barracks.  John Lyman Bogue, “America’s Largest Cantonment, Camp Lewis.”  
National War Work Council—Reports, 1918-1919.  Armed Services: World War I (Y.USA.4-1).  Kautz Family 
YMCA Archives.  University of Minnesota Libraries. 
138 Programs for Camp Mills religious services; Program, “Welcome Service to New Men of the 1st Regiment, 159th 
Depot Brigade, Camp Zachary Taylor.” 
139 Bogue, “America’s Largest Cantonment.” 
140 See, for example, “Souvenir Program, Ft. Thomas Military Minstrels,” October 3, 1919. Home Camps: P 
Through T, Reports & Publications, ca. 1918.  Armed Services: World War I (Y.USA.4-1).  Kautz Family YMCA 
Archives.  University of Minnesota Libraries; The YMCA’s initial schedule of traveling entertainers was curtailed 
soon after in-camp work began, owing to budgetary constraints.  Minutes of the Meeting of the Finance Committee 
of the War Work Council, November, 13 1917. Minutes—Meetings of the Finance Committee of the National War 
Work Council, May-Dec, 1917.  Armed Services: World War I (Y.USA.4-1).  Kautz Family YMCA Archives.  
University of Minnesota Libraries. 
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military training.  The YMCA physical education program included calisthenics as well as a 
variety of organized sports, including pushball, wrestling, boxing, and the new sport of 
basketball.  “A volley ball, basket ball or foot ball serve immediately to break up the monotony 
and strain of a military drill and makes their training a sport rather than a hardship,” explained 
the notes to an illustrated lecture on YMCA war work.141 
While it claimed a direct connection between athletics and other activities, including 
group singing,142 and military efficiency, the YMCA touted its educational program on the basis 
of its contribution to civil life in the United States.  The Army-as-university was a popular trope 
that helped rationalize the mass induction of male American youth in the service of fighting a 
European war.  The soldiers of today “will unquestionably shape and control the destiny of the 
United States of America,” George W. Perkins argued in a July 1918 speech on YMCA war 
work at the Bankers’ Club in New York. “For when they return, whether a large percentage or a 
small percentage, they will unquestionably hold the political positions of this country, both small 
and great, for many years to come. They are not only, therefore, going to war, but are going to 
the greatest university that a body of men ever attended . . . .”143  The YMCA took the idea of the 
                                            
141 “Illustrated Lecture on the Army YMCA at Home and Abroad.”  Red Triangle Publications ca. 1918.  Armed 
Services: World War I (Y.USA.4-1).  Kautz Family YMCA Archives.  University of Minnesota Libraries; Boxing 
was a special favorite of both recruits and their officers, as it seemed to bear the most direct relationship with 
soldiering. “Experience at the front has shown that knowledge of boxing is an important factor in the development 
of skill and aggression in bayonet fighting,” explained a CTCA bulletin on the teaching of boxing. YMCA 
secretaries with experience boxing were thus engaged by the CTCA to teach hand-to-hand combat in the camps. But 
all athletics contributed to the end of creating a strong, unified Army, the same memorandum argued: The value of 
participation in athletic sports in the development of a sense of group loyalty and of an esprit de corps is generally 
recognized.” War Department, “Bulletin No. 50,” September 5, 1917.  Negotiations between the YMCA and the 
Army/Navy 1917-1919.  Armed Services: World War I (Y.USA.4-1).  Kautz Family YMCA Archives.  University 
of Minnesota Libraries. 
142 See, for example, Grace Humphrey, “Uncle Sam’s Singing Army,” Everybody’s Magazine 38, no. 4 (April 
1918): 88-90. 
143 “The Y.M.C.A. Hut is the Soldier’s Library, Lecture Hall, University & Club . . . Extracts from the Remarks of 
Geo. W. Perkins at the Bankers’ Club, New York,” July 18, 1918.  Miscellaneous Red Triangle Publications.   
Armed Services: World War I (Y.USA.4-1).  Kautz Family YMCA Archives.  University of Minnesota Libraries. 
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Army’s intellectual influence one step further, offering within the Army training camps 
instruction in a range of subjects from basic reading and writing to advanced math and 
cartography.144 
A final aspect of the YMCA hut’s identity as the soldiers’ home away from home was the 
way in which the organization’s secretaries related to the enlisted men.  The in-camp secretaries 
dressed and comported themselves as soldiers:  the organization adopted a military-style 
uniform;145 secretaries were advised to wear a “military style of hair-cut” and to refrain from 
using umbrellas or overshoes;146 and the men working in the huts adopted military customs and 
language, calling, for example, the Bibles they distributed among the troops “khaki testaments.” 
But the YMCA secretaries were not to relate to the draftees as officers to enlisted men; 
rather, their organization encouraged them to demonstrate that the hut was a place in which 
seniority did not matter.  The Manual of Camp Work suggested that secretaries work alongside 
the soldiers in cleaning and tidying the regimental huts.  “A commissioned officer might lose 
caste with the men if he were to do manual work with them,” the Manual explained, “but on the 
                                            
144 The subject matter addressed by YMCA instructors was remarkably broad, especially considering the constraints 
on the soldiers’ time posed by military training. The offerings at Camp Doniphan included classes in penmanship, 
French, Spanish, American history, the history of Western Europe, algebra, trigonometry, physics, physiology and 
hygiene, and economics.  “Outline of the Army Y.M.C.A. Educational Work for Camp Doniphan, Ft. Sill, Okla.,” 
Home Camps: Doniphan & Douglas, Reports & Publications ca. 1918.  Armed Services: World War I (Y.USA.4-1).  
Kautz Family YMCA Archives.  University of Minnesota Libraries; H. V. McChesney, History of Army Y.M.C.A. 
Work at Camp Zachary Taylor (Louisville, KY: 1920), 9.  Home Camps: St-Ta (end) 1918.  Armed Services: World 
War I (Y.USA.4-1).  Kautz Family YMCA Archives.  University of Minnesota Libraries; The YMCA’s classes were 
numerous as well:  the YMCA huts at Camp Lewis hosted 4792 classes in 21 months.  Bogue, “America’s Largest 
Cantonment,” 22. 
145 The standard in-camp outfit comprised a “barracks cap” of “forestry green” cloth, with a black braid, black strap, 
black visor, black hat cord, and red YMCA insignia; an “English model” green blouse or jacket with red YMCA 
chevrons; a black necktie; riding breeches; leather leggins; and matching tan shoes. The secretaries were to wear 
“regulation U.S. model” overcoats in “forestry green” with YMCA chevrons, and were also permitted “a coat of 
military style and same color of uniform may be warn.”  “The Y. M. C. A. Uniform and How to Wear It.”  [Armed 
Services Work] Brief Historical Statement Concerning the National War Work Council Part 1 1919.  Armed 
Services YMCA (Y.USA.4-4).  Kautz Family YMCA Archives.  University of Minnesota Libraries 
146 “The Y. M. C. A. Uniform and How to Wear It.” 
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other hand it will give the secretary a better standing to show the men that he is willing to share 
their life and labors.”147 
The YMCA preferred that soldiers think of the hut secretaries not as officers, but as 
surrogate fathers.  Camp workers were to provide the emotional and spiritual support, not to 
mention moral guidance, lacking in the barracks and on the drill fields.  The organization 
published a poem entitled, “Where a Fellow Finds a Dad” that read in part: 
But the Camp life is not home life 
Nor the days like what you had, 
And there often comes the feeling 
That you’d like to talk to Dad. 
Soon you see the Y Huts open 
On the job from morn ’til night, 
With a husky bunch of workers 
And the stuff that steers you right. 
They are quick to tell a fellow 
What is good from what is bad, 
And you feel when they’re around you 
That in Camp you’ve got a Dad.148 
 
The Architecture of the YWCA Hostess House 
Like the YMCA’s cantonment hut program, the YWCA’s in-camp work was grounded in 
the organization’s prewar experience in cities across the United States.  Since 1860, the YWCA 
had located or provided safe housing for working women; helped women locate employment; 
and offered supervised recreational opportunities to women and girls.149  As such, the 
organization straddled the feminisms of the nineteenth centuries:  while the upper- and middle-
class women leaders of the YWCA framed their work as an expansion of the domestic sphere, 
                                            
147 Manual of Camp Work, 1st edition, 18. 
148 “Where a Fellow Finds a Dad.”  Miscellaneous Red Triangle Publications ca. 1918.  Armed Services: World 
War I (Y.USA.4-1).  Kautz Family YMCA Archives.  University of Minnesota Libraries. 
149 Spain, How Women Saved the City, 89-91. 
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they actively supported employment and financial independence for the working-class women 
they served.150 
Even more than the YMCA, the YWCA of the Progressive Era defined itself as a home 
away from home for “women adrift” in America’s cities.  The domestic imagery and language of 
the YWCA—women supervisors were “matrons”—protected its female sponsors from 
accusations that they were overstepping their traditional roles as household moral guardians.  At 
the same time, the equation between the urban YWCA and the suburban home served a 
conservative purpose, insulating young women members from the potentially subversive 
influence of boarding-houses, nickelodeons, and dance halls. 
The training-camp incarnation of the YWCA, the hostess house, was likewise meant to 
protect its visitors from the surrounding environment:  in this case, the Army cantonment.  The 
YWCA was a late arrival on the camp-welfare scene.  Its hostess houses served as supervised, 
delimited spaces in which soldiers could meet women family and friends, whose arrival en masse 
to the training camps had not been anticipated by military officials.151 
Like the YMCA huts, the YWCA hostess houses bore only a superficial relationship, 
architecturally, to urban YWCA buildings.  The latter tended to be imposing multi-story 
structures in the Colonial Revival or Renaissance styles.  More importantly, up until World War 
I, most city YWCAs retained a Victorian arrangement of interior spaces, with each activity 
relegated to its own room, and with public and private areas strictly separated (see figure 2.4).  
                                            
150 For more on separate spheres, see Wright, Building the Dream, 108-9. 
151 Young Women's Christian Association of the USA, War Work Council, Report of Hostess House Committee 
(New York : War Work Council, National Board of the Young Women’s Christian Associations, n.d. [ca. 1920]). 
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(The YMCA, in contrast, had begun to experiment with a more open, flexible plan at least by 
1912-1913, when its Brooklyn building went up; see figure 2.1.)152 
 
Figure 2.4:  Plan of First Floor, Cleveland YWCA Headquarters Building (Built 
1908).  Published in Daphne Spain, How Women Saved the City (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2001). 
 
                                            
152 Lupkin 122-131. 
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Instead, other types of spaces—specifically, spaces designed for women—seem to have 
informed the hostess houses’ design.  The Arts and Crafts movement, and in particular the 
private homes designed in the Arts and Crafts style by hostess house architect Julia Morgan 
before the war, shaped the interiors of many hostess houses.  With its rejection of the Victorian 
segmentation of living spaces, its emphasis on the use of local materials, and its deployment of 
structural features as decoration, the Arts and Crafts style was a natural fit for a building program 
that proposed using the same space for multiple purposes, relied heavily on wood, and allowed 
little extra time or money for superficial decoration.  But the application of the Arts and Crafts 
style to hostess house interiors may have been more than a practical choice; it may also have 
been a statement about the shifting definitions of femininity and domesticity under the new 
social, political, and economic conditions of the twentieth century.153 
 Morgan adhered to no single style as the perfect solution to every architectural 
problem,154 with the result that she has been criticized for her stylistic eclecticism and for being 
overly beholden to her clients’ tastes.  She nevertheless worked consistently in the Arts and 
Crafts style in her many domestic designs prior to World War I.  Karen Ann McNeill, in her 
dissertation on Morgan, makes a compelling argument about the possible feministic import of 
                                            
153 Julia Morgan, born in San Francisco in 1872, became the first woman to graduate from the University of 
California at Berkeley with a degree in civil engineering. Shortly thereafter she traveled to Paris and, thanks to the 
legacy of another hostess house architect, Fay Kellogg, was admitted in 1898 as the first female student to the 
architecture section of the École des Beaux-Arts. She received her Certificat at the age of thirty and returned to 
northern California to establish an architectural practice. Her office in the San Francisco Merchants’ Building 
burned in the 1906 earthquake, but her two recently-completed designs for Mills College survived, and Morgan’s 
career swooped upward when she was awarded a contract to reconstruct the badly-damaged Fairmont Hotel.  From 
before she traveled to Paris and throughout her career, Morgan received professional advice and support from 
Bernard Maybeck, an architect and Berkeley professor known for his Arts and Crafts, Mission Style, and Gothic 
Revival designs.  Cary James, Julia Morgan (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1990), 15-18, 23.;  Maybeck’s 
support of Morgan is a recurring theme in Karen Ann McNeill, “Building the California Women’s Movement: 
Architecture, Space, and Gender in the Life and Work of Julia Morgan” (PhD dissertation, University of California, 
Berkeley, 2006). See, for example, 48-9.  
154 McNeill, “Building the California Women’s Movement,” 161. 
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Arts and Crafts design to both Morgan and her clients.  Though the Arts and Crafts movement 
has been explained as either a wholesale rejection of industrial culture or, contrarily, as an 
embrace of simplicity within the context of the scientific housekeeping movement, McNeill 
offers a third interpretation.155  In breaking down the literal privacy walls of the Victorian era, 
Morgan and her clients both made a statement about the primacy of community, and confused 
the boundary between the private and public spheres.156  The latter is particularly important 
within the context of the YWCA program, which crafted new social roles for both the middle- 
and upper-class sponsors of YWCA work and the working-class women they served. 
Besides hundreds of private homes, Morgan also designed close to 90 buildings for 
women and women’s organizations including the YWCA.157  Two of Morgan’s pre-World War I 
projects in particular seem to have shaped the architecture of the hostess house program:  her 
work at Asilomar, a YWCA retreat center, beginning in 1913; and her design of the interior of 
the YWCA building at the Panama-Pacific International Exposition (PPIE) in 1915. 
Both Morgan’s Asilomar buildings and her interior for the YWCA PPIE building were in 
the Arts and Crafts mode, and thus are quite different from another of her prewar designs for the 
organization, the Oakland YWCA building (1914).  In preparation for her work on the Oakland 
building, the first city YWCA she designed, Morgan toured many existing East Coast 
YWCAs.158  This may explain her choice of an Italian Renaissance style for the Oakland 
                                            
155 Per McNeill, Lears reads the Arts and Crafts movement as a pushback against industrial capitalism; Wright ties 
the style to Progressive-Era concerns with standardization and sanitation.  McNeill, “Building the California 
Women’s Movement,” 174-5. 
156 McNeill, “Building the California Women’s Movement,” 176. 
157 McNeill, “Building the California Women’s Movement,” 124. 
158 Sharon D. Kasser, “Challenges and Successes in a Hostile Environment: Julia Morgan, Architect” (master’s 
thesis, San Jose State University, 2004), 32. 
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structure.  In contrast to the intimacy of her open-plan Arts and Crafts houses, the two-story 
courtyard of the Oakland YWCA (see figure 2.5), a near-replica of Donato Bramante’s cloister at 
Santa Maria della Pace in Rome, is imposing, the fireplace and accompanying inglenooks the 
only evidence of the courtyard’s intended use as a social space. 
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Figure 2.5:  Julia Morgan, Courtyard of Oakland YWCA Building (Built 1914).  
Nomination Form and Accompanying Photographs Available for download through 
the National Park Service’s National Register of Historic Places, 
http://pdfhost.focus.nps.gov/docs/NRHP/Photos/84000755.pdf.  
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Like the courtyard at the Oakland YWCA, the administration building at Asilomar (1913; 
now the Phoebe Apperson Hearst Social Hall) is a large open space with a single fireplace, but 
there the similarities end.  The exposed triangular trusses and warm red wood of the 
administration building make the space feel smaller than it is.  In contrast to the Oakland 
building, which showcased Morgan’s Beaux-Arts credentials, the administration building and 
later structures were designed to blend into the site’s spectacular natural setting.  As for 
Morgan’s cantonment hostess houses, the choice of the Arts and Crafts style for the buildings at 
Asilomar may have been about finding the right architectural aesthetic to fit the program at hand, 
narrowly construed; but it also might have been a broader statement about the erasure of 
boundaries not just between inside and outside, but between the women of the YWCA and the 
world outside their domestic enclosures. 
Morgan designed a second Arts-and-Crafts space for the YWCA before the war, this the 
interior of the organization’s building at the 1915 PPIE in San Francisco.  In a series of events 
that would be echoed in the Great War training camps, the fair’s all-male architectural board had 
at first made no special provision for female visitors, but responded to complaints by asking the 
YWCA to sponsor a women’s hospitality center.  Edouard F. Champney, the fair’s supervising 
architect, took over the design of the building’s exterior; Morgan was given control of the 
interior.159  Champney’s and Morgan’s work contrast sharply:  Champney’s Italian Renaissance 
exterior is highly ornamented, with pairs of caryatids circling the building, while Morgan’s Arts 
and Crafts interior is equally restrained.  In this case the relative simplicity of the Arts and Crafts 
style underscores the YWCA’s decision to provide functional amenities within the building, 
                                            
159 Sarah Holmes Boutelle, Julia Morgan, Architect (New York: Abbeville Press, 1995), revised edition, 101-105. 
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including a cafeteria and childcare, rather than to display women’s artwork as at previous 
world’s fairs.160 
The interiors of most hostess houses, including not just those designed by Morgan but 
also the many buildings designed by Katharine Cotheal Budd, picked up on the Arts and Crafts 
theme developed by Morgan at Asilomar and the PPIE, as well as in her residential designs.  
Photographs of the hostess houses’ multipurpose living rooms show visitors gathered around 
large stone fireplaces or seated in chairs around the perimeter of the two-story space.  As at 
Asilomar and the PPIE, the entrance hall at Camp Mills (Budd; see figure 2.6), for instance, is at 
once open and intimate, the wood floors and trusses, the mezzanine balconies, and the paned 
windows reducing the sense of scale without functionally dividing the space.  In Camp Mills’s 
dining room, similarly, triangular trusses lower the ceiling, and a brick fireplace forms the focal 
point of the many individual tables. 
                                            
160 Mary Pepchinski, “Woman’s Buildings at European and American World’s Fairs, 1893-1939,” in Gendering the 
Fair: Histories of Women and Gender at World’s Fairs, ed. T.J. Boisseau and Abigail M. Markwyn (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 2010), 193; See, for example, Sophia Hayden’s Women’s Building at the World’s 
Columbian Exposition, a typical exhibition hall. 
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Figure 2.6:  Katharine Cotheal Budd, Entrance Hall, YWCA Hostess House, Camp 
Mills.  Published in “The Hostess House in the Army Cantonment,” Architecture 38 
(1918). 
 
The hostess houses’ exteriors were explicitly domestic—much more so than the exteriors 
of the YMCA huts.  The women architects involved in the YWCA program consciously 
manipulated features common to American domestic architecture to identify their hostess houses 
as visitors’—and soldiers’—homes away from home. In contrast to the more purely functional 
architecture of the military barracks and the unfinished YMCA huts, camp hostess houses were 
distinguished by porches, fireplaces, many-gabled roofs, dormer windows, and references to 
common residential styles (including the bungalow style, the Tudor Revival and West-Coast 
board-and-batten construction). The architects of the YWCA’s hostess houses emphasized the 
residential character of their designs, even as they simultaneously celebrated the many-faceted 
work taking place inside them. 
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We know the least about the houses designed by Fay Kellogg.161  The single War Work 
Bulletin article dedicated to her work described all seven of her southeastern hostess houses162 as 
being similar in construction—“a bungalow type, with long sloping green or gray roof and the 
house cream colored with green trimmings.”  The houses had an entrance hall, living room, 
kitchen, cafeteria, and rest room on the first floor, and emergency bedrooms on the second 
floor.163 
A small exterior photograph of Kellogg’s Camp Gordon hostess house published in the 
War Work Bulletin (see figure 2.7) gives us some idea of what these buildings looked like. The 
house is broad and rectangular, with a wide first story topped by a much smaller, square second 
story. Both stories have flat or barely pitched roofs.  The entire front facade of the first story is 
                                            
161 Kellogg worked for the Hostess House Committee from at least the fall of 1917 until her resignation, due to ill 
health, in May of 1918.  Born in Brooklyn in 1871, Kellogg began studying architectural drawing after her father 
dissuaded her from a career as a physician. After college in Washington, D.C., then a year at the Pratt Institute, she 
moved from a job in New York to an atelier in Paris, where she was instrumental in gaining women’s entry to the 
prestigious École des Beaux-Arts. By 1907 she was back in New York as the American News Company’s company 
architect. Kellogg insisted that “[w]omen desiring to enter the profession should take up domestic architecture” 
because of their status as “chief occupants and governing spirits” of their own homes. But she herself was in charge 
of or assisted in the design of a variety of building types, including a monastery, an armory, and New York’s Hall of 
Records. “[I]t was always my ambition to be able to build a nice little house which I could call my own, and I am 
proud to say that this and a lot more has been realized,” she reflected in 1907.  Kellogg died in July 1918.; Meeting 
minutes, April 24, 1918.  World War I, War Work Council, Hostess House Committee: Minutes, 1917-18.  YWCA 
of the U.S.A. Records, Sophia Smith Collection, Smith College, Northampton, Mass.; Meeting minutes, May 29, 
1918.  World War I, War Work Council, Hostess House Committee: Minutes, 1917-18.  YWCA of the U.S.A. 
Records, Sophia Smith Collection, Smith College, Northampton, Mass.; Fall 1917 date from “Chronological List – 
Opening of Hostess Houses and Closing Dates.”  World War I, Hostess Houses, Miscellaneous, Lists, 1919.  YWCA 
of the U.S.A. Records, Sophia Smith Collection, Smith College, Northampton, Mass.; “Miss Fay Kellogg, Architect, 
Dies,” New York Times, July 12, 1918; “Woman Invades Field of Modern Architecture,” New York Times, 
November 17, 1907; Kellogg's support for the cause of woman suffrage is indicated by her attendance as part of a 
“delegation of self- supported women” at English suffragette Sylvia Parkhurst's 25 October 1909 Carnegie Hall 
appearance. “Great Throng Hears Mrs. Parkhurst,” New York Times, October 26, 1909. 
162 Meeting minutes, April 10, 1918.  World War I, War Work Council, Hostess House Committee: Minutes, 1917-
18.  YWCA of the U.S.A. Records, Sophi;a Smith Collection, Smith College, Northampton, Mass.; These included 
at least one house each at Camp Gordon, Fort Oglethorpe, Camp Zachary Taylor, and Camp Lee. She seems also to 
have been involved, according to Hostess House Committee notes, with the design of hostess houses for nonwhite 
visitors at Camps Gordon and Jackson. 
163 “South Atlantic Field Hostess Houses,” War Work Bulletin (YWCA War Work Council), no. 14 (January 11, 
1918): 2. 
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covered by a porch, its roof supported by widely spaced columns. A low railing runs across the 
bottom of the porch. The side of the first story and front of the second story feature a row of 
rectangular windows. The one visible side of the second story has no windows. Kellogg’s hostess 
house at Camp Zachary Taylor (see figure 2.8) was similar, except that the porch extended along 
at least two sides.  The square second story of the house also has (square) windows along both of 
the visible sides.164 
 
Figure 2.7:  Fay Kellogg, YWCA 
Hostess House, Camp Gordon.  
Published in War Work Bulletin 
(YWCA), no. 14 (January 11, 
1918). 
 
                                            
164 “South Atlantic Field Hostess Houses,” War Work Bulletin, no. 14 (January 11, 1918): 2; Postcard in author’s 
collection. 
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Figure 2.8:  Fay Kellogg, YWCA Hostess House, Camp Taylor.  Postcard in 
Author’s Collection. 
 
Katharine Cotheal Budd’s165 numerous166 hostess house designs are comparatively well- 
documented, thanks primarily to two articles published in the contemporary architectural press.  
In “Bringing Home to the Army Camps,” Estelle Frances Ward described the evolution over 
time of Budd’s hostess house architecture. Her earliest houses were of what Ward called the 
“God’s Providence type,” after the 1652 God’s Providence House in Chester, Cheshire, 
                                            
165 Budd began her career as a painting student in William Merritt Chase’s summer program in Shinnecock Hills, 
New York.  She also became involved in the Art Student’s League of New York (founded 1875), for which Chase 
was the chief instructor.  Budd then took an architecture class at the Museum of Modern Art in New York and, after 
winning the end-of-term award, entered the architectural office of her professor, Grenville Snelling.  She followed 
six years with Snelling by a tenure in Paris, where she worked in the same atelier (that of Marcel de Monclos) as had 
Kellogg. Upon her return to New York, Budd worked for the architect Grosvenor Atterbury (another of Chase’s 
students) before founding her own firm.  Budd's papers, housed at the American Institute of Architects Archives 
(Washington, D.C.) are not yet open to researchers. I have obtained photocopies of approximately 100 documents 
from Victoria Budd Opperman, who donated the collection (cited hereafter as VBO Collection).; Victoria Budd 
Opperman, “Katharine Cotheal Budd (1860-1951): One of America's Early Women Architects” (Division III paper, 
Hampshire College,1983), 1-8. 
166 The most prolific of the three women architects hired by the War Work Council, Budd designed over fifty 
hostess houses on at least sixteen different plans, and altered twenty-three existing buildings for hostess house use. 
“Hostess Houses Under Direction of Katharine Cotheal Budd,” 1-2, VBO Collection. 
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England.167  The very first of these, and the first hostess house authored by Budd, was at the 
Great Lakes Naval Station. 
Though it is hard to tell from the two extant photographs, the hostess house at the Great 
Lakes Naval Training Station appears to be T-shaped in plan, with a square porch nestled 
between the two bars of the T on either side. The arched entry, which is situated between the 
gable-end of the T’s crossbar and the porch to the left, has a small gabled roof over it. The 
stuccoed gable-end to the right of the entrance is topped with a cross-shaped finial. As Ward’s 
description indicates, the emphasis in the Great Lakes Naval Training Station hostess house is on 
the horizontal rather than the vertical; this sets it apart from her later designs, as well as from the 
original God’s Providence House, a multi-story row house. 
The second of Budd’s hostess house types, according to Ward, “looks like a many- 
gabled mansion, but if Miss Budd tells you its secret, you will see that it is really nothing but an 
American barn with a porch at each side where the farmer would build a lean-to; that the roof is 
disguised with dormers and broad windows flooding the rooms with sunlight and air.”168  Ward’s 
description of this type of house as resembling both a mansion and a barn is puzzling, until we 
remember the premium she—along with Budd, the Hostess House Committee, and Army 
architects and planners—put on the identity of Army camp architecture as particularly 
                                            
167 Estelle Frances Ward, “Bringing Home to the Army Camps” House Beautiful 45 (February 1919): 76.  
According to Ward, in the Great Lakes hostess house and its successor, Budd “flattened the gables but retained the 
wide bay boards and something of the feeling in the stucco work.”; The Great Lakes hostess house, and those that 
followed it, including the YWCA building at Camp Dodge, were modeled on God’s Providence House at 9 
Watergate Street and 11-11A Watergate Row, Chester, Cheshire England. Built in 1652, the four-story Tudor-style 
row house was constructed of sandstone and timber framing with plaster panels and a slate roof. The first and 
second floors comprise storefronts, the latter part of the “Chester rows,” a second-story covered walkway found on 
each of the city’s four main streets. The third-story facade centers around a casement window, itself surrounded by 
plaster panels decorated with naturalistic motifs. The fourth, attic story, has a row of quatrefoil braces across its its 
base, and a smaller window at its center. Between the second and third stories is a freeze engraved with the words: 
“GOD’S PROVIDENCE IS MINE INHERITANCE.” This motto is said to come of the household’s escape (in a 
previous structure, dating to the 13th century) from the 1647-48 plague. 
168 Ward, “Bringing Home to the Army Camps,” 77. 
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“American.” For Ward, it seems, a Fifth-Avenue mansion was nothing more than a trussed-up 
version of that agricultural archetype, the Mid-Atlantic barn. Ward claimed that Budd developed 
the barn hostess house design in order to reduce costs; as this form was familiar to builders, they 
were able to construct it for less money than a more experimental architecture might require.169 
Budd’s barn-inspired hostess houses varied significantly in complexity.  One of her 
simpler designs, plan 16, was implemented at Camps Grant (house #1), Sherman (nonwhite 
house), Dodge (house #2), and Morrison, and was revised for Camp Lee (nonwhite house), 
Camp Meade (nonwhite house), Camp Alexander (nonwhite house), Camp Beauregard 
(nonwhite house), Raritan Arsenal, Camp Shelby, Camp Sheridan, Fort Sill, and Camp Taylor 
(house #2).  A drawing of Camp Grant hostess house #1 (see figure 2.9) and a photograph of the 
nonwhite hostess house at Camp Sherman both show buildings roughly square in plan, with a 
central space covered by a pitched roof and lean-to screened porches to either side.  A third 
screened porch projecting from the front of the house frames the entrance.  Across the gable 
directly above the front porch is a row of three windows; the space above the windows is 
decorated with half-timbering and a hexagonal YWCA plaque. A shed dormer and chimney 
project up from one side of the roof.170 
                                            
169 Ibid., 77, 100. 
170 The hostess houses at Camps Dix (house #1) and Devens are also related to Budd’s barn type, though we do not 
know whether she or another architect designed them. These hostess houses have an I-shaped plan, with the center 
segment one-and-a- half stories high and both end segments two stories high. Each of the Camp Dix house’s two 
entrances are at the center of a lean-to porch, one attached to the center section of the building and one to an end 
section. A gable shaped projection above each door frames a YWCA sign. The Camp Devens house has a central 
lean-to porch but appears to have only one entrance, at the center of an end section lean-to porch. The Camp Dodge 
hostess house #1, also unattributed to a particular architect, is similar in plan, but has only one lean-to porch, 
attached to the center segment of the building, and thus only one entrance.  Drawing of Camp Dodge hostess house 
#1 in “Various Views of the Seventy Hostess Houses,” in “About Hostess Houses,” special issue, War Work 
Bulletin, no. 18 (February 5, 1918): 2. 
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Figure 2.9:  Katharine Cotheal Budd, YWCA Hostess House, Camp Grant.  
Published in Estelle Frances Ward, “Bringing Home to the Army Camps,” House 
Beautiful 45 (February 1919). 
 
Budd’s most celebrated hostess houses, at the embarkation Camps Merritt and Mills (plan 
17) are particularly complex versions of her barn type.  The author of an unsigned article in 
Architecture (1918), possibly Budd herself, described the houses in words similar to Ward’s:  
“The roof line of these hostess houses is taken from that of the fine old barns of Pennsylvania 
and New Jersey.  The outline is simple and direct, a gable with lean-to extensions; thousands 
may be seen by any traveler.”  And like Ward’s article, the piece in Architecture claimed, “This 
truly American type of architecture is suitable for a building that must be large but 
inexpensive.”171  But while the design for the hostess houses at Camps Mills and Merritt were 
steeped in American architectural history, they were also innovative, the article’s author claimed.  
“A thorough knowledge of the hundreds of details that make for success in a hostess house is 
necessary before a successful plan can be drawn, she wrote. “The result as here shown is 
interesting:  the architect evolved an entirely new plan of the ‘cross’ variety, with a wing devoted 
to each branch of hostess-house work” (see figure 2.10). 
                                            
171 “The Hostess House in the Army Cantonment: Katharine Cotheal Budd, Architect,” Architecture 38 (1918): 268. 
   91 
 
Figure 2.10: Katharine Cotheal Budd, Plans, YWCA Hostess House, Camp Mills.  
Published in “The Hostess House in the Army Cantonment.” 
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A visitor entered the hostess houses at Camps Mills and Merritt through a set of heavy 
doors set in the gable-end of a rectangular central hall. Projecting out from either side of the hall 
at sixty-degree angles were two gabled structures, each having a lean-to porch to front and back. 
Thirty degrees from each of these, to the back of the house, were two narrower structures 
housing the private rooms of the house—the bathrooms, changing rooms, nursery, emergency 
room, and hostesses’ sleeping quarters. The hostess house’s public spaces were double-height, 
the entry hall having a second-story balcony; the private wings had rooms on both stories. 
Budd’s interest in Tudor Revival architecture manifested itself spectacularly in the exterior 
decoration of each of these houses (see figure 2.11). The entry to each house is surrounded by 
half-timbering and a balconet. A horizontal “Hostess House” sign above the latter echoes the 
motto inscribed above the door of God’s Providence House. 
 
Figure 2.11:  Katharine Cotheal Budd, Exterior View, Hostess House, Camp Mills.  
Published in “The Hostess House in the Army Cantonment.” 
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Budd’s hostess house plan 17 and the similar plan 21172 recall the summer cottage she 
built in 1896 for Georgina and Abby Howland at Southampton, Long Island (see figure 2.12). 
Budd had become friends with the Misses Howland when they studied together at William 
Merritt Chase’s Shinnecock Hills summer school. The shingle-style house she designed for the 
sisters nestled around a hilltop, its two wings projecting diagonally back from a porch entrance 
and triangular central hall. The structure is flattened by a low, curving roof, its second story 
camouflaged as a partial story by dormer windows.173  The plan for the Southampton house may 
have been born of topographic necessity. But Budd carried the diagonal-wing concept, which 
also allowed for greater exposure throughout of light and air, as well as a neat separation of 
functions among and along each of the wings, to the varied sites of at least eleven hostess 
houses.174   
                                            
172 “Hostess Houses Under Direction of Katharine Cotheal Budd,” VBO Collection.  Budd assigned a plan similar to 
that used at Camps Mills and Merritt, number 21, in either standard or revised form to a number of other hostess 
houses: Camp Grant #2, Camp Custer, Quantico Naval Base, Camp Humphreys, Camp Taylor (white house), the 
Naval Training Station at Newport, Camp Knox, Camp Wadsworth, and Camp Pike. Like the plan-17 houses, the 
hostess houses built according to plan 21 had four wings projecting from a central, rectangular hallway. A second-
floor plan of plan 21 in the VBO collection shows the addition of a small rectangular porch over the entrance, and 
sleeping porches to the inside of the end of each narrower wing.; A photograph of the hostess house at the Naval 
Training Station in Newport, Rhode Island, which was built according to a revision of plan 21, shows a smaller and 
simpler version of the houses at Mills and Merritt, with a less-ornamented entryway and wings only one-and-a-half 
stories in height.  War Work Council, Report of Hostess House Committee, 20.; See also a postcard of the Camp 
Custer hostess house at Willard Digital Collections, “Camp Custer Hostess House, c. 1918,” Willard Library, 
http://dspace.willard.lib.mi.us/xmlui/handle/123456789/10523 (accessed September 11, 2012). 
173 Joy Kestenbaum, “Katherine [sic] Budd, 1860-1951,” in Long Island Country Houses and their Architects, ed. 
Robert B. MacKay, Anthony K. Baker, and Carol A. Traynor, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997): 86-
87. Budd designed another, larger diagonal-wing house on Long Island, “Sunwood” for Frank Melville (1919). 
Kestenbaum suggests that Melville commissioned Budd after being impressed with her attention to the topography 
of the Howland estate site. 
174 Interestingly, Morgan designed a house with a similar plan for Oma and Ralph Eltse.  As in Budd’s diagonal-
plan hostess houses, at the Eltse house the living room and dining room form separate wings connected by an 
entrance hall, allowing for some functional separation within a relatively open plan.  See figure 46 in McNeill, 
“Building the California Women’s Movement,” 314. 
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Figure 2.12:  Katharine Cotheal Budd, Plan, Cottage for the Misses Howland.  
Courtesy Victoria Budd Opperman. 
 
The third of Budd’s hostess house plan types, according to Ward, was “a simple cube 
with the addition of two gables and two piazzas. In effect it is an American country house of 
well-known type.”175  The particular plan highlighted by Ward was number 3. Budd executed 
hostess houses on this plan at Camps Dix (nonwhite visitors; see figure 2.13) and Dewey, and 
modified the plan for Camp Eustis, Camp Hancock, and Camp Hill. Like Budd’s barn-type 
houses, the plan 3 houses typically had a lean-to porch to either side of the symmetrical center 
section of the building. As Ward’s description suggests, this central space is a two-story cube 
whose geometry is disguised by a large gable to either side of the central entrance. Shed dormers 
                                            
175 Ward, “Bringing Home to the Army Camps,” 100. 
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projecting from the side roof of each gable-end add second-story space. Photographs of the 
houses at Camps Dewey, Dix, and Hill all show Tudor-style exterior decoration.176  
 
Figure 2.13:  Katharine Budd, YWCA Hostess House, Camp Dix (Nonwhite 
Visitors).  Courtesy Victoria Budd Opperman. 
 
The two hostess houses known to have been designed by Julia Morgan—those at Fort 
MacArthur, in San Pedro, California, and at Camp Fremont, in Palo Alto—are similar to one 
another in both plan and construction. Both have an I-shaped plan, with double-height public 
spaces to either end (likely the cafeteria and living room) and an entrance hallway and, perhaps, 
classrooms, running between them. The tall windows puncturing the buildings’ facades counter 
                                            
176 See photographs of various hostess houses in VBO collection.  At the Camp Dewey house this was most 
pronounced, with half-timbering on each gable-end and a wooden sign above the entrance again recalling the God’s 
Providence House motto. On the other extreme, while the top story of the gable ends of the Camp Dix (nonwhite) 
house are covered in stucco and plaster, with some half-timbering, the house’s ground story is clad in horizontal 
siding.; See also drawing of Dix house, which shows siding only below windows of ground story, in Ward, 
“Bringing Home to the Army Camps,” 76. 
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the horizontality of the long roof with its shed dormers and flattened gables. Both the Camp 
Fremont hostess house and the Fort MacArthur house, too, were clad in the board-and-batten 
siding popular in contemporary California residential construction.  The open roof trusses in the 
Palo Alto house’s living room nicely complemented the second-floor balcony running along its 
circumference, and picked up a theme of much of Morgan’s work. As Richard W. Longstreth has 
observed, “Unlike many academicians, [Morgan] was not reticent about exposing structural 
members frankly, but also had no desire to produce unnecessarily complicated structural 
effects.”177 
Like the YMCA huts, and like urban YMCAs and YWCAs more generally, the YWCA 
hostess houses were laid out not just to facilitate visits between soldiers and their women family 
and friends, but also to allow efficient supervision by the organization’s hostesses.  In most 
hostess houses, the front door led to a central entrance hall, within which the building’s 
information desk was located, and from which all or part of both the living room and cafeteria 
would be visible.  As at city YWCAs, what made the mixing of sexes within the hostess houses 
acceptable to the parents of the soldiers and their girl friends was the organization’s assurance 
that nothing untoward could happen there, exactly because the public rooms of the house were so 
exposed to the hostesses’ gaze.  “A soldier and a girl arrive; ‘engaged’ written all over them,” 
reported a piece in the War Work Bulletin. “They make for the big settee. The emergency 
                                            
177 See photographs of the Camp Fremont and Fort MacArthur hostess houses, respectively, in Sarah Allaback, The 
First American Women Architects (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2008), 144, and on San Pedro Peninsula 
Chamber of Commerce, “YWCA—Morgan House,” http://www.sanpedro.com/sp_point/ywca.htm (accessed 
September 11, 2012).; Richard W. Longstreth, “Julia Morgan: Some Introductory Notes,” Perspecta 15 (1975): 82; 
The hostess house at Camp Kearny was likely also designed by Morgan; in any case, it is a simpler version of her 
designs for Camp Fremont and Fort MacArthur. The long, low shed building is fronted by a veranda with plain, 
widely-spaced pillar. The roof is punctuated by three sets of shed dormers, and the verticality of the first-floor 
windows is echoed in the half-height balustrade in front of each one. Like the hostess houses at the other two 
California posts, that at Camp Kearny was clad in board-and- batten wooden siding.  See photograph in War Work 
Council, Report of Hostess House Committee, 30. 
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hostess has what she calls her ‘weather eye’ out. She pays a casual visit to the unoccupied end of 
the settee and focuses her kind orbs that have a twinkle of humor in them upon the couple. 
Decorum that might have been abandoned is restored.”178 
The most complex space within the hostess house was its cafeteria.  YWCA 
representatives were enormously proud of the hostess house cafeteria program, touting it both as 
a locus of comfort for soldiers and their guests, and as an efficient business operation.  In 
addition, the cafeterias, especially those in Budd’s hostess houses, evidenced the interest of the 
YWCA and its architects in contemporary theories of household efficiency. 
The 1918 Architecture article on the Camp Mills hostess house devoted considerable 
space to a description of its cafeteria. Budd’s careful arrangement of the food-preparation and -
service areas according to their function evidences her interest in efficiency studies along the 
lines of Frederick Winslow Taylor’s work in factories. According to the article’s author, “Travel 
lines are carefully laid out in the architect’s first sketches. Effort is made to show the direction of 
the work of each servant from preparation to completion. Each line is in a different color, and 
care is taken that no line crosses another. Efficiency is studied and an effort made to simplify all 
work.” And again: 
The location of each class of work and its relation to all the others is first decided. 
Careful measurements are laid out, distances between tables decided, the probable 
movements in each process in cooking thought out, the heights of tables and 
counters decided for various workers . . . . A good floor plan gives space where 
needed and keeps cubic contents down. Cubic contents run up expense in 
building: space may be wasted in unnecessary hallways, oversize [or] unimportant 
rooms, or awkward arrangements.179 
 
                                            
178 “The Hostess House Settee,” War Work Bulletin, no. 26 (April 5, 1918): 1. 
179 “The Hostess House in the Army Cantonment,” 268. 
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In the Camp Mills cafeteria, for instance, beyond the long counter dividing the seating area from 
the food-preparation area, appliances were grouped according to their use:  the stove, sink, and 
counters together; the tools for cleaning, cutting and cooking vegetables in another compartment; 
and the refrigerator and butcher block together somewhere else.180 
Like its architecture, the hostess house’s interior decoration reinforced the identity of 
these spaces with civilian homes. Inasmuch as it did, it further set the YWCA buildings apart 
from the military buildings around them. The men of the camps, rather than their female visitors, 
seem to have been the particular targets of the YWCA’s decorating schemes. “The home-
kindness of our rooms seems to appeal strongly to the boys,” wrote a hostess from San Diego in 
September of 1918. “ . . . Frequently some one will start to leave the rooms, but will return to 
say, ‘I want to tell you, I’ve felt more at home here today than I’ve felt since I left home.’”181 
Another hostess, writing to the War Work Bulletin, theorized, “It is doubtful whether [the 
soldiers] notice such details as curtains on the windows or flowers on the mantel, but the general 
effect appeals to them strongly.” She quoted a company cook: “‘It’s powerful pretty, and I think 
it’s fine.’”182 
The central element, both literally and figuratively, of any hostess house was its hearth. In 
his book on training-camp welfare activities, Keeping Our Fighters Fit, Edward Frank Allen 
wrote: “Everywhere the very heart of the house is the big chimney in the middle of the huge 
living-room, where in a double fireplace log-fires burn when they are needed.”183  On the facing 
                                            
180 “The Hostess House in the Army Cantonment,” 268. 
181 “Report of Hostess Gallery, Balboa Park,” Sept. 16-30, 1918.  World War I, Hostess Houses, 1918-19, Naval 
Base—San Diego, Cal.  YWCA of the U.S.A. Records, Sophia Smith Collection, Smith College, Northampton, 
Mass. 
182 “By a Woman Who Saw,” War Work Bulletin, no. 8 (November 30, 1917): 2. 
183 Edward Frank Allen, Keeping Our Fighters Fit (New York: The Century Co., 1918), 117-118. 
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page he printed a photograph of “A corner of the living room” of the Camp Devens hostess 
house, showing a group of adults seated in wicker furniture on a big square rug in front of a stone 
fireplace (see figure 2.14). The fireplace’s mantel is decorated with fresh evergreen boughs; the 
women are knitting while the soldiers look on.184 
 
Figure 2.14:  Living Room, YWCA Hostess House, Camp Devens.  Published in 
Edward Frank Allen, Keeping Our Fighters Fit (New York: The Century Co., 1918). 
 
Many contemporary descriptions of hostess house interiors highlighted the softness and 
fragility of its decorations, a particular point of contrast with utilitarian military architecture and 
                                            
184 Allen, Keeping Our Fighters Fit, 119. 
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furniture. Allen, for example, told of a soldier’s first visit to the hostess house at his camp. “‘Can 
I stand on the rug in front of the fireplace?’ he asked. ‘It’s the first time I’ve seen one in so long 
that I’ve forgotten the feel of it under my feet.’ He finally exclaimed to the boy who was 
evidently showing him around: ‘Gosh, ain’t it all nice and refined! I’m coming here every 
day.’”185 
 
Life in the YWCA Hostess House 
The activities taking place within the hostess house, like those within the YMCA huts, 
were an important part of the YWCA’s attempt to counter the demoralizing effect of military 
training.  In the hostess houses, however, one particular activity was paramount:  quiet visiting 
between soldiers and their women visitors, or even among soldiers alone.  The hostesses worked 
to create an atmosphere of quiet conviviality that was unknown elsewhere in the Army training 
camps, even in the buildings belonging to the other welfare associations.  “The boys come to the 
House just as they come to the Y.M.C.A. Huts,” the head of the YWCA Hostess House 
Committee wrote in her history of hostess-house work, “but we give them something that they 
cannot give them. We do not entertain the boys, we give them a quiet comfortable seat with a 
book, by a fire . . . .”186 
The hostess house nursery was a special attraction for both women visitors and single 
soldiers alike. A piece in the War Work Bulletin entitled “Babies Have a Room” highlighted the 
novelty of the idea. When a new mother “saw the immaculate little beds, her eyes filled with 
                                            
185 Allen, Keeping Our Fighters Fit, 128.; See also “An Official View of the Hostess House,” War Work Bulletin, 
no. 33 (June 14, 1918): 3 
186 Mrs. Edward M. Townsend, “Hostess Houses,” April 10, 1918.  World War I, Hostess Houses, Miscellaneous, 
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tears and she said, ‘I never dreamed there was such a place here,’” the article recalled.187 Thanks 
to the baby-friendly facilities at the hostess house, wives could bring their children with them to 
meet their fathers, some for the first time.  Even soldiers without families of their own took to 
looking in on the little ones in the children’s room. “It’s not so much the great living room with 
its huge fireplace, nor the big cafeteria that seats two hundred persons at a time, nor even the 
comfortable smoking room of the Hostess House, but the nursery that soldiers at Camp Lewis, 
American Lake, Washington are exhibiting with the greatest delight to their friends,” recorded a 
dispatcher for the War Work Bulletin. “[M]an after man comes in and asks, ‘May I show my 
friend the nursery? It’s the first real bit of ‘home’ we have had since we came here.’”188 
Other YWCA services fit around the hostess house’s emphases on chaperonage, quiet 
visits, and cafeteria service. The primary benefit the hostess house offered to women, of course, 
was a place for them inside the camps. “I think the Army started out with the idea that there 
would be no women, but the women did come to the camps to visit the men,” the director of the 
hostess house program recalled.  “There were no opportunities or places where any woman could 
go to meet her man. They sat on barrels, sat on fences, etc., and there was a great unrest in the 
commanding officers’ minds as to how to handle the mothers and sisters and wives of the men in 
training who felt they must see the boys.”189  YWCA hostesses also offered concrete help to 
female guests, loaning women forgotten articles of clothing, and putting up family members of 
sick soldiers overnight.190 
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Hostess house staff, further, claimed to be educating by example in the camp buildings. 
The author of “Only Two Kinds of Pie” wrote that, in addition to serving women visitors and 
creating a homelike space for men, the hostess houses, “Through their cafeterias . . . aim to be a 
means of education and example to the women who visit the soldiers. Not a few of the guests,” 
she went on, “have had no opportunity to understand what food conservation means nor what 
substitutes for their ordinary diet the [United States Food Administration] is suggesting.”  
YWCA leaders understood the educational aspect of hostess-house work to be of particular 
relevance among nonwhite visitors. A December 1918 War Work Bulletin article on the so-
called colored hostess houses argued that, “Aside from their other services, the Hostess Houses 
also serve as an example of how to furnish a house in good taste and to serve meals that conform 
to the food regulations . . . .”191 
YWCA workers also kept an eye out for, and on, young women who had traveled to the 
training camps for the wrong reasons. The hostesses at the hostess gallery in Balboa Park, San 
Diego, for instance, became concerned for a girl who, accompanied by her sister, had followed 
her boyfriend to camp. “[I]t finally developed,” reported a hostess, “that she and her sister were 
both girls of very unfortunate reputations and so they were through our workers[’] discovery of 
them, advised by police authorities to return to their home.”  “I’m sure the kindly words of 
[advice] given them,” she went on, “must bear its fruit, no matter how hardened the girls seem 
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kindness and friendliness seem to touch them greatly.  Every day has brought its incidents in this 
protective side of the work also.”192 
Outside visiting hours, YWCA hostesses lavished attention on the servicemen who came 
to the hostess house.  Soldiers visiting the hostess house found an environment different from 
both their spare barracks and the noisy YMCA huts. The hostess house, explained one history of 
the program, was “not least where the soldier himself can find a comfortable chair by the fire, a 
quiet nook to read or write, a woman’s welcome from the Hostesses when he has no guest of his 
own, a dainty supplement to his heavy ration and a touch of home within the camp.”193 For 
soldiers wanting some time to themselves, the hostess house’s lounge was stocked with books 
provided by the ALA and newspapers donated by publishers.194  Hostesses were available to help 
with personal crises, such as the unraveling of a favorite sweater. The soldier in question, upon 
seeing it repaired by the YWCA workers, cried, “‘I am so glad to have it right again because my 
mother made it.’”195 
If the YMCA secretary was a surrogate Dad, the YWCA hostess was a surrogate mother, 
particularly to the soldiers.  A War Work Bulletin profile of Mrs. E. M. Townsend, chairwoman 
of the Hostess House Committee of the YWCA, emphasized her experience in real-life 
motherhood as preparation for heading the hostess house program. “She has two sons of her own 
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who went into the service at the beginning of the war and she knew what appeals to the man in 
camp,” the piece began, “—the man who appreciated the dishes mother cooked, the delicate 
china used at home, and the softly cushioned lounges, filled pipe and handy tobacco jar as he 
never did before.”196 
As surrogate mothers, one of the most important things the YWCA hostesses offered 
soldiers in training camps was an ear for the emotional pains associated with separation from 
their family. A hostess reporting from Wilbur Wright field wrote, “Many homesick boys have 
come into the office looking for some one who might understand and sympathize with them 
asking if we have time to talk with them: they are never ashamed to tell that they are homesick 
and lonely, and that it will mean much to them if we should let them visit a while,” she 
explained.197 A hostess at another airfield confirmed, “One of the high officials of the camp,” she 
noted, “said that we couldn’t render our country a greater service than that of cheering and 
encouraging these boys when we see that they need such comfort and help.”198 
 
YMCA and YWCA Architecture After the War 
Not long after the signing of the armistice, the United States Army and Navy 
“militarized” the training-camp welfare program, absorbing the services previously performed by 
the YMCA, the YWCA, and other organizations into the military hierarchy.  The YMCA and 
YWCA both left the camps, the YMCA donating most of its huts for continued use by the 
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military, the YWCA salvaging as many of its hostess houses as possible.  But this is not to say 
that the organizations returned to business as usual:  to the contrary, both adjusted their building 
programs to fit the lessons learned in war. 
In the years immediately following the Great War, the YMCA’s urban building program 
changed substantially.  Two developments are of particular note.  First, after the war the Building 
Bureau shifted its attention from complicated city buildings to smaller, simpler “community” 
structures.  Lupkin explains, “Branch buildings had existed before, as had buildings of different 
sizes for cities of different populations, but this was the first time that the model for design was 
not the large, complex ‘city’ building.”199  Second, during 1919 and 1920 the Building Bureau 
completed its evolution from an advisory department to a full architectural service.  As a result, 
the YMCA buildings constructed during the 1920s both were aesthetically more consistent and 
had plans better suited to their functions.200 
Both of these changes—a shift from city- to neighborhood-scale buildings, and the 
absorption by the Building Bureau of all stages of YMCA building design—were influenced by 
the organization’s cantonment work.  The connection between the hut-building program and the 
centralization of the YMCA’s design work is the more speculative of the two, but the following, 
at least, is clear.  Before the war, the Building Bureau offered an advisory service to local 
YMCAs constructing new buildings.  For a fee, Bureau staff would advise the architect chosen 
by the local organization as to the YMCA’s programmatic peculiarities, but it stopped short of 
actually designing the building; this was still the domain of the outside architect.201  During the 
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war, in contrast, the War Work Council’s Division of Construction was solely responsible for all 
aspects of the hut-building program, from conception to design and construction.  In the years 
just after the armistice, Neil McMillan—head of both the Bureau and the wartime Division of 
Construction—altered the Building Bureau along similar lines, eliminating the need for outside 
architects.  It seems unlikely that McMillan would have made such a change had the wartime 
administrative structure not proven successful.  He may even have structured the Division of 
Construction in anticipation of an increase in the Building Bureau’s responsibilities. 
Whether the Division of Construction was born of wartime necessity, or was a conscious 
experiment by McMillan in the centralized administration of design work, the postwar 
consolidation of architectural output under the Building Bureau improved the quality of YMCA 
building design, at least according to that organization’s representatives.  Charles C. May wrote 
in the Architectural Record about the extent to which local architects tended to misunderstand 
the YMCA program.  The prewar Building Bureau would provide the architect with blueprints of 
previously-constructed YMCA buildings as a guide to his design, May explained.  But “As often 
as not, the main idea was overlooked, and minor specialties, visible to a superficial eye, were 
pounced upon for use in a plant where they applied not at all.”202  The postwar Building Bureau 
would, by contrast, bring architects and experts on the YMCA program together in its New York 
office, and thus would “make their future plants increasingly the expression of a focusing of the 
most able and widely distributed architectural talent of the country upon their problems.”203 
While the link between the hut-building program and the postwar reorganization of the 
Building Bureau remains somewhat tenuous, the new community YMCA buildings introduced 
                                            
202 May, “A Post-War Construction Program,” 220. 
203 Ibid. 
   107 
after the war were directly modeled on the cantonment huts.  After the war, the YMCA 
appointed a special Commission on the Conservation of the Values of the War Work to make 
recommendation as to what wartime innovations the organization should retain.  Correspondence 
with soldiers and others who had visited the training-camp YMCAs indicated “a popular 
enthusiasm for the general idea of the hut.”204  But the Commission’s November 1919 report 
explained that because the cantonment huts had been built of wood for temporary use, it would 
be impossible to replicate them exactly outside Army posts and other special spaces—
community fire codes simply wouldn’t allow the erection of such flimsy structures.205   
It was the character, rather than the particular built environment, of cantonment hut work 
that the Commission recommended introducing to the peacetime YMCA building program.  In a 
section of the report on the “Psychological Effect” of the hut program, Commission members 
argued, “The simplicity and informality of the hut, which caught the fancy and won the approval 
of the enlisted man, should be carefully preserved in our permanent work.”206  Excerpts from 
soldiers’ letters included in the report emphasized the convenient locations of the huts (“in the 
very midst of the people it is sought to reach”); the lack of “constraint” on soldiers’ behavior 
within the huts; the “democratic” nature of the spaces; the variety of the hut program; and the 
huts’ “homelike” decoration, with “Nothing to attract attention but all worthy of it.”207  The 
Commission also listed the successful service features found in the huts, which included both 
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spaces (like the billiards room and library) familiar to members of urban YMCAs, and the kinds 
of flexible spaces (“Auditorium capable of adaptation for religious meetings, gymnasium, and 
theater”) that allowed the size-limited regimental hut to serve a variety of needs.208 
The Commission report recommended the building of small, hut-type recreational spaces 
in areas previously neglected in favor of center-city YMCAs, including factory and mill towns, 
amusement parks, and suburban neighborhoods.  The neighborhood YMCA hut, which became 
the centerpiece of the organization’s immediate postwar building program,209 was a logical 
extension of the YMCA’s training-camp work.  After all, a regimental group was to a divisional 
training camp was what a neighborhood was to a city or suburb.  The distribution of small 
buildings regiment by regiment in lieu of a single central YMCA had worked well in the 
cantonments; why couldn’t the same strategy best serve residents of America’s civilian cities and 
towns? 
Given the community-center program’s basis in the wartime hut program, it is perhaps no 
surprise that the Building Bureau’s postwar plans for neighborhood YMCAs closely resemble 
those of the regimental huts.  The type C-2 community building, as illustrated in May’s 
Architectural Record article (see figure 2.15), had, like the type E cantonment hut, 2 wings, one 
each filled by a social room and a multipurpose gymnasium and auditorium.  The C-2 
community building was more complex than the E buildings had been, with a billiards room 
attached to the social room and additional recreational facilities in the basement, but it was 
nevertheless much simpler than a prewar city building.  The multipurpose wing also retained the 
spirit of the camp buildings’ flexible program.  The building’s exterior, in the English cottage 
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style with a shingled roof and dormer windows, likewise marked its divergence from the 
YMCA’s city-center buildings, and brought it closer to the cantonment hut standard.  Though the 
C-2 building differed from the typical training-camp hut in its materials and the extent of its 
architectural treatment, both types were distinctly domestic in appearance, rather than inspired by 
commercial or civic architecture like the prewar YMCAs.210 
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Figure 2.15:  YWCA Community Building Type C-2.  Published in Charles C. May, 
“A Post-War Construction Program: The Building Bureau of the International 
Committee of the Y.M.C.A., Part I, ” Architectural Record 45, no. 3 (March, 1919). 
 
Finally, the Commission’s report on YMCA war work may have speeded the 
secularization of the urban YMCA program.  Of course, worship services and Bible studies had 
been an important part of the cantonment hut experience.  And civilian YMCAs across the 
United States had already embraced secular recreation to an extent unforeseen by the 
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organization’s founders.  But “in the war work,” wrote the commissioners, “there was a 
comprehensiveness and a reality in the service that covered the entire needs of the men away 
from home.  The balanced program gripped the lives of men.”  In the future, they urged, the 
YMCA should avoid focusing too much on any one aspect of its program, including its religious 
basis.211  After all, the majority of the soldiers who flocked to the cantonment huts hadn’t been 
looking for Jesus Christ.  They had instead sought nothing more than a place where they could 
put their feet up, watch a film or a read a newspaper, and forget, for a time, what was happening 
Over There. 
The YWCA’s city buildings, too, changed after the end of World War I.  The urban 
YWCAs constructed during the 1920s looked more like hostess houses and the precedents that 
shaped them, including Arts and Crafts residential designs and Julia Morgan’s Asilomar and 
PPIE building, and less like their original models, the city YMCAs of the late nineteenth century.  
The YWCAs of the prewar period were monumental, self-consciously urban buildings with 
tightly structured plans.  The postwar YWCAs, in contrast, were smaller in scale and yet more 
flexible in use, with fewer but larger rooms intended to meet a variety of needs. 
Julia Morgan herself designed over a dozen city YWCA buildings in the years following 
World War I.  One of her earliest was the “Y Cottage” at the University of College, Berkeley, 
built with YWCA War Work Council funds to carry on the organization’s work with students 
that had begun during the war.212  The low, many-gabled building had a nondescript exterior 
punctuated by tall rectangular windows; on the interior, it looked almost exactly like a hostess 
house.  A contemporary photograph shows visiting men and women sitting in wicker chairs in 
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front of a brick fireplace.  The two-story space is almost entirely without partitions, a short half-
wall serving to separate the fireplace area from a door to an adjacent room or hallway.  A 
mezzanine balcony and exposed trusses serve to diminish the space’s height, while a row of 
French doors dissolves the boundary between the building’s interior and exterior.213 
Morgan’s more elaborate postwar YWCAs also seem to have been influenced by her 
hostess house designs.  Though the exterior of her sprawling YWCA headquarters building in 
Honolulu, Hawaii, for example, is in a hybrid Italian Renaissance-Spanish Mission style, its 
interior has a distinct Arts and Craft flavor.  In the building’s combination library-sitting room, a 
series of unornamented arches segment the space into smaller areas for sitting and reading 
without actually obstructing either visitors’ circulation or the gaze of the YWCA matrons.  The 
ceiling is crisscrossed with exposed beams.214 
Morgan was not the only YWCA architect whose postwar designs echoed the simplicity 
and multi-functionality of the hostess houses.  William F. Thompson, a consulting architect 
headquartered in New York City, designed a series of city YWCAs during the 1920s according 
to the same formula:  living room, kitchen, gymnasium, plus a few smaller spaces for the 
building’s administration.  In his Erie, Pennsylvania, YWCA (see figure 2.16), for instance, the 
large entrance hall doubled as a living room; it connected via a small lobby to a 130-seat self-
service cafeteria.  Stairs at the opposite end of the entrance hall led to a gymnasium, which, with 
a stage, could also accommodate large meetings and performances.  Thompson’s rectangular 
YWCA building for Waterloo, Iowa (see figure 2.17) was even more flexible in plan.  To the left 
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of the entrance hall was a gymnasium with a folding stage; to its right, a social room connected 
via a removable partition to the cafeteria.215  Interior photographs of Thompson’s 1920s YWCAs 
show that while he preferred a neo-Colonial architectural style, he, not unlike Morgan, utilized 
partial rather than full walls to break larger spaces into multiple, more intimate, areas.216 
 
Figure 2.16:  William F. Thompson, YWCA Building, Erie, Pennsylvania (Built ca. 1923).  
Published in “Buildings for the Y. W. C. A.,” Architecture 48 (October 1923). 
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Figure 2.17:  William F. Thompson, YWCA Building, Waterloo, Iowa (Built ca. 
1923).  Published in “Buildings for the Y. W. C. A.” 
 
The architectural opening-up of the YWCA after World War I foreshadowed a gradual 
but undeniable shift in the organization’s mission.  The organization had, from its beginnings, 
pushed the boundaries of Victorian gender norms, justifying the involvement of upper-class 
women in urban reform as an extension of the domestic sphere, and supporting working 
women’s financial independence as a necessary evil of industrial capitalism.  But starting in the 
1920s, the YWCA would amplify its efforts to support professional women of all classes, and 
would downplay its historical identity as a religious organization born in the parlors of the upper 
class. 
That the YWCA would abandon the separate spheres ideology in the wake of the hostess 
house program is perhaps no surprise.  The training-camp project represented an important 
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moment in women’s history:  for the first time, American women had a literal place inside the 
military, not just as wives in officers’ housing, but in a space designed by and for them.  Though 
the hostess houses were clad in the trappings of traditional residential architecture, their flexible, 
multipurpose interiors suggested that the women who designed the houses saw in them an 
opportunity for the creation of new social and not just spatial arrangements.  Fay Kellogg, 
Katharine Budd, and Julia Morgan were, after all, themselves twentieth-century New Women—
women who had already built for themselves a space outside the expected. 
 
Conclusion 
Both the YMCA and the YWCA defined their World War I buildings against the Army 
cantonments in which they were built.  The YMCA huts and YWCA hostess houses, their 
supporters claimed, offered an antidote to the demoralizing effects of military training.  As such, 
the hut and hostess house programs paralleled the organizations’ urban work, in which upper- 
and middle-class sponsors worked to uphold traditional moral values in the face of changing 
social and economic conditions.  But neither the YMCA nor the YWCA had faced a test like 
World War I before—in the training camps and beyond, the organizations operated on an 
unprecedented scale and scope. 
Both organizations, as a result, appear to have learned both programmatic and 
architectural lessons from their in-camp experiences, lessons that they would apply to civilian 
America during the postwar period.  For the YMCA, the success of the Army huts led to a 
postwar building program focused on neighborhood-scale recreation centers.  It may also have 
encouraged the Building Bureau to centralize the construction of urban and suburban YMCAs.  
The YWCA similarly approached the design of urban buildings after the war as it had the hostess 
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house program, creating simplified, flexible spaces designed to facilitate social interactions on a 
variety of scales.   In both cases, the change in building program prefaced a profound change in 
organizational mission, one in which Victorian moral standards no longer had a place.  
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Chapter 3:  Civilianizing Army Housing: The War Department Housing 
Program and the Prewar Suburb 
 
Introduction 
If the cantonments of World War I were “magic cities,” the permanent Army posts of the 
early 1920s were altogether too real.  Housing was a particular problem, with barracks and 
officers’ quarters—some more than half a century old, some temporary structures leftover from 
the war—in disrepair.  In a 1926 guide to Army posts (“The Baedeker of the Army,” according 
to the book’s subtitle), Captain Charles J. Sullivan detailed the extent of the housing problem at 
each reservation.  At Mitchel Field, on Long Island, married officers lived in “56 old frame sets 
of the temporary type, semi-modern, poor condition . . . .”217  At Camp Lewis, similarly, nearly 
all of the same type of quarters were “old converted cantonment buildings made habitable by a 
great deal of work and enough expense to have built a great many real sets.”218  Army officials 
worried about the impact the posts’ decay had on retention rates:  the low morale brought on by 
poor living conditions had resulted in “a very high and discouraging percentage of desertions,” 
Secretary of War Dwight F. Davis alleged in 1925.219 
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Conditions began to change in 1926, when the Army inaugurated a massive post-
renovation program known as the War Department Housing Program (WDHP; variously the 
Army Housing Program).  The influx of funds dedicated to the replanning and rebuilding of 
barracks and officers’ quarters nationwide allowed the Army to consolidate and redistribute 
troops according to the organizational mandates of the 1920 National Defense Act.  More 
significantly, through the WDHP the Army redefined itself spatially as a particularly American 
institution that prized individuality and privacy as much as it did uniformity and hierarchy.  For 
the officials in charge of the WDHP, planning and architecture were critical tools in the 
reformation of the Army between the two world wars. 
As during the Great War, during the WDHP military officials relied on civilian design 
professionals to materialize their vision of the new Army.  The pivotal figure in this episode was 
George Burdett Ford, a New York consultant and active participant in the American city 
planning movement.  To a lesser degree, Arthur Loomis Harmon also played a role in the 
WDHP, as architectural advisor. 
Ford’s work for the WDHP in particular both reflected and helped to shape contemporary 
ideas about effective city planning.  The planners who had laid out the cantonments of World 
War I had conceptualized the Army training camp as a homogeneously urban space, with 
separate zones for work, residence, and recreation, and with residence segregated by military 
rank, per Army policy.  Ford took the separation of work and residence one step further, 
removing the officers’ housing from the central post to self-contained enclaves planned 
according to suburban design principles.  Ford’s Army post plans reflected his conviction that 
the best place to live, particularly for members of the middle and upper classes, was outside the 
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city altogether, in suburban developments protected by zoning and other controls against 
densification and the encroachment of competing land uses. 
Ford was not alone in suggesting that the removal of housing to a city’s surrounds would 
help to solve the problems associated with urban congestion.  As a leader in the early twentieth-
century city planning movement, Ford saw his argument in favor of suburbanization published in 
popular architectural and city-planning journals, and discussed at national conferences.  While 
historians have offered a number of explanations for America’s love affair with the suburbs, 
including changing ideas about the family and the availability of cheap rapid transit, the support 
of some city planners for the suburbanization of middle-class housing has been overlooked.220  
Ford’s story helps to correct this imbalance. 
The architecture of the WDHP reinforced the identity of the renovated Army posts with 
civilian cities and suburbs.  Military officials expected that the application of particularly 
American architectural styles to post buildings would help to reverse the stereotype of the 
military as an anti-democratic institution.  Local variations in style, moreover, would tie 
individual posts to their neighboring communities as well as to the centralized Army command 
apparatus.  On a more practical level, the architectural improvement of officers’ housing would 
make accepting an Army commission as attractive as taking a white-collar civilian job.  In other 
words, the Army officials responsible for the WDHP hoped that it would, by making military 
posts spatially indistinguishable from civilian communities, negate some of the difficulties 
inherent to raising a volunteer Army in a decentralized democracy. 
The WDHP prefigured the federal government’s support for suburbanization and 
concordant neglect of the inner city in the decades beginning with FDR’s presidency.  The 
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suburbanization of officers’ housing gave official sanction to a conviction already shared by 
many civilians that the city was no longer a good place to live.  The impact within the Army of 
the separation of housing according to rank was relatively benign, as it constituted a symptom 
rather than a cause of military hierarchization.  But in the world outside the Army post, the 
government-supported spatial segregation of Americans by class and race would have dire 
consequences not just for the United States’s built environment, but for American social relations 
more generally. 
This chapter begins with a brief introduction to the WDHP and Ford’s involvement in the 
same, followed by an overview of the history of suburbanization in the United States up to the 
1920s.  It then turns to Ford’s work as WDHP city planner, taking his plans for Fort Lewis and 
Governors Island as case studies.  It next considers the architectural side of the WDHP program, 
and particularly the question of style and Army post architecture.  The chapter concludes with a 
look forward to federal support for suburbanization during the New Deal and the years 
immediately following World War II. 
 
The War Department Housing Program 
The War Department inaugurated its base renovation program in early 1926, following 
the passage of legislation that proposed using the proceeds from the sale of surplus Army 
reservations to finance new construction.221  The WDHP followed years during which Army 
construction was almost at a standstill, and during which much of the wartime staff of the 
Construction Division—now the Construction Service—departed for other posts or for civilian 
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jobs.222  But by 1923, worsening housing conditions were prompting embarrassing investigations 
by the popular press.  The Secretary of War responded with a proposal for a base renewal 
program valued at $110 million over ten years.223 
The WDHP was more than an answer to media criticism of Army housing.  It was also an 
opportunity to reform the Army spatially according to the mandates of the 1920 National 
Defense Act.  This landmark legislation settled, at least for the time being, the question of 
military format:  Would the American Army, as Chief of Staff General Peyton C. March and 
reformer General Emory Upton hoped, be a professional force large enough to serve as the 
skeleton of a wartime draft Army?  Or would the Regular Army, as most members of Congress 
desired, comprise a reduced force whose primary duty was to train civilian members of the 
National Guard and the Organized Reserves?  The 1920 Act landed in favor of the latter scheme, 
which privileged the ideal of the citizen-soldier over that of a centralized, professional—and 
some would say, un-American—fighting force.224 
                                            
222 Lenore Fine and Jesse A. Remington, The Corps of Engineers: Construction in the United States, United States 
Army in World War II, The Technical Services (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 
2003), 43-4, http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/010/10-5/index.html (accessed September 12, 2012).  In 
August of 1921, Secretary of John W. Weeks issued a moratorium on permanent construction except where 
absolutely necessary.  As a consequence, spending on military-post construction fell to an average of $755,893 per 
year. 
223 Fine and Remington, The Corps of Engineers, 45-7. 
224 Richard W. Stewart, ed., “Between World Wars,” chap. 2 in American Military History Volume II: The United 
States Army in a Global Era, 1917-1923, Army Historical Series (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 
United States Army, 2005), 53-76, http://www.history.army.mil/books/AMH-V2/AMH-V2-PDF.htm (accessed 
September 12, 2012).  Under the 1920 National Defense Act, the Army of the United States was to be composed of 
three organizations: the Regular Army; the National Guard; and the Organized Reserves. The Regular Army, with 
an authorized maximum strength of 280,000,  was too small to form the skeleton of a wartime army. Up to 17,726 of 
these men-- triple the prewar number--were to be officers. Thus the Regular Army would be equipped to fulfill its 
new mission, training the National Guard and the Reserve troops. In addition, the 1920 National Defense Act 
required half of the officer force to be made up of non-Regular veterans of the Great War and compelled Army 
officials to make promotions from a single list of candidates, effectively prohibiting discrimination on the basis of 
time spent in a Regular unit. 
   122 
The National Defense Act of 1920 had an immediate effect on the location and relative 
importance of Army installations across the continental United States. According to the Act, the 
Army of the United States was to be distributed evenly throughout nine corps areas, geographical 
regions with approximately equal civilian populations.  Each corps areas would house six 
infantry divisions, of which only one belonged to the Regular Army.225  The WDHP offered the 
first real chance since the passage of the National Defense Act to renovate existing Army posts 
and build new ones according to these mandates. 
But while the National Defense Act effected a lesser expansion of the Regular Army than 
an Uptonian scheme would have, the theory that underlay it suggested a substantial improvement 
in living conditions for recruits.  That is, if members of the Army were to be citizens first and 
soldiers second, they should be able to expect roughly the same standard of housing they might 
inhabit in civilian life.  In an all-volunteer force that competed for officers with private-sector 
employers, quality of life on Army posts mattered.  Under the WDHP, Ford and the 
Quartermaster Corps created spaces that mimicked contemporary cities and suburbs in part to 
solve the problem of recruitment and retention as posed by the reorganization of the Army under 
the National Defense Act. 
George B. Ford brought a history of wartime architectural work and a reputation as one of 
the United States’s foremost city planners to his work for the WDHP.226  Ford, who studied at 
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Harvard University and at the École de Beaux-Arts,227 headed the Red Cross’s Reconstruction 
Bureau during the Great War, then worked with the French Renaissance des Cités to replan 
bomb-torn Rheims, among other cities.  He also gave lectures on city planning to the American 
Expeditionary Force Art Training Center in Bellevue, Seine-et-Oise, France.228  Ford, who would 
go on to found the journal City Planning, was present at the first National Conference on City 
Planning in 1909.  He joined Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr. and E. P. Goodrich as delegates of the 
same organization to the Council on National Defense at the start of World War I.  After the war, 
as part of Goodrich’s Technical Advisory Corporation, he worked with over 100 planning 
commissions in 30 cities.  A lifelong advocate of zoning and other environmental controls, Ford 
was a consultant to the Committee on City Planning of the Board of Estimate and 
Apportionment, and to the Commission on Building Districts and Restrictions for New York 
City.  Later he served as an adviser on the Russell Sage Foundation Plan of New York and its 
Environs, and at the time of his death was general director of the New York Regional Plan 
Association.229  
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The Suburbanization of the United States, 1815-1941 
The civilian context for the WDHP was one in which the balance of the United States’s 
built environment had just tipped in favor of the suburban over the urban.230  Suburban historians 
agree that upper- and middle-class families fled the city center beginning in the late-nineteenth 
century in order to escape the social and spatial ills there.  This reaction against industrial 
capitalism and the spaces it created was, in turn, closely related to a shift in the definition of the 
home, which had been the locus of production but now was understood as a moral safe haven to 
be kept at a distance from the workplace.  In this new world of separate spheres, privacy was the 
paramount cultural value, and the city’s inability to offer much privacy to its residents was one 
of its principal failings.231 
In its planning and architecture, the characteristic American suburb of the late-nineteenth 
and early-twentieth century was neither urban nor rural, but a combination of both:  what art 
historians call the picturesque.232  Early suburban developers including Frederick Law Olmsted, 
Sr. carefully manipulated design elements to give the impression of a seamless integration of the 
manmade and the natural—though, as in Olmsted’s Central Park and other urban projects, not 
much of the preexisting landscape had actually been left untouched.  An identifying feature of 
the picturesque suburb was its winding roads, which thwarted industry’s emphasis on efficiency 
and economy.233 
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But despite its eschewal of urban form, the pre-World War II suburb remained entirely 
dependent upon the city.  In fact, as Robert Fishman has pointed out, middle- and upper-class 
suburbs retained a connection to the center city exactly because all of the elements the former 
excluded—including factories, office buildings, and stores—could be found in the latter.234  Thus 
the suburbanization of the United States cannot be considered apart from American urban 
history, as suburbs and cities remained economically and socially tied until at least the late-
twentieth century. 
Though other populations did seek out and create suburban communities of their own,235 
until the second half of the twentieth century suburbanization remained primarily a white, upper- 
and middle-class phenomenon.  The exclusion of people of color and lower incomes from the 
earliest suburbs would eventually heighten the power imbalance between city and suburbs:  as 
more and more wealthy, politically-influential people moved to the urban surrounds, they left 
behind in the center city a population ill-equipped to pay the city’s bills, let alone direct its 
physical development.  Thus federal aid to suburban homeownership translated into financial 
support for the white and well-off, and a concordant neglect of the nonwhite urban working 
class. 
Some of the ramifications of widespread suburbanization were yet unclear at the time of 
the WDHP.  Nevertheless, the writing was, to some extent, on the cottage walls:  those who 
could, left the city center.  Those who could not would wait out the demographic and economic 
shifts taking place. 
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Ford consistently promoted suburbanization as the best solution to the problems 
associated with center-city congestion.  In his contribution to Benjamin Marsh’s 1909 An 
Introduction to City Planning, Ford argued that the best location for urban housing was “in all 
the outlying districts,” accompanied by secondary commercial centers to allow for “an 
independent existence.  The streets as far as is consistent with the future development of the city 
should be irregular and winding, arranged in small plots so as to allow a certain amount of land 
about each house”—Ford’s scheme permitted only single-family houses, not apartments or 
tenement buildings.  The size of the house plots would vary according to the class of the 
residents, but all residential blocks should have open space for playgrounds at their centers.  The 
particular plan of each subdivision would “[depend] upon the natural topography of the country 
and every advantage should be taken of this in planning the district.”236 
A 1913 report authored by Ford’s brother, Harvard housing expert James Ford, and 
published under George Ford’s name,237 applied his theory of suburban housing to the particular 
case of Newark, New Jersey.  In its section on “The Housing Problem,” the report asked whether 
tenements or cottages made more desirable dwellings.  In tenements, wrote James Ford, “True 
privacy and solitude, though very important to the growth of the moral individual are difficult to 
obtain . . . . [I]n general the atmosphere of the tenement or apartment house is one destined to 
create a race of adults that are unhealthful, puny, and socially, highly artificialized.”238  The 
suburban cottage, on the other hand, offered plenty of privacy; less dust; more natural sunlight; 
and an opportunity to educate children through contact with nature.  “It is probable, therefore,” 
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James Ford concluded, that at least for families with children, “the suburban home is preferable 
to the tenement.”239 
The Newark report went on to discuss some methods of promoting suburban housing.  
These included altering the building codes to make the construction of tenements prohibitively 
expensive,240 encouraging architects to experiment with low-cost single- and multiple-family 
suburban houses,241 zoning residential areas to disallow conflicting land uses,242 and lowering the 
price of suburban land by taxing or otherwise discouraging speculation.243  More specifically, 
James Ford suggested that Newark’s public works department should discontinue its insistence 
on standard lot sizes arranged along orthogonal roads.  If the main streets of the city’s outer 
residential districts were wide enough, the report proposed, the subdivider could plan for narrow 
residential streets; “these streets might wind, which would enhance their beauty, and if on a 
hillside, ought to wind in some accordance with the contour lines of the hill.”244 
Ford diverged from many of his contemporaries245 in his support for suburbanization, but 
he nevertheless argued that suburban development should be planned, not allowed to proceed 
according to the whims of private builders.  Ford’s preference for the planned decentralization 
for urban housing grew out of his admiration for the German planning model.  Indeed, his 
description of an ideal city plan in his 1909 essay for Marsh’s book was a hybrid of City 
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Beautiful—which Ford criticized for its focus on aesthetics over “scientific” data-collection246—
and German ring-road planning.  At the center of Ford’s city were monumental government 
buildings circled by broad streets; outside these were the business center, then office buildings, 
then radial avenues leading in every direction.  The radial roads led from the center city to 
secondary centers, which in turn were connected by a ring road.  Outside the ring road Ford 
located apartment buildings then, beyond, “winding and picturesque streets with irregular blocks 
and lots for small houses.”247 
In 1910 Ford traveled to Germany for the General Town Planning Exhibition, where he 
was among the first foreigners to view the entries for a planning competition for greater Berlin.  
He particularly admired two aspects of the German plans on display:  their attention to the traffic 
problem; and their method of zoning.  Traffic was an important consideration for any city 
because, as Ford wrote, its main question was how to provide residents with the best life for the 
least money.  “All agree that this can be done better in the suburbs than it can in the heart of the 
city, provided the land for the building of cottage houses can be secured at a reasonable rate, and 
provided that adequate transit to these points can be provided,” Ford argued.  The German 
planners represented at the exhibition had handled the latter admirably, designing a system of 
radial and circumferential avenues to provide rapid access to the city center from the suburbs, 
and vice versa.248 
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Ford also applauded the zoning system employed by planners in various German cities.  
As his brother would argue in the 1913 Newark report, Ford saw zoning as an effective means to 
promote suburbanization.  By setting maximum building heights and lot sizes relatively low in 
outlying districts, city planners could insure that these areas would not be taken over by 
commercial or other land uses.  At the same time, higher limits in the center city would make the 
construction of housing there unprofitable.  Though German zoning was relatively stringent, with 
every part of the city assigned parameters regarding subdivision and construction, Ford wrote, 
“The curious part of this zone system is that the property owners do not seem to object to it, and 
the German cities seem to have comparatively little trouble from complaints of discrimination 
against individuals.  In other words it is simply a matter of getting used to it.”249 
Thus Ford, like many middle- and upper-class Americans of his time, thought 
suburbanization was the best solution to the problems associated with urban congestion.  But this 
did not mean that Ford neglected the center city.  Rather, he saw suburban planning as an 
essential part of city planning; just as the cities and suburbs were economically dependent, so 
should their physical development be carefully coordinated.  Ford’s plans for the WDHP were 
microcosms of his approach to metropolitan planning more generally, in which housing for the 
well-off was both a part of and kept apart from the remainder of the urban environment. 
 
WDHP Planning 
Among Ford’s subjects during his tenure with the WDHP were two very different posts:  
Fort Lewis, between Tacoma and Olympia, Washington; and Governors Island, in New York 
Harbor.  Fort Lewis was first laid out only a decade before, as a temporary National Army 
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cantonment (see chapter 1).  Governors Island, on the other hand, had been an Army reservation 
since 1783, and in 1927 was home to a collection of permanent buildings of varying ages, as well 
as a number of Great War-era storage buildings.  But despite the dissimilarity of their 
geographical locations, histories of use, and intended future use, Ford’s redesign of both posts 
followed a common pattern.  At Fort Lewis and Governors Island, as in many of his other 
WDHP plans, Ford separated the officers’ housing from the rest of the post and applied a 
different formal model to each area.  Ford laid out the administration and operation facilities as 
well as the enlisted barracks in geometrical and relatively dense arrangements; the “residential 
section” of the bases, in contrast, comprised low-density housing scattered along curving lanes.  
Ford’s plans for Fort Lewis and Governors Island, in other words, replicated his ideal city on the 
scale of the Army post. 
Ford’s plan for Fort Lewis was based on an earlier scheme laid out by Charles H. 
Alden,250 an architect and officer in the National Guard Reserve.  With an eye to the site’s 
limitations, including the location of World War I-era infrastructure, Alden selected a central 
portion of the cantonment grounds for development as a permanent post.  This area, which had 
only been partly built-upon during the war, was relatively open to the north but heavily wooded 
to the south.251 
                                            
250 The son of an Army surgeon, Charles H. Alden, III (1867-1951), studied architecture at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (M.A. 1890). After working with Cram and Wentworth, and Shepley, Rutan and Coolidge in 
Boston, and Howard and Galloway in San Francisco, Alden opened his own practice in Seattle, in 1909. With 
Shepley, Rutan and Coolidge Alden took part in the design of Stanford University, in Palo Alto, California; he 
assisted Howard and Galloway as local manager at the Alaska-Yukon-Pacific Exposition. In 1915 he was head of 
the architectural department for the Panama-Pacific Fair in San Francisco. Alden was a Fellow of the American 
Institute of Architects as well as Regional Director of the association’s Western Mountain District. He published 
articles on architecture and city planning, primarily concerning Seattle, and worked on his local city and county 
planning commissions.  Clyde Grainger, “Charles Henry Alden, III, F.A.I.A., 1867-1951,” Journal of the American 
Institute of Architects 16 (December 1951): 262-263; Alan Michelson, “Alden, Charles,” Pacific Coast Architecture 
Database, https://digital.lib.washington.edu/architect/architects/2541/. 
251 Charles H. Alden to The Commanding General, Fort Lewis, Washington, “Plan of Proposed New Construction,” 
October 14, 1927.  War Dept.  EI.1-EI.57.  GBF.  FLL-SC. 
   131 
Alden located the enlisted men’s barracks, which in fact were already under construction, 
north of Montana Avenue, where C. F. Pilat had sited the First Brigade Infantry’s barracks 
during World War I (see figure 3.1).  Across the road to the southwest would be a parade ground, 
also designated as such during Pilat’s time, and, in the woods beyond, officers’ quarters.  The 
separation of officers’ housing from the barracks, Alden explained, would 
meet the military and social conditions in that the officers will not be living in close 
proximity to the enlisted men, implying constant surveillance detrimental to their 
contentment and morale. The welfare and contentment of the officers and their families, 
it is believed would also be improved by not being in too close proximity to the men 
while at the same time sufficiently close to make it convenient for the officers to attend to 
their administrative duties.252 
 
 
Figure 3.1:  C. F. Pilat, Plan of Camp Lewis.  Published in National Army Cantonments: 
Plans and Photographs, June 1918 (War Department, Construction Division, 1918). 
 
 
Besides providing some distance from the enlisted men, Alden argued, the wooded 
location of the officers’ houses had independent merits.  The area was “admirably suited to 
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development for residential purposes and would be considered eminently desirable for such use 
in civil community,” he wrote.  The site’s natural beauty was among its recommendations:  “The 
trees, many of which are of permanent value, offer an attractive setting for the buildings and the 
proposed roads following the higher contours of the ground add to the attractive setting, forming 
an interesting and natural development of the problem.”253  For Alden, who was writing to the 
Commanding General at Fort Lewis, providing officers with “attractive” housing comparable to 
what might be found outside some civilian city was as important a design consideration as was 
respecting the hierarchy of command. 
Ford took over work on the Fort Lewis plan beginning in November of 1927, at the 
request of an officer in the Office of the Quartermaster General.  That officer asked Ford to 
review Alden’s plan as well as one prepared by the OQMG, and to “make any suggestions that 
may seem to you to be advisable in regard to the suggested changes, particularly in regard to the 
general arrangement of the officers’ quarters area.”  Not much else could be adjusted, as the 
barracks were already being built, and work on the hospital was under contract.254 
Ford responded with two different layouts drawn three weeks apart.  The first, dated 
December 1, 1927,255 is uniformly formal.  North of the parade ground are three U-shaped roads 
surrounded by barracks.  To the west of these, on a rectangular plot, is the post exchange; west of 
the post exchange is a triangular plot containing, from north to south, the NCO club, the existing 
post library, and the headquarters building.  North of the post exchange, and entirely isolated 
from the rest of the base, are six single-family quarters and one apartment building, probably for 
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non-commissioned officers.  The commanding officer’s quarters is at the top of the parade 
ground, surrounded by a traffic circle.  West of the circle is the post chapel.  South of the chapel 
and commanding officers’ house are, respectively, a large apartment building for bachelor 
officers, and the officers’ clubs. 
In his December 1 scheme, Ford arrayed the officers’ quarters in columns within 
rectangular blocks south of the parade ground.  Multi-family houses or small apartment buildings 
form a row fronting the parade ground.  South of these are U’s of single-family houses, 94 in 
total.  Two of the blocks contain a rectangular open space at their center; the other two have only 
a vertical service road dividing the two columns of houses; Ford modified the width of the blocks 
to align them with the barracks blocks across the parade ground.  Ford evidently intended the 
dense woods described by Alden to be cleared, as he indicates a uniform planting scheme—trees 
planted at even intervals along the edges of each blocks, with clusters of trees marking each 
corner—for the entire pots. 
Ford sent the Quartermaster General a second layout for Fort Lewis256 (see figure 3.2) on 
December 21.  “I am to say,” he wrote General Cheatham, “that I like this scheme much better 
than the formal arrangement which I sent you ten days ago.”  In it, he explained, Ford had 
attempted to “preserve all the best features of Mr. Alden’s scheme” in combination with some of 
the better aspects of his and the OQMG’s earlier plans.  In contrast to his December 1 scheme, 
which had assumed—aside from the existing buildings and the barracks under construction—a 
tabula rasa, in his revised plan Ford depicted all of the existing trees; with respect to the wooded 
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area in the south, “I believe it will be possible,” he wrote, “with a light shifting of location of 
houses on the ground, to avoid cutting any tree.” 257 
 
 
Figure 3.2:  George B. Ford, Plan of Fort Lewis.  “New Army Posts for Old: A New Design 
and Layout for Army Posts and Fields,” Quartermaster Review 9, no. 3 (Nov.-Dec. 1929): 
19-22. 
 
Ford altered both the northern and southern segments of the post in his December 21 
plan.  He rearranged the administrative and club buildings so as to diminish the importance of 
any single structure:  for instance, he moved the NCO club onto the post exchange’s plot, and he 
relocated the chapel from the head of the parade ground to the corner of the triangular block 
containing the library and the post headquarters building.  Ford pushed the commanding officer’s 
quarters back to the plot previously occupied by the chapel, and placed an additional small 
building to either side of it along a semicircular drive.  The three buildings are shown surrounded 
by preexisting trees, and thus are associated, in terms of landscape, with the officers’ quarters to 
the south, rather than with the more formal building groups to the north.  
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In his December 21 plan, Ford abandoned the symmetry between officers’ and enlisted 
housing in favor of an informal arrangement of 78 single-family houses around curved roads.  
Between the loops of single-family houses Ford reserved two large and several smaller open 
spaces, as suburban planning principles suggested.  Ford made up for the reduction in the 
number of single-family homes between his first and second plans by doubling the number of 
multiple-family structures from four to eight.  He arranged these along the southern rather than 
the northern boundary of the wooded area, thus increasing the distance between the post proper 
and the majority of the officers’ residences. 
Ford’s apparently random arrangement of Fort Lewis’s officers’ quarters in fact 
concealed a secret order.  That is, as he explained to the Quartermaster General, Ford had split 
the houses into three groups, each corresponding to a particular regiment and its barracks group 
across the parade.  Thus he had balanced the organizational reality that underlay every Army 
base with his conviction that the best place for officers to live was away from the regimentation 
of the rest of the post. 
Ford’s plan for Governors Island was also based on another architect’s design, this one 
authored by the prestigious firm of McKim, Mead & White.  Ford began working as an 
intermediary between the OQMG and the New York practice in May of 1927.  But by June of 
the same year he had become frustrated enough with McKim, Mead & White’s handling of the 
project that he prepared an alternate scheme for consideration by the Quartermaster General. 
The Governors Island project was particularly important to the administrators of the 
WDHP.  The post was significant not just historically but also organizationally, as a regional 
Army headquarters.258  In addition, the post was just across the water from Manhattan and thus 
                                            
258 Governors Island was made headquarters of the Second Corps Area in 1920, following the National Defense Act 
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highly visible, not just to New Yorkers but to immigrants arriving at neighboring Ellis Island.  “It 
is desired when completed this shall be a ‘show post’ and that all the buildings and the general 
layout shall present a neat and artistic appearance,” a member of the OQMG explained.259  As of 
early 1927, the island was anything but (see figure 3.4).  A New York Times article from March 
of that year quoted a visiting congressman as saying:  “From what one sees from the water side, 
[Governors Island] is a dump.  The military position here is a permanent one and has been since 
the first days of the island.  The buildings, therefore, should be permanent stone structures 
instead of wooden shacks.”260 
  
                                                                                                                                             
Landmarks Preservation Commission, 1996), 18, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/lpc/downloads/pdf/reports/GOVERNORS_ISLAND_-_HISTORIC_DISTRICT.pdf 
(accessed September 13, 2012). 
259 W. R. Gibson to Quartermaster, 2d Corps Area, Governors Island, New York, “Supply and utility layout for 
Governors Island,” October 20, 1927.  War Dept.  EI.1-EI.57.  GBF.  FLL-SC. 
260 Article (New York Times, March 6, 1927) quoted in National Park Service History Program, Northeast Region, 
Governors Island National Monument, New York, New York: Historic Resource Study  (National Park Service, 
2007), 196. http://www.nps.gov/history/history/online_books/gois/gois_hrs.pdf (accessed September 20, 2012). 
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Figure 3.3:  Governors Island during World War I.  Published in National Park Service 
History Program, Northeast Region, “Governors Island National Monument, New York, 
New York: Historic Resource Study,” 
http://www.nps.gov/history/history/online_books/gois/gois_hrs.pdf  
 
Given the Quartermaster Corps’s concern for the aesthetics of the post, McKim, Mead & 
White was a logical choice for the job.  During the Gilded Age, the firm had become 
“synonymous with bringing American buildings to a level of design equal to that of 
contemporary Europe,” writes historian Mosette Broderick.261  Though the original partners also 
designed residences, the practice was best known for its institutional and civic buildings and 
monuments, including the Washington Arch in Washington Square Park (1892); the campuses of 
Columbia University (1893-1900) and New York University (1891-1900); the Boston Public 
Library (1895); Pennsylvania Station (1910); the main building of the American Academy in 
                                            
261 Mosette Broderick, Triumvirate: McKim, Mead & White, Art, Architecture, Scandal, and Class in America’s 
Gilded Age (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2010), xxii. 
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Rome (1914); and the Harvard Business School (1925).  McKim, Mead & White also had a few 
Army connections:  the firm had designed the Army War College’s central building, Roosevelt 
Hall (1903-1907).  And Lt. Col. Francis B. Wheaton, who headed the Quartermaster General’s 
architectural staff during the WDHP, had worked for the practice before accepting a commission 
with the Army.262 
McKim, Mead & White submitted a tentative layout for Governors Island during the 
spring of 1927.  Lawrence Grant White, founding partner Stanford White’s son, recorded the 
criticisms of a number of War Department representatives at a May 3 meeting.  Among the 
Army officials’ objections was to McKim, Mead & White’s assignment of officers to single-
family houses.  “This is a City problem not comparable to the traditional frontier posts,” White 
wrote, for which apartment buildings would be most appropriate.263 
A few weeks later, McKim, Mead & White sent Ford a revised scheme for Governors 
Island, asking for his comments.  Ford either had not heard or had ignored the consensus of the 
May 3 Army group against single-family officers’ houses.  He suggested that the New York firm 
should split the officers’ apartments into a group of smaller buildings facing Buttermilk Channel.  
A similar treatment could apply to the nurses’ quarters.264 
The architects at McKim, Mead & White continued to develop their layout for Governors 
Island over the following months.  Among firm’s drawings retained by Ford is a plan labeled 
                                            
262 Fine and Remington, The Corps of Engineers, 48. 
263 L. G. White, “Re: Governors Island, Memorandum of Conference Held at the Office of the Secretary of War, 
Washington, D.C., 2:30 P.M., Tuesday, May Third, 1927,” 1.  War Dept.  EI.1-EI.57.  GBF.  FLL-SC. 
264 McKim, Mead & White to George B. Ford, Esq., “Governors Island,” May 26, 1927.  War Dept.  EI.1-EI.57.  
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Dept.  EI.1-EI.57.  GBF.  FLL-SC; L. G. White, “Memorandum,” June 2, 1927.  War Dept.  EI.1-EI.57.  GBF.  
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“Scheme B,” dated July 1, 1927.265  The plan reserves the southwestern portion of the island as a 
large parade ground or park, per Army officials’ request.  The centerpiece of the built-up area in 
the north is a massive U-shaped barracks and drill hall, which faces both the parade ground and 
the old Fort Jay.   To the northwest of the barracks building are a small building for non-
commissioned officers and the hospital, which is I-shaped in plan.  To the southeast are another 
NCO quarters and the YMCA building. 
McKim, Meade & White arranged the remaining quarters along the long edges of the 
semi-oval leading from the barracks building to the water side of Fort Jay and back again.  To 
the north are a small quarters for the post nurses, a larger NCO apartment building, and—
mirroring the nurses’ home—the post school.  To the southeast are two U-shaped officers’ 
apartments buildings.  Beyond the apartments, to the far side of the post chapel and the officers 
club, is a V of six officers’ quarters, probably multi-family building, plus the hostess house. 
McKim, Mead & White’s Scheme B is unsurprising, given both the War Department’s 
preference for a monumental urban scheme, and the firm’s reputation as a bastion of Beaux-Arts 
architecture and planning.  The post buildings are widely spaced and as symmetrical as possible 
in arrangement; they are connected by perpendicular, diagonal, or semi-circular roads; the major 
intersections are marked with traffic circles; and the widest roads are pictured as tree-lined 
boulevards.  Even the sidewalks in front of the officers’ apartment buildings echo the geometry 
of the plan of as a whole, with two perpendicular paths meeting at a circle.  The Army had asked 
for a “show post”; McKim, Mead & White delivered.266 
                                            
265 The George B. Ford Collection at Frances Loeb Library, Harvard University, also contains an aerial perspective 
drawing of the entire island, and a perspective showing the façade of the main barracks/drill hall building, both by 
McKim, Mead & White.  See folder Governors Island, NY.  E. IV Series.  GBF.  FLL-SC. 
266 McKim, Mead & White, “Governors Island, New York Harbor, Plot Plan, Scheme ‘B,’” July 1, 1927.  
Governors Island, NY.  E. IV Series.  GBF.  FLL-SC. 
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Ford’s September 1927 plan for Governors Island was similar to McKim, Mead & 
White’s with one important exception:  his treatment of the officers’ quarters.  Like in McKim, 
Mead & White’s plan, Ford situated the combination barracks and drill hall near the 
geographical center of the island.  He preserved much of the New York firm’s circulation 
pattern, and rendered the area to either side of Fort Jay even more symmetrical by breaking up 
the officers’ apartment buildings into multiple smaller structures and arranging them to mirror 
the buildings on the island’s opposite side.  The majority of Ford’s plan, therefore, was as tied to 
the City Beautiful tradition as was McKim, Mead & White’s. 
Ford gave the officers’ houses at the southeast corner of the island an entirely different 
treatment.  Again flouting Army officials’ wish for consolidation, Ford broke McKim, Mead & 
White’s multi-family houses into smaller structures, and pushed these to the very edge of the 
island—as far away from the central monumental group as possible.  A series of picturesquely 
curving roads weave the houses together.  The area is also marked by informal clusters of trees, 
either existing or intended for planting, in contrast to the regimented rows of trees along the 
island’s boulevard.  Even the existing Gothic chapel, midway between the officers’ houses and 
the apartment buildings, is treated informally:  Ford arranged the roads around it so that the 
church sits off-center of its circular plot.267 
In his plan for Governors Island, Ford thus incorporated the WDHP leadership’s desire 
for a monumental, city-like post only as far as the operational and administrative buildings, and 
some of the housing.  “Home” for the island’s officer families, on the other hand, would be a 
different space, both physically separate from the rest of the post and planned in an informal 
                                            
267 George B. Ford, “Governors Island, New York, Layout Made for the War Department,” September 1927.  
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style opposed to the centralized, symmetrical order of the remainder of the base.  The Army 
officials had asked for apartment buildings; Ford gave them cottages in a park. 
General Hanson Ely, a career officer and commander of the Second Corps Area 
headquartered at Governors Island, submitted a third plan for the post in December 1927.  The 
layout was accompanied by a letter from island Quartermaster Clyffard Game critiquing the 
McKim, Mead & White scheme.  Game argued that the New York practice’s scheme was flawed 
both practically and aesthetically.  With respect to officers’ housing specifically, he 
recommended that the U-shaped apartments be relocated to the northwestern tip of the island, 
near Castle William, whose “historic interest” the architects at McKim, Mead & White had failed 
to consider when they proposed using it for fuel storage.  “The general view from the apartments, 
as located in [McKim, Mead & White’s] plan, is of the unsightly Brooklyn shore line and the 
construction of apartments in this location is considered very inadvisable.”  The Castle William 
area, on the other hand, fronted a “most impressive” view of lower Manhattan.268 
Unlike McKim, Mead & White’s and Ford’s plans, Ely’s layout was decentralized, with 
all of the buildings located around the island’s perimeter, and the area around Fort Jay—the 
monumental front yard of the barracks building in the other two designs—dedicated for use as a 
golf course.  The barracks and drill hall building, while as large as in Ford’s and McKim, Mead 
& White’s plans, is reduced in importance by its location along the southeastern edge of the 
island.269 
Ford and McKim, Mead & White panned Ely’s layout for Governors Island.  “[F]rom the 
glance I had to Gen. Ely’s scheme,” Ford wrote the Quartermaster General, “I got the impression 
                                            
268 Clyffard Game to the Quartermaster General, December 14, 1927.  War Dept.  EI.1-EI.57.  GBF.  FLL-SC. 
269 Office of the Quartermaster, 2nd C. A., Governors Island, N. Y., “Plot Plan,” December 8, 1927.  Governors 
Island, NY.  E. IV Series.  GBF.  FLL-SC. 
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that the buildings did not arrange or group at all; that they would look like so many buildings 
sifted out of a shaker.”270  A representative of McKim, Mead & White, meanwhile, defended the 
firm’s location of the officers’ apartments on the Brooklyn side of the island on the grounds that 
they had done so “with the approval of the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, who has an 
intimate acquaintance with the living conditions on the Island, and yourself.”271 
McKim, Mead & White’s plan to house the officers in apartments rather than in a 
picturesque development of single-family homes eventually held sway.  (In fact, not much of 
either plan was implemented, while many of the island’s older structures, slated for demolition in 
the WDHP schemes, were preserved.)272  Building number 12, a four-story apartment building 
meant to house all of the island’s officers, went up in 1931 according to plans developed by 
McKim, Mead & White.273  Ford, however, refused to acknowledge defeat.  In a 1929 article 
published in the Quartermaster Review, he admitted that Governors Island “presented an entirely 
different sort of problem” than did the Army’s larger posts.  “Here it is a question of housing a 
large population on a small island and doing it in a way that will leave as much of the island 
open as possible.”  Thus the Army officers stationed at the post would be housed in large 
apartments—but Ford characterized these not as monumental urban structures, but as “large 
garden apartments of a New York suburban type.”274 
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272 See Pearson, ed., “Governors Island Historic District Designation Report.” 
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274 George B. Ford, “New Army Posts for Old: A New Design and Layout for Army Posts and Fields,” 
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Fort Lewis and Governors Island were not the only Army posts at which Ford planned the 
suburbanization of officers’ housing.  He used a similar technique at a number of other locations.  
At Fort Sam Houston, for instance, Ford entered a debate about how condensed the permanent 
post should be, given the high cost of excavation in the San Antonio area.  A board of officers 
reviewing another designer’s plan for the post argued “that such a compact arrangement of 
existing and projected construction can be achieved only by adopting frankly a city scheme for 
the arrangement of buildings and placing all the new construction in the many vacant spaces.”275  
Yet in his plans for the post, Ford insisted on leaving the historic cavalry post parade ground 
open, thus providing a buffer of green space between the NCO and officers’ housing and the rest 
of the base.276 
At Fort Benning, meanwhile, Ford had the opposite problem.  In Georgia he struggled to 
bring order to a post that, in his words “just grew, like Topsy,” without any comprehensive plan.  
He did, however, eventually reshape the OQMG’s linear scheme into a tightly geometrical, 
centralized layout for the post center.  The officers’ quarters, however, were exempt from Ford’s 
consolidation:  these Ford, like the OQMG before him, “scattered on the hillcrests” along 
curving roads.277 
Ford most clearly articulated his vision for the twentieth-century Army post in his 
discussion of Mitchell Field (Long Island; see figure 3.4), included in his Quartermaster Review 
article on the WDHP.  Ford imagined that he had so improved the disposition of the airfield’s 
                                            
275 “Proceedings of a Board of Officers convened by paragraph 3, Special Order no. 246, Headquarters Second 
Division & Fort Sam Houston, Texas,” November 6-8, 1926, 3.  War Dept.  EI.1-EI.57.  GBF.  FLL-SC. 
276 George B. Ford, “Fort Sam Houston, San Antonio, Texas,” January 1927.  Fort Sam Houston, TX.  E. IV Series.  
GBF.  FLL-SC.; George B. Ford, “Fort Sam Houston, San Antonio, Texas, Revised Plan,” March 1927.  Fort Sam 
Houston, TX.  E. IV Series.  GBF.  FLL-SC. 
277 Ford, “New Army Posts for Old,” 21; George B. Ford, “Restudy for New Construction, Fort Benning, Georgia,” 
August 26, 1929.  Fort Benning, GA.  E. IV Series.  GBF.  FLL-SC. 
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housing that the officers’ quarters might be mistaken for a civilian suburban development.  
“According to the accepted new layout,” he wrote, “all of the officers’ quarters are arranged in 
what appears, from the air, to be a charming subdivision adjoining the Meadow Brook Hunt 
Club.”  The officers’ single-family homes were widely-spaced with large yards, making for 
“plenty of privacy.”  “The post itself will have all the charm that the best modern subdivisions 
have,” Ford wrote.  He concluded: 
What is true of Mitchel Field is true, to a greater or less degree, of all the schemes of 
development for the various Army posts.  One and all they are being made more livable 
and more pleasing to the eye, actually more comfortable and a far better place to bring up 
children in—all without any sacrifice in efficiency.278 
 
 
Figure 3.4:  George B. Ford, Plan of Mitchell Field.  Published in “New Army Posts for 
Old.” 
 
 
Ford, as a collaborator with the Quartermaster Corps on the WDHP, had a significant say in what 
shape the renovated Army posts would take.  As such, his vision of the ideal post, which in turn 
was based on his vision of the ideal city, was of more than theoretical import.  By relocating 
officers’ quarters to the Army post’s periphery, Ford elevated a growing trend in private 
development—the suburbanization of middle- and upper-class housing—to a federally-
sanctioned planning principle. 
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WDHP Architecture 
The officials in charge of the WDHP used architecture as well as planning to redefine the 
Army’s popular image.  Two aspects of the WDHP architectural program are particularly 
significant in this regard.  First, the WDHP opted to build single- rather than multiple-family 
houses for commissioned officers.  Army officials thereby offered prospective officers the 
chance to serve in the military without giving up the amenities associated with civilian life in the 
suburbs.  Second, the architects of the WDHP united the new quarters stylistically.  The 
application of two prevalent residential styles—the neo-Georgian or Colonial style in the 
northeast, and the Spanish Mission style in the southwest—to military housing encouraged a 
perception of the Army as a specifically American institution.  At the same time, the WDHP 
leadership argued that these two architectural styles accommodated much local variation, and 
thus confirmed an understanding of the United States Army as an institution that prized 
individuality as much as it did uniformity. 
As it had for the planning side of the WDHP program, the Quartermaster Corps hired a 
civilian architect as an adviser to the military architectural staff.  The man selected was Alfred 
Loomis Harmon, who worked for McKim, Mead & White and Wallas & Goodwillie before 
opening his own practice.  Around the time of the WDHP, Harmon also worked for the 
American Battle Monuments Commission, for which he designed the Services of Supply 
Memorial at Tours (1928-1932), and monuments at Somme-Py (1927-1932) and Cantigny 
(1927-1932).279 
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Harmon’s involvement with the WDHP had a different character than did Ford’s.  He 
rarely traveled to Washington,280 and he seems only to have sketched redesigns of buildings in 
unusual cases.  Many of his written comments concerned relatively minor details, such as the 
length of a railing281 or the depth of a linen closet.282  Yet his engagement with the program was 
fairly comprehensive, with the Quartermaster General requesting that all new plans for officers’ 
quarters pass through Harmon’s review.283  Thus it is difficult to determine, without a 
painstaking reconstruction of the archived correspondence, exactly which aspects of the WDHP 
designs Harmon was responsible for, and which were the work of the OQMG. 
Harmon understood his job, in part, as the lending of legitimacy to the WDHP’s 
architectural aspirations.  Writing to request a review of interior and exterior paint schemes, 
Harmon explained, “for your own protection in case of any future criticism.”284  To a certain 
extent any civilian architect could have played this role.  Yet Harmon’s background in housing 
design also recommended him for work with the War Department. 
Harmon’s most famous pre-WDHP commission was for the Shelton Hotel (1924), an 
apartment hotel for which he received gold medals from the New York chapter of the American 
Institute of Architects and the Architectural League of New York.  Like the six smaller Allerton 
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apartment buildings Harmon designed between 1916 and 1924,285 the thirty-five-story Shelton 
featured architectural devices meant to conceal its status as a multiple dwelling.  For example, 
Harmon’s design, according to one write-up, “attempt[ed] to eliminate the public atmosphere of 
the typical first-floor hotel lobby” by situating the building’s recreational areas on the second 
floor and above.286 
Harmon’s designs for apartment hotels were both similar to and much more radical than 
the Army-post buildings of the WDHP.  On the one hand, both projects involved the use of 
architecture to domesticize spaces that had the potential to challenge traditional ideas about the 
home:  in the case of the Shelton Hotel, urban accommodations for single men; in the case of the 
WDHP, buildings for single soldiers and families both built and owned by the federal 
government.  On the other hand, much of Harmon’s work for the WDHP comprised the review 
of plans and elevations for officers’ houses, which were much more traditional, socially and 
spatially, than apartment hotels or even barracks buildings. 
A 1926 New York Times article on the WDHP anticipated that officers’ wives 
“particularly will welcome the prospect of having homes in which they can entertain without 
making apologies.”287  For the WDHP leadership, this meant building single-family houses 
rather than apartments or multiple-family homes.  The assignment of commissioned officers to 
stand-alone houses may have begun before the 1920s, but it was codified in the WDHP.  Only 
the lack of adequate ground area would lead to multiple-unit general officers’ quarters, Wheaton 
explained in the Quartermaster Review.  Otherwise, officers and their families would live in one- 
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or two-story single-family houses with a living room, dining room, kitchen, pantry, three 
bedrooms, two bathrooms, a maid’s room, and a maid’s bathroom.  In those few cases where 
space required duplexes, Wheaton wrote, each family would have their own entrance and porch.  
Four-unit houses would only be built at the various Army schools.  The smaller size of these 
homes could be excused “as they are for the use of student officers whose tours of duty are 
relatively short.”288 
Under the WDHP, the number of housing units in a single structure was inversely 
proportional to the rank of its inhabitants.  While general officers lived in stand-alone houses 
except in rare cases, married non-commissioned officers, field officers, and company officers 
were relegated to duplex or other multi-family houses.  Enlisted personnel, of course, lived in 
dormitory-style barracks.  Thus the WDHP defined the detached house as the most desirable 
accommodations type.  That single-family houses might have been favored by most officers’ 
families regardless of the Army’s method of assignment matters less than that the WDHP 
officially equated the freestanding house with its own yard and gardens with the top of the 
military hierarchy. 
The watchword of the WDHP’s architectural program was style.  After considering a 
building’s function, Wheaton explained, the architect’s second thought was of style.  This was a 
modern problem:  historically, builders were limited to what they knew—typically the single 
style of their birth region.  But in the twentieth century, Wheaton explained, architects traveled, 
information about architecture traveled, and styles could travel, too.  Echoing German architect 
Heinrich Hübsch’s argument in his seminal book, In What Style Should We Build (1828), 
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Wheaton warned against the adoption of modish architectural designs.  Instead, buildings should 
be designed in styles whose meaning would be deep and lasting. 
The architectural style of a national building program like the WDHP, Wheaton wrote, 
“should be one that has acquired some degree of national character and that has become familiar 
to and is understood by a majority of the people.”  Thus the WDHP’s administrators had selected 
two styles for its new buildings:  the neo-Georgian, or Colonial style; and the Spanish Mission 
style.  Both styles, Wheaton explained: 
were brought over by the original founders of the settlements in those respective sections, 
and while they maintain a major popularity in their original zones, they have spread 
throughout the central and western states until they have covered the land. They have 
long since ceased to be importations and have become national growths and are 
recognized as such in the civilized world.289 
 
Thus the architecture of the building program would be uniquely and recognizably 
American.  The unnamed bogeyman of the 1920 National Defense Act was the European 
standing army, which opponents of Emory Upton’s push for a large, centralized, professional 
military associated with the non-democratic regimes of Germany and other states.  Under the 
1920 Act, the American army was to be a distinct product, a decentralized, size-limited force of 
citizen-soldiers.  Redesigned in the Colonial and Spanish Mission styles (see figure 3.5 and 3.6), 
the United States’s Army posts would visually communicate their Americanness, assuaging fears 
that the very existence of the Regular Army presented a threat to democracy. 
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Figure 3.5:  WDHP-era Officers’ Housing, Ft. Knox, Kentucky.  Published in R. 
Christopher Goodwin and Associates, Inc., National Historic Context for Department of 
Defense Installations, 1790-1940 (Baltimore, MD: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1995), 
1:79. 
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Figure 3.6:  WDHP-era Noncommissioned Officers’ Housing, Ft. Benning, Georgia.  
Published in R. Christopher Goodwin and Associates, Inc., National Historic Context for 
Department of Defense Installations, 1:209. 
 
But while the WDHP would unite the nation’s Army posts architecturally, Wheaton 
argued, variations within the styles would tie particular posts to the regions in which they were 
located.  WDHP architects took pains to identify the buildings of each post with local landmarks.  
Of the Spanish Mission posts, for instance, Fort Sam Houston’s architecture paid homage to the 
Alamo as well as to San Antonio’s other missions: the Mission Concepción; Mission San José; 
and Mission San Francisco de la Espada.  Similarly, the architecture at March Field and 
Rockwell Field in California was based on the missions along California’s Camino Real, among 
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them Mission San Juan Capistrano and Mission San Luis Rey de Francia.290  In the Colonial 
section of the country, the housing at Fort Devens would “at once suggest to the trained eye the 
influence of the older buildings in the yard at Harvard” University.  The barracks at Fort Meade, 
in Maryland, were modeled on Doughoregan Manor in nearby Ellicott City.291  Thus the 
architecture of the WDHP, in its regional variability, would suggest to civilians and soldiers alike 
that the Army was as much a local as a national institution. 
At the same time, Wheaton insisted, the architectural variety of the WDHP affirmed the 
value of individualism over (European) collectivism.  The Army’s new housing thereby refuted 
another criticism of the Regular Army, that its emphasis on uniformity was anathema to 
individual freedom.  Reflecting a popular conception of America’s founders as refugees from 
tyranny, Wheaton wrote of the Colonial style:  “When we review this field we find that the 
various colonists who started the first settlements, individualists to begin with, rapidly developed 
a more or less individual architecture suited to the particular climate and mode of life in each 
class.”  By class, Wheaton meant economic class; for an essential tenet of American 
individualism was that different people achieved different stations in life, depending on effort 
and ability.  The regional distribution of wealth was reflected in regional architectural variations, 
in “the simple but refined details of New England, the so-called Dutch Colonial of New York 
and its vicinity, and the more opulent type found further south in Maryland, Virginia, the 
Carolinas, and Georgia.”292  The architecture of the WDHP, according to Wheaton, would 
communicate the Army’s compatibility with an individualist ethos and even class difference. 
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Finally, the choice of the Spanish Mission and Colonial styles had contemporary 
significance, as these were architectural styles favored by suburban developers.  According to the 
Army and Navy Journal, 
It is proposed to construct types of buildings at the army posts in the various sections of 
the country that will be similar in architecture to those prevailing in the community . . . . 
The prevailing commercial designs for homes in the South, for example, would be 
followed and the Southern posts present attractive suburban sections, with inviting homes 
for the people of the army. Buildings in the North and West would resemble the suburban 
homes in those sections.293 
 
For example, McCook Aviation Field in Ohio, wrote a New York Times editorialist, 
would be renovated “with a view to making this air post a suburb in keeping with modern 
Dayton.”294 
On the one hand, the Colonial and Spanish Mission styles served a similar purpose for 
both suburban developers and Army officials:  by their historical associations, they lent 
legitimacy to communities that might be criticized as overly commercial (new suburban 
developments) or not commercial enough (Army posts).  At the same time, adapting the WDHP 
architectural program to meet commercial building trends allowed the Army to ride the wave of 
suburban growth, and to argue that life in the Army was not that different from life outside it, 
after all. 
The leadership of the WDHP, including civilian consultant Alfred Loomis Harmon, used 
architecture to reshape the twentieth-century Army post, both physically and in the minds of the 
American public.  The architecture of the WDHP was meant to hold several meanings.  First, the 
use of the Colonial and Spanish Mission styles signaled to soldiers and civilians that the United 
States Army was a homegrown institution, not a European import.  Local variations on these 
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styles, moreover, indicated an Army post’s connection to its particular locale, as well as the 
importance of individuality within the institution as a whole. 
But the architecture of the WDHP also transmitted an unintended message about the 
trajectory of American urban growth.  The program’s preference for single-family houses for 
officers was a reflection of popular sentiment, but it also helped to formalize a hierarchy of 
housing types.  Similarly, the styles chosen by WDHP architects did not just have historical and 
political significance; they also tied the renovated Army posts to contemporary suburban 
developments.  Thus the Army sanctioned the suburbanization of the United States’s built 
environment, nearly a decade before any other federal program would do so. 
 
Federal Support for Suburbanization 
The suburbanization of the Army, as an agent of the federal government, had implications 
outside the institution itself.  The WDHP prefigured, even if it did not directly inform, the 
support of middle-class suburbanization by various government programs in the years beginning 
with FDR’s presidency.  These programs would have powerful, if not always intended, 
consequences for the built environment of the United States as well as for American society 
more generally. 
The story of federal support for suburbanization, and a concordant neglect of the 
American inner city, has been told by a number of historians, including Kenneth T. Jackson and 
Gwendolyn Wright.  The intervention of the federal government into urban and suburban 
housing markets had opposite effects.  During the New Deal, the Public Works Agency (PWA) 
built low-rent urban public housing for the “deserving poor.”295  Several years later, the 1937 
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Housing Act established the United States Housing Agency (USHA), empowering it to finance 
local housing agencies.  The public housing paid for by the USHA was almost entirely 
concentrated in the cities, for two reasons.  First, the formation of a local housing agency was 
voluntary, and thus a commitment an area without a substantial low-income population was 
unlikely to make.   Second, local agencies were required to undertake slum clearance in tandem 
with new construction; this meant only places with existing slum conditions could build USHA 
public housing.296  The result of the USHA’s reliance on local housing agencies, in other words, 
ensured that low-income populations remained in the center city, even if the quality of their 
housing improved.297 
As public housing policy shifted its focus, after the New Deal, from the working poor to 
the very poor, residents of government-funded projects entered a vicious cycle of worsening 
environmental conditions and increased social stigma.  Over the course of the 1940s and 1950s, 
architectural standards for housing projects dipped and racial tensions rose, and more and more 
observers turned their backs on the center city, now seen as a locus of violence and poverty.298 
But there was another side to the federal housing coin.  As Robert O. Self points out in 
his book on race and space in Oakland, the story of American suburbanization is as much about 
the forces driving upper- and middle-class whites to the suburbs as it is about the forces driving 
them from the inner cities.299  Federal support for suburban housing construction began as early 
as did the construction of urban public housing.  Rex Tugwell’s Greenbelt Town Program, for 
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instance, “was explicitly intended to foster deconcentration,” Jackson writes.  Tugwell himself 
explained, “My idea was to go just outside centers of population, pick up cheap land, build a 
whole community, and entice people into them.  Then go back into the cities and tear down 
whole slums and make parks of them.”300 
The Greenbelt Town Program was unusual in that involved the federal government both 
funding and building extra-urban communities.  More typical was support for private suburban 
housing construction.  One of the New Deal programs to have a long-term impact on housing 
distribution was the Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC; 1933), which refinanced existing 
mortgages.  To aid lenders, HOLC also established a standardized appraisal system that 
privileged new, deconcentrated, and homogeneous developments over aging, dense, mixed-race 
areas.301 
HOLC’s appraisal system was put to discriminatory use by the Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA; 1934), which insured private lenders and thereby reduced the minimum 
down payment and extended the payment period for first-time mortgages.  Because the FHA 
used HOLC-type appraisals to value property, the majority of FHA insurance went to new 
suburban housing tracts.  The FHA, moreover, established housing standards that “effectively 
eliminated whole categories of dwellings . . . from eligibility for loan guarantees” by denying 
assistance in cases where a minimum setback or lot size had not been met.302 
As Jackson points out, federal policy did not make or break the suburbanization of the 
United States.  Much of the impetus to suburbanization was cultural, coming from below rather 
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than from above.  Yet the federal government’s housing programs “put its seal of approval,” in 
Jackson’s words, on the middle-class exodus from the inner city and the race- and class-based 
discrimination that went with it.303  That the government did not manufacture but rather 
encouraged an existing trend does not absolve it of responsibility for the consequences. 
 
Conclusion 
Between 1926 and the start of World War II, the United States Army renovated many of 
its stateside posts under the War Department Housing Program (WDHP).  The program’s 
leadership believed that improved living conditions would improve morale and therefore raise 
rates of recruitment and retention, an important consideration in an all-volunteer Army.  A New 
York Times editorial introducing the WDHP explained: 
In the past there has been a sameness, which made for neither the attractive nor the 
useful, in quarters, barracks, administration buildings, hospitals and post exchanges.  It is 
now doubted whether the standard designs were economical in the long run. Certainly the 
army was not proud of them, and the psychological effect of the monotony and bareness 
of the architecture, in which art was lacking, did not contribute to efficiency . . . . Give 
the army commodious and handsome quarters, well ventilated and comfortable hospitals, 
clean and airy post exchanges, and administration buildings that impart character to a 
post, and from General to private, the garrison will take a greater pride in the service and 
be smarter on parade.304 
 
The WDHP had both planning and architectural components.  The key figure on the 
planning side of the program was George Ford, a leader of the contemporary city-planning 
movement.  Ford argued that it was time for the Army to move away from purely functional 
design.  “[I]t has been a well-known tradition of the Army in the past that whereas Army 
buildings and layouts must be practical, nevertheless they should look military,” Ford wrote.  
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“There seemed to be a feeling that any building or layout that was not foursquare and austere 
was effeminate and unworthy of the Army.”  At Fort Wadsworth, for example, the barracks were 
arranged “in monotonous rows close together, with little privacy, and with no outlook or setting, 
utterly unattractive.”305 
Ford’s typical post plan was characterized by two different approaches to urban form.  
First, Ford arranged the administration and operation buildings as well as the barracks into 
compact geometrical designs.  The section of the post devoted to officers’ housing, on the other 
hand, he tended to organize according to suburban planning principles, with informal groups of 
single-family homes spread along curving roads and culs-de-sac.  Ford’s divergent approach to 
the administrative and residential sections of the Army post is clearest in cases where he was 
asked to modify another planner’s design, as at Fort Lewis and Governors Island. 
Ford’s preference for locating officers’ housing on the periphery of the Army post was 
directly related to his experience in civilian city planning.  Ford, like many of his 
contemporaries—both design professionals and laypeople—believed that the best way to relieve 
inner-city congestion was to remove housing from the city center to the suburban surrounds.  
Ford believed that by modeling Army housing on suburban subdivisions he could raise the 
quality of life for officers and their families, in accordance with WDHP directives. 
The architectural side of the WDHP, meanwhile, revolved around two questions:  what 
type of housing to build, and what style to build it in.  Army officials, in consultation with 
architect Alfred Loomis Harmon, elected to house officers in single-family homes designed in 
one of two styles, Colonial or Spanish Mission.  The choice of single- over multi-family houses 
was largely a reflection of a growing middle-class preference for the same.  The leadership of the 
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WDHP chose the two styles it did in order to identify the modern Army as a non-threat to 
American democratic values, and to bring Army housing in line with popular taste in domestic 
architecture. 
Both the planning and architectural aspects of the WDHP privileged suburban over urban 
living.  Again, this was in part a ploy to attract middle-class men to a career in the Army.  But 
the WDHP had the full weight of the federal government behind it, and thus had the potential to 
create public opinion even as it reflected it.  Later government agencies including the HOLC and 
the FHA would endorse suburban living even more explicitly, with profound effects on the 
United States’s built environment. 
The Army, as a federally-controlled institution, was largely insulated from these effects.  
Military posts did not suffer the kind of physical and economic decay that many of America’s 
inner cities did.  But this does not mean that Army planners did not turn their backs on the urban 
model.  To the contrary, more and more of the postwar Army post would be suburban in 
character, again both reflecting and helping to create a popular revolt against the city.  
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Chapter 4:  How Best to Build: Army Experiments in Prefabrication 
 
Introduction 
Between the Great Depression and World War II, “prefabrication” was a much-used term 
in architecture and construction circles.  During that period, dozens of new of companies and 
products emerged, each promising to apply factory production techniques to housing.   The very 
quantity and diversity of approaches to factory-fabrication, most of which were untested on any 
scale, made it difficult to define prefabrication, let alone assess its potential to revolutionize the 
house-building industry.  “Throughout the last decade,” Douglas Haskell wrote in the June 1943 
edition of Architectural Record, “there has been more disturbance to mental peace from 
prefabricated notions about prefabrication than from any development that has taken place in the 
field, where man meets mortar.”306  The editors of Architectural Forum began their 1942-3 series 
on prefabrication on a similar note: “Prefabrication is all things to all men, and a source of 
confusion to many.”307 
The Army was not immune to either the enthusiasm or the skepticism surrounding 
prefabrication. During the years immediately preceding the Second World War, the 
Quartermaster Corps studied a number of different prefabrication systems in order to assess their 
usefulness to Army projects, both for permanent and temporary (emergency) construction. In the 
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context of permanent Army construction, Office of the Quartermaster General (OQMG) staff 
studied prefabricated housing designs with an eye to reducing the cost of officers’ quarters 
without sacrificing living space or amenities. With regards to emergency construction, the 
Army’s architects and engineers weighed the potential savings represented by prefabricated 
barracks against the time-tested utility of conventionally constructed wooden buildings. 
The OQMG ultimately recommitted to conventional methods for both permanent and 
temporary Army construction, despite pressure from prefabricators, members of Congress, and 
Army officials to adopt new building technologies. The evolution of mobilization construction 
around the time of the United States’s entry into World War II is particularly instructive, both in 
terms of the OQMG’s insistence upon using wood-frame construction, and in the Army’s 
adoption of standardized methods and materials and mass-production methods to achieve savings 
in time and money similar to those promised by prefabricators. The OQMG’s conviction that 
perfecting existing methods would ultimately prove more efficient than adopting new 
technologies and materials foreshadowed the rejection of fabrication in favor of mass production 
on site by postwar suburban “merchant builders” including Alfred Levitt. 
This chapter begins with an examination of the various prefabricated-housing systems 
studied by the OQMG in the years leading up to World War II.  It shows that Army officials 
objected to prefabrication on a number of grounds, including the high cost of the new products.  
In addition, many existing systems were only partially prefabricated, which meant that they 
required labor on-site as well as in the factories.  The chapter next turns to the Army’s alternative 
for emergency building, conventional wood-frame construction, and shows how Army 
contractors applied mass-production techniques on-site to save time.  It concludes with a look 
forward to the suburban housing boom of the 1940s and 1950s, in which large developers like 
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Levitt & Sons similarly rejected factory fabrication in favor of the on-site mass production of 
conventionally-built homes. 
 
Prefabrication and Permanent Army Construction 
In the five years before the United States entered World War II, the OQMG studied a 
number of new housing systems, all of which relied to some extent on the factory fabrication of 
house parts, for use in both permanent and temporary Army construction.  In the case of 
permanent construction, the goal was to reduce the cost per unit of officers’ quarters.  The 
OQMG staff eventually voted against prefabricated officers’ housing, arguing that the new 
systems were at least untested and at worst inferior to conventional wood-frame or masonry 
construction. 
In November of 1936, for instance, a major in the Office of the Quartermaster, 
Headquarters Sixth Corps Area inspected several prefabricated steel houses built by General 
Houses, Inc. near Chicago.308  He saw two types of houses: a steel-frame and steel-panel model; 
and a more recently developed combination steel-frame and plywood-and-asbestos-panel 
design.309  An article in Architectural Forum explained that the latter type was a newly-
developed “happy medium” between the expensive steel-panel version and a flimsier plywood-
panel model.310 
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The steel-panel house the major visited had just been constructed.  He noted that in this 
house type the steel panels typically served as a shell within which conventional interior finishes 
were applied.  The steel panels were bolted together at special connectors, and were insulated 
with an asphalt-and-wood compound. 
The Sixth Corps Area man praised certain aspects of General Houses Inc.’s steel-panel 
design.311 “In general,” he wrote, “the buildings are more air-tight than those of ordinary 
construction. The thinness of walls and partitions, the absence of radiators, hence less unusable 
space, are the desirable features.” Nevertheless, he could not advocate the adoption of the system 
by the War Department. Because it was finished with conventional materials, the steel-panel 
house would cost about as much as a wood-frame home to build.  In addition, the problem of 
condensation between the steel outer and plaster inner walls needed to be solved before the full 
potential of the system was realized. Third, the major worried that the house’s panel construction 
limited planning flexibility. And finally, he was reluctant to pass on a design whose longevity 
had yet to be tested.  The major had asked for a list of owners of General Houses-designed 
homes but had not received one.  “It has, therefore, been impossible to examine any houses 
erected some time ago or talk with anyone who has lived in one,” he wrote.312 
The asbestos-panel houses the Sixth Corps Area representative visited were likely similar 
to two models published in the June 1936 Architectural Forum (see figure 4.1). Named the 
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“Goodwin” and the “Highland,” both were one-story structures with two bedrooms, one 
bathroom, a kitchen, a living room, a storage pantry, and an attached one-car garage. The larger 
“Highland” also had a dining room and a front patio. Both models had flat roofs and relatively 
unornamented exteriors. According to the Architectural Forum, prices ranged from $2,990 for a 
three-room house to $7,000 for a six-room house.313   A similar house included a 1936 study at 
Purdue University cost $4,625 to build.314  The Purdue researchers found the asbestos-panel 
construction “somewhat less than satisfactory,” as the major seems to have suspected it would 
be.  “Two panels were broken in handling,” the Purdue report stated; “two months after 
completion several underwindow panels had warped out sufficiently to permit water running 
down the windows to flow into the space between inner and outer wall surfaces; cracks have 
appeared over the surface of several other panels.”315 
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Figure 4.1:  General Houses, Inc.’s “Goodwin” and “Highland” Prefabricated Houses.  
Published in “A Pioneer Prefabricator,” Architectural Forum 64, no. 6 (June 1936): 524. 
 
The Purdue analysis additionally indicated that substantial savings could only be achieved 
once the demand for General Houses’s asbestos-panel product was high enough to warrant mass 
production.316  Without a major savings in cost, and with the construction process itself relatively 
untested, the War Department had little incentive to choose this particular panel system over 
wood-frame construction.  
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Several years later, the OQMG revisited the question of prefabrication in permanent 
construction. At the end of January 1940, Major F. S. Conaty, the Constructing Quartermaster at 
Fort Bragg in North Carolina, sent Chief of Staff General George Marshall a clipping from the 
Architectural Forum. The article described a series of partially-prefabricated plywood houses 
built by Standard Houses Corporation near Chicago. “On your recent trip to Fort Bragg, you 
expressed an interest in low-cost prefabricated houses for non-commissioned officers,” Conaty 
wrote to Marshall. The Standard Houses units, he explained, would be suitable for staff 
sergeants. The houses might require larger outlays in maintenance costs than standard OQMG 
NCO quarters, wrote Conaty, but the first cost was so much reduced as to make the venture 
worthwhile. “I am sure that the quarters would be more nearly in line with those occupied by 
families in civil life in similar salary brackets,” he concluded, touching upon one of Army 
officials’ key concerns.317 
The Architectural Forum described Standard Houses’s Chicago showing as a coup for 
both sellers and buyers. The four men who made up the company—headed by Bauhaus-trained 
architect Bertrand Goldberg—had 
glued together the knock-down parts of five identical plywood houses, assembled them in 
Chicago suburb, Melrose Park, sold them all in one day for the bargain-counter price of 
$2,995 (including land). And they made those houses attractive to boot—both outside and 
in.318 
 
The houses were “actually only half-prefabricated,” the Architectural Forum article 
explained. Plywood panels for walls, ceiling, and roofs, as well as plywood wardrobes and 
cabinets, were assembled in the factory and trucked to the lots. The actually assembly, as well as 
the installation of the plumbing and wiring, was performed on site. The on-site work was 
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organized according to mass production methods, with each builder responsible for only a small 
portion of the job.  In this way the construction crews, learning as they went, would spend less 
and less time on each successive house.319 
As for the purchase price of the house, actual construction accounted for only $1980; the 
rest of the cost went to land, landscaping (factors the Army could leave out), and profit. 
According to company president Bertrand Goldberg, the savings was almost entirely due to the 
factory methods applied to the house’s construction; an identical house built by conventional 
means would cost $3,000. In fact, only twenty-five percent of the construction cost, or about 
$500, went to making the plywood shell. The remaining seventy-five percent was spent on 
mechanical equipment, insulation, decorating, trim, and roofing.320 
The Standard Houses prefabricated units were “well planned,” according to the 
Architectural Forum. “Architects Black and Goldberg kept interior partitions to a minimum, thus 
lent a sense of space to cramped quarters,” the article explained. The square plan featured a 
living room, two bedrooms, the kitchen, and one bathroom arranged around a small, square hall. 
The front door entered directly into the living room, which in turn was open to both the kitchen 
and the hall. The kitchen could be closed off with a moveable screen. The house’s technological 
innovations included a flexible showerhead.321 
The Architectural Forum article on Standard Houses’s Chicago homes admitted that the 
“[b]iggest stumbling block in merchandising factory-made houses is transportation—each 
additional mile that knock-down parts are shipped adds to the total cost.”  Standard Houses’s 
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plywood panels weighed less than other prefabricated house materials, and thus gave the 
company an edge in shipping. Goldberg and Black estimated that each house could be shipped 
1,000 miles and still be profitable.322 
General Marshall forwarded Conaty’s letter to the Quartermaster General for comment.  
OQMG staff were first incensed by Conaty’s impertinence:  he had gone above their heads to the 
Chief of Staff, and insulted the office’s own designs in the process.  In addition, the Army 
architects were less than impressed by the Standard Houses designs.  Without more detail 
drawings, it was impossible to comment on the structural stability of the plywood design, an 
OQMG staff member explained to the Adjutant General.  He did, however, point out that the 
article made mention of the Melrose Park development being outside of Chicago’s building code.  
This was cause for concern, he wrote, as “city building codes do not, in general, require anything 
in residence construction in any way unreasonable but do impose on prospective builders 
requirements which will ensure construction of buildings which will provide safe and sanitary 
living conditions for the occupants.”323 
The OQMG architect also listed numerous specific objections to the Standard Houses 
design.  At 560 square feet the house was much smaller than “even the smallest and cheapest of 
the non-commissioned officers’ quarters constructed in recent years.”  The bedrooms were too 
small to accommodate even basic bedroom furniture.  The house was also lacking in storage 
space, the same being provided for only by a built-in wardrobe in each bedroom.  Nor did the 
house have space for laundry tubs.324 
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Adopting a Standard Houses-type design for NCO quarters would indeed save money up 
front, the OQMG staff member concluded, but only “if the principle of providing permanent, low 
maintenance cost, substantial and long lived structures is abandoned.”  Conventionally-
constructed NCO houses, moreover, offered a range of amenities unavailable in a design as basic 
as Standard Houses’s, including special play and toy storage areas for children.  Whatever 
Conaty’s assessment of the Standard Houses design vis a vis civilian standards, adopting such a 
reduced plan would significantly alter the quality of life of the NCO officers and their 
families.325 
In addition to requesting information on the Standard Houses prefabricated unit in 
particular, the Adjutant General also ordered the OQMG to undertake a study of NCO housing 
more generally, with the goal of reducing the cost by 30%.  Colonel Hugo E. Pitz, a graduate of 
the Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, took charge of the project.  The cost of any particular set of 
quarters already varied considerably, he explained, from about $6,500 to $9000, according to 
whether it was a single, double or row house; where it was built, meaning variations in climate, 
freight rates, and materials; and local labor costs. Starting from a rough average of $7500, a 30% 
reduction would mean building each set for $5000 or less.326 
The OQMG developed two different reduced-cost NCO houses, one each of conventional 
and prefabricated construction.  The former, plan 625-6520A, was a two-story house with either 
frame or masonry walls, and was well suited for either warm or cold climates.  It was 
considerably larger than the Standard Houses model. The basement had room for a central 
heating plant, clothes-washing facilities, and storage. The first floor contained a living room, a 
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dining alcove, a kitchen, and two bedrooms and one bath. The second floor was one continuous 
space. “It may be used for general household purposes,” wrote Pitz, “or partitioned temporarily 
with light material if desired. It is an economical method of obtaining overflow space for 
families requiring more accommodations than are provide on the first floor.”327 This house, 
according to OQMG estimates, would cost about $5000 in the north, possibly less in warmer 
climates.328 
Pitz enumerated for the Adjutant General the various advantages of the conventionally-
constructed NCO house:  as a single-family house, it offered a “degree of privacy”; it had a 
standard heating plant (rather than a single stove, as in the Standard Houses design); it contained 
room for storage, in the basement; and it allowed for expansion into the second floor.329 
The prefabricated reduced-cost NCO quarters, plan 713-101A, made use of Cemesto 
insulating board for walls and ceilings. The John B. Pierce Foundation, Pitz pointed out, had 
used the same material in its experimental low-cost houses. “A representative of this office 
inspected a model house [built with Cemesto boards] recently and was well impressed with its 
value,” Pitz wrote.330 
The John B. Pierce Foundation, named for the founder of the American Radiator 
Company, was established in 1924 to promote housing research.  In subsequent years, the 
foundation, whose laboratories were in Raritan, New Jersey, sponsored a number of experiments 
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in new construction methods and materials.331  The Cemesto construction system was developed 
by the Pierce Foundation and Skidmore, Owings & Merrill during the late 1930s.  In a Cemesto 
house, builders attached asbestos composite boards as curtain walls to a skeleton frame of four-
by-four inch wood columns, sills, and plywood girders.  As the Architectural Record explained 
of a Cemesto house built by the Stansbury Corporation near Baltimore, Maryland in early 1941, 
“Unlike a usual bearing wall of traditional materials . . . , or a heavy panel unit assembly 
requiring special means for support and attachment, the curtain wall in the Baltimore house is 
simply a material, as it comes from the factory.”332  Interior and exterior Cemesto panels were 
factory fabricated in a standard size of four by twelve feet, then were trucked to the site along 
with precut framing materials.  The boards required no further finishing and were ready for 
paint.333 
In order to reduce the cost of the prefabricated structures to $3790 per quarters, the 
OQMG had planned for double houses. Each quarters would include a combined living and 
dining room, two bedrooms, one bathroom, a kitchen, and porches to both the front and rear. 
Though the OQMG had planned the house with a southern climate in mind, Pitz noted, Cemesto 
houses had been erected in New York and on Long Island.334 
                                            
331 See, for example, “Framing and Details Key to Efficiency,” Architectural Record 108 (July 1950): 135-139.; 
“Houses: John B. Pierce Foundation,” Architectural Record 89 (May 1941): 63-66.; “Research in Low-Cost 
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334 Pitz to The Adjutant General, “Prefabricated Houses for Non-commissioned Officers,” May 9, 1940, 2.  623.  
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The low cost of the Cemesto double quarters, Pitz explained, was partially dependent on 
building a number of the houses at once—a consideration common to all factory-fabricated 
designs. “It is almost entirely a job prefabricated in the shop,” Pitz wrote, and could be erected 
on site within two days of pouring the concrete footings. As for finishing, he noted, “Exterior 
painting is not essential but for aesthetic purposes, a proper scheme of color combinations would 
aid materially in its acceptance as living quarters.” In contrast to Seaman’s condemnation of the 
Standard Houses plywood house, Pitz marveled at the possibilities of building with Cemesto 
board. “A careful inspection of the plans is suggested,” he concluded, “to fully appreciate the 
ingenuity, simplicity, strength and probably long life of this type of construction.335 
Despite Pitz’s enthusiasm for the Cemesto system, the Adjutant General reported that the 
prefabricated quarters were “not considered suitable” by the Secretary of War.  He instead 
suggested that Pitz revisit the conventional-construction design, this time planning for attached 
houses.336  Though the Adjutant General did not elaborate on the Secretary of War’s dislike of 
the Cemesto plan, several factors likely came into play.  First was the conflict between the 
Army’s commitment to open bidding and the adoption of a proprietary construction product. If 
the Army committed itself to building in Cemesto board, it would be beholden to the price 
structure set by the Celotex Corporation, the makers of Cemesto. In addition, Cemesto-board 
houses, according to Pitz, were relatively untested in the northern states of the US. It would 
make little sense for the OQMG to adopt two such technically distinct standard plans for NCO 
officers:  conventional frame or masonry construction for the north, and Cemesto-board 
construction for the south. Finally, as Pitz pointed out, prefabricated methods saved money in 
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part because they relied on mass production methods. Thus a transition to Cemesto-board 
construction would save the Army money only if they were prepared to undertake construction 
of a large number of officers’ quarters at once; conventional construction methods, on the other 
hand, offered more flexibility in terms of the scale of the job. 
 
Prefabrication and Temporary Army Construction 
With war in Europe looming, the problem of emergency construction was also on the 
minds of Army officials.  In tandem with their studies of prefabricated officers’ housing, OQMG 
staff also examined the applicability of factory fabrication to temporary housing, especially 
barracks for stateside training camps.  Once again, the Army architects agreed that prefabricated 
methods failed to top conventional OQMG building methods. 
In late 1937 the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff asked the Quartermaster Corps to 
prepare estimates for two semi-permanent divisional camps constructed of prefabricated 
materials, one each near San Antonio, Texas, and Fort Lewis, in Washington state.  A major in 
the Quartermaster Corps called a conference of the OQMG staff to consider the problem.  The 
consensus of the meeting was revealing.  “No one knew of any company which had perfected 
prefabricated materials suitable for the complete construction of barracks, hospitals, 
administrative building, post exchanges, warehouses and similar buildings,” the major wrote.  In 
fact, the only major prefabricated design element in widespread production was the “so-called 
prefabricated standard truss, or beam,” for use in large spans. Thus only about 6% of each 
building would actually comprise prefabricated parts. Even if a total prefabrication system were 
available, it would likely use steel, which would be rationed during wartime.  Finally, the 
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conferees suspected that no single company or group of companies would be capable of turning 
out the quantity of buildings required during the short build-up to mobilization.337 
However theoretical the construction of a prefabricated divisional camp thus remained, 
the OQMG technical group had tried to calculate its cost. They used the only data available, 
namely the price quoted for a National Guard camp mess hall constructed according to the 
Harnischfeger system. The Harnischfeger Corporation of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, a manufacturer 
of mining and construction machinery, began its foray into prefabrication in 1935, when 
company head Walter Harnischfeger dedicated $1,000,000 to the erection of a prototypical 
prefabricated house. The following year, according to a 1937 Life magazine article, 
Harnischfeger Corporation’s new Pre-Fab Houses division sold 65 units. The houses were built 
of steel, fiberboard, gypsum board, and plywood panels pressed between vertical steel joins.338 
The cost of the Harnischfeger system mess hall, the OQMG major wrote, was 35% higher 
than the cinder-block model used in concurrent training camps, and 90% greater than the OQMG 
design (probably wood frame) used in the same camps. Similarly, the conference attendees 
agreed that when prefabricated housing manufacturers had submitted bids for quarters in recent 
years, “[i]n practically every case their estimates were at least 10% higher than the lowest bids 
received, and if they were required to put up bonds and comply with formal contracts of the 
Government, it is probable that their prices would have been still higher.” Moreover, any 
prefabricated structure with an exterior finish—namely, stucco or brick—in common with 
                                            
337 J. Moultrie Ward to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, “Prefabricated Buildings, or Low Cost Construction in Army 
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conventional construction would cost at least as much as a comparable wood-frame or masonry 
building. 
The only system of prefabricated construction the OQMG conferees came close to 
endorsing was that designed by the Army for use by the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC). The 
CCC buildings, which were manufactured by the Green Lumber Company of Laurel, 
Mississippi, used a simple panel system in which insulation board and wood siding (for exterior 
panels) or a thin sheathing material (for interior panels) were attached to a 7-foot by five-foot 
wood frame.339  Barracks of this type cost about $160 per man to build, as opposed to $1,220 per 
man for “the very best barracks,” likely of the War Department Housing Program type (see 
chapter 3). “In every case,” wrote the major, “it can be reliably stated that the Government gets 
just what it pays for.” And much of what Congress paid for in the case of permanent brick or 
stucco barracks, he explained, had little to do with the structure itself. Rather, beginning with the 
Barracks Completion project of the late 1920s, the Army General Staff had insisted on more and 
more in-built amenities, including refrigerators, water coolers, and amenities.  In a recent 
hospital project, for example, the building’s equipment had contributed one-third of the total cost 
of construction.340 
Having thus dispelled the Assistant Chief of Staff’s notion that it would be possible to 
fully prefabricate a divisional training camp, the OQMG drew up plans for a 10,000-man camp 
                                            
339 We know the Green Lumber Company manufactured the buildings from Corp of Engineers correspondence.  
See, for example, J. S. Seybold to Mr. Donald M. Nelson, “Authority to Negotiate Contract for Prefabricated 
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Purchase and Contract Branch Construction Section Subject Files 1940-1942.  Records of the Office of the Secretary 
of War, Record Group 107.  NACP.; The National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD, holds blueprints for 
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340 J. Moultrie Ward to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, “Prefabricated Buildings, or Low Cost Construction in Army 
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of permanent buildings incorporating as many prefabricated elements as possible.  The buildings 
were steel-frame structures with concrete floors and roof slabs and walls faced with brick on the 
exterior and tile on the interior.  Roofing would consist of insulation covered with tar or asphalt.  
The OQMG recommended three-story buildings to lower utilities costs and conserve ground 
area.  Prefabricated elements to be used in the designs included standard steel bays, stock-size 
steel windows, steel stairways, and stock wood frames and sash. 
Were the buildings to be constructed for an emergency, the OQMG major explained, the 
brick-and-tile walls could be replaced with sheets of corrugated metal or asbestos; the floors and 
roofs would be built of wood or other lightweight materials.  After the buildings’ temporary use, 
workers could strip off the temporary materials and replace them with permanent ones, using the 
same steel frame.341 
The OQMG’s technical staff was dissatisfied with the results of their experiment, and 
recommended against using the steel-frame system, especially before trying it out on a large 
scale.  Moreover, wrote the major, “It is the opinion of this office that planning for emergency 
construction should consist of genuinely temporary buildings. Buildings of the so-called ‘semi-
permanent type’ are neither one thing nor another and become a source of great expense and 
trouble after their original use has passed.”342  Ward recounted the experience at Fort Hoyle, 
where the Army had constructed a series of semi-permanent buildings in 1918. The barracks, 
built of hollow-tile walls, asphalt felt roofing, and pine floors and beams, were now in serious 
disrepair. “Termites have so thoroughly destroyed the wood supports, flooring, etc. that there is a 
question of how much longer they can be used with safety. Repairs would seem more expensive 
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than rebuilding,” which itself would cost, according to a recent request, over $2,750,000. “This is 
not a satisfactory record for semi-permanent buildings,” he concluded.343 
Two years later, in 1939, the Secretary of War, having been bombarded with literature 
from prefabricated housing companies, initiated another test of conventional versus prefabricated 
cantonment construction.  He proposed opening the bids for barracks at three air depots 
(Middletown Air Depot, Sacramento Air Depot, and Fairfield Air Depot) to steel construction 
companies.  This would entail issuing parallel specifications for conventional wood-frame and 
prefabricated steel construction.344  The OQMG complied, adjusting the bid sheets 
accordingly.345 
The Secretary of War’s test was a response not just to prefabricators’ claims, but also to 
an ongoing quarrel between the Chief of the Air Corps and the head of the OQMG’s 
Construction Division.  Earlier that year, the Air Corps chief had withheld his approval of the 
OQMG’s layout plans for the Air Corps Expansion Program because they showed the men living 
in two-story mobilization-type barracks.  The Chief wanted Civilian Conservation Corps-type 
prefabricated barracks instead, to be erected by the troops. Finally, after several months of 
debate, the Air Corps and the Construction Division effected a compromise: the Air Corps would 
accept wood-frame mobilization buildings if they prevailed in a bidding process open to both 
prefabricators and conventional construction companies.346 
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As a prelude to accepting bids for the three airfields, the Assistant Chief of Staff ordered 
one representative each from the Quartermaster Corps and the Corps of Engineers to investigate 
several existing examples of prefabricated construction.  The men would first visit Birmingham, 
Alabama, where U.S. Steel had built a prefabricated barracks.347 
The Quartermaster General appointed Major Howard B. Nurse, a long-time member of 
his staff, to take part in the expedition.348  Nurse was impressed by what he saw in Birmingham.  
The barracks, built by U.S. Steel subsidiary Tennessee Coal, Iron and Railroad Company, 
seemed to Nurse to be of “the most logical construction of this type yet produced by any of the 
prefabricated people.” He went on to say that, while he questioned the ability of U.S. Steel and 
other prefabricators to match in their designs the quality achieved by conventional wood-frame 
construction, he would welcome such a development—within limits.  If steel prefabricated 
structures could be built at no more than 125% of the cost of frame built-in-place structures, they 
might reasonably replace the latter.  If the buildings were to cost more, he cautioned against their 
use. His calculations, he explained, were based on wood’s higher maintenance cost; a slight 
increase—less than 50% over the cost of wood—in first cost of steel construction would be paid 
for by savings in maintenance over the long run.349 
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The Tennessee Coal, Iron and Railroad Company barracks design was likely similar to 
the homes the company built for the Farm Security Administration, also in 1939 (see figure 4.2).  
The buildings’ exteriors were made entirely of steel, with prefabricated steel panels joined 
together around the perimeter of a steel footing plate.  Interior walls were insulation board over 
steel framing; the floors were wood over steel joists.350  
                                            
350 “Steel-Panel Prefabricated Farm Buildings Erected in the South,” Architectural Record 85 (January 1939): 38-
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Figure 4.2:  Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Company, Prefabricated Farm Buildings.  
Published in “Steel-Panel Prefabricated Farm Buildings Erected in the South,” 
Architectural Record 85 (January 1939): 38. 
 
Nurse did criticize the Tennessee Coal, Iron and Railroad Company design on a couple of 
points. He questioned the compatibility of the allowable stress used in U.S. Steel’s calculations 
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with the American Institute on Steel Construction guidelines. He also took issue with the floor 
load, suggesting that it should be increased from 40 to at least 60 pounds. This, wrote Nurse, 
could be accomplished by switching from 14-gauge to 11-gauge pressed steel in the floor beams, 
and by changing the way the floor beams were supported.351 
Nurse suggested that the OQMG prepare a typical barracks plan for construction 
according to the Tennessee Coal, Iron, and Railroad Company system. But though he was, in 
general, pleased with the U.S. Steel design, Nurse also wished to defend the OQMG against 
allegations—in the case conventional wood construction was used in the end—that it failed to 
consider prefabricated design. “We undoubtedly will be called on to show the course of our 
studies and, whether this building plan is ever put to use or not, we should be in a position to 
furnish a plan of a steel prefabricated building of this type, if called upon, together with estimates 
of cost,” he wrote.352 
Nurse’s fears that official fascination with prefabrication would override good sense were 
not unfounded, as the OQMG’s experience with the airfield bids would show.  At the end of 
November, the office received bids for the construction of two barracks and one mess hall at 
Middletown Air Corps Depot. Per the Adjutant General’s directive, the office had issued two sets 
of specifications, one each for conventional wood frame construction and prefabricated steel 
construction. The low bidder for conventional construction was S. W. Shoemaker and Son, who 
estimated the cost of the three buildings at $24,240. The low bid for the second category, from 
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Walbridge, Aldinger Company, came in at $16,850—over $7,000 less than the wood-frame 
bid.353 
After a thorough study of the Walbridge, Aldinger design, Nurse’s office recommended 
that the Middletown contract be awarded to S. W. Shoemaker, even though the conventional-
construction bid was over 40% higher. The Walbridge, Aldinger scheme “was of an inferior 
design and came far from meeting the factors of safety set up under the American Institute of 
[S]teel [C]onstruction. It does not appear reasonable,” Nurse concluded, “that the War 
Department should at this time disregard such standards of common practices pertinent to good 
construction.”354 
Not long after, on December 7, 1939, bids for a nearly identical project (two barracks and 
one mess hall) for Patterson Field came in to the OQMG. The lowest bid in the wood-frame 
construction category came from George W. Timmons, Inc., and totaled $21,965. The low bidder 
in the prefabricated steel group was again Walbridge, Aldinger Company. The company’s 
Patterson Field design was valued at $21,050.355 
Just over a week after the OQMG received the bids for Patterson Field, Walbridge, 
Aldinger submitted alternative plans for the project, having “become aware that The 
Quartermaster General would not recommend awards based on the inferior plan submitted with 
their bid . . . .” Nurse urged the OQMG to stick to its policy against considering revisions, as the 
Air Corps required the new buildings immediately.  He was overruled by a member of the 
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General Staff, who seemed to think that the OQMG was biased against steel construction.356  “I 
cannot understand why the Staff should feel this way as I am sure the Quartermaster General 
would welcome this type of construction for peace-time use provided the design is structurally 
sound and the cost to the Government is within reason,” Nurse fumed.  But under current 
conditions accepting a prefabricated steel structure would be unwise. “The Quartermaster 
General has never had a failure in a single structure,” he wrote, “and cannot well afford to risk 
failure by accepting inferior design in order to bring steel construction within the range of wood 
prices.”357 
Despite his reservations, Nurse suggested the OQMG consider the second set of plans 
being submitted by prefabricators Walbridge, Aldinger—but only because the pressure from 
Army higher-ups was unrelenting. “I believe we had better go along on these revised plans, 
regardless of the fact it might be somewhat unethical, in order that the animosity of G-4 may not 
be further aroused,” he advised his supervisor in the OQMG.358 
As it had for permanent construction, the OQMG also investigated specific systems’ 
suitability for temporary Army construction.  In early 1940, the Adjutant General wrote the 
Quartermaster General with news that the Lumber Manufacturers Association planned to erect a 
prefabricated wooden barracks building near Washington, DC. The Adjutant General forwarded 
plans of the proposed building for consideration by the OQMG.359 
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A member of the OQMG staff submitted his report on the Lumber Manufacturers 
Association barracks in March of 1940.   Speaking on the grounds of “past experience and the 
standards of this office,” he pointed out that prefabrication was useless if, once on site, the 
factory-fabricated parts could not be assembled without further alteration. He was concerned that 
the wood panels in the Lumber Manufacturers Association’s proposed system required too much 
on-site adjustment in order to fit the building’s frame.360 
The OQMG representative worried in addition that the Lumber Manufacturers 
Association design was “much too flimsy to be used in the Army as a Barracks or Mess Hall.” 
The roof and floors each could handle only 25 pounds per square foot live load, and the floors 
were so springy as to appear even weaker.  The building was insufficiently braced for horizontal 
wind loads, and the footings were sized for ideal soil conditions. “The building as a whole will 
rack and twist after a small amount of service,” he concluded. “In a hurricane region these 
buildings will be dangerous to life, limb, and property.”361  The barracks “were not equal in 
strength or stability to the type of wood Barracks and Mess Buildings, that are now being built 
by the Construction Division,” he wrote, and thus he could only endorse their use in the case that 
portable buildings were required. 
Months later, in the fall of 1940, the OQMG commissioned a design for mobilization 
barracks based on the Seaton Housing Corporation’s system of construction.  The Seaton 
Housing system had been developed in New York by Guy C. Seaton, an engineer, and Philip 
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Hanson Hiss, III.362 Though Hiss was never formally trained as an architect, he dabbled in 
building design in addition to being a photographer and, after World War II, working for the 
United States Information Agency. Hiss would become best known as a client of Paul Rudolph, 
who built his Sarasota home in 1953.363 
The Seaton Housing system’s primary structural component was a lightweight I-shaped 
beam composed of two sheets of bent steel fillet-welded together.  The space to either side of the 
weld could be filled with a composition that would accept nails.  Multiple steel beams were 
attached to one another to form a self-supporting frame, which was then bolted to a concrete 
foundation.  For the Army, Seaton and Hiss designed a two-story steel-frame barracks building 
with steel-framed windows and doors, Gypsum Wall Board partitions, and linoleum or asphalt 
tile floors.364 
In his report on the Seaton Housing proposal, a member of the OQMG staff concluded 
that “the design submitted offers no decided advantages over the wood frame mobilization type 
structures now in use, and that its cost would exceed that of the present type of construction.”365  
Because the sheets of steel used in the Seaton Housing beams were only one-tenth of an inch 
thick, and because of how they were bolted to one another, the frame would lack rigidity and 
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require regular maintenance to prevent a breakdown.  “From this standpoint,” he explained, “the 
wood frame mobilization type structures are superior.”366 
The OQMG staff member further disputed the Seaton Housing Corporation’s estimate of 
cost, $7,000 per barracks building, as far too low.  A better figure would be $10,000 per 
building, based on a cost of 20 cents per cubic foot.  Constructing a standard wood-frame 
mobilization barracks, by contrast, cost only $7,500. Nor did the Seaton Housing design have an 
advantage in terms of time required for construction, he explained; at 30 days per building, it 
only matched the rate for conventional construction. In the balance, then, Seaton and Hiss had 
not appreciably improved upon the Army’s time-tested system of mobilization construction.367 
The report writer’s superiors agreed that the Seaton Housing design, while not a complete 
failure, did not warrant immediate action.  A major in the OQMG concluded, “With changes in 
regiments and growing shortage of steel, I believe we should file and take no further action. I 
don’t see why we have to answer this any more than any other salesman talk. An answer usually 
serves only to prolong the argument.”368 
Also in the fall of 1940, the Army awarded a contract to two Alabama firms to build at 
Fort McClellan a complete divisional camp out of prefabricated tent frames and precut wood in 
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just 34 days.369  The contract, totaling $4,084,000, covered 282 buildings and almost 4,000 tents, 
plus 18 miles of roads, 12 miles of utilities lines, and several miles of railroads.370 
The Fort McClellan experiment was “a mistake,” the site’s lead contractor recalled 
several months later.  The project was plagued by problems.  The lumber mill at Anniston was 
undersupplied on occasion, causing delays; grade marks were cut off the lumber prior to its 
arrival at the site, making inspection impossible; because pre-cut lumber was bundled by 
building, rejecting a single piece meant holding up the construction of the entire building; the 
cost of cutting the lumber at the outside mill “would have paid for setting up and operating a mill 
on the site.” The double-hauling of materials—to the Anniston mill, then from the mill to Fort 
McClellan—made no sense; in fact, cutting the lumber on site would have eliminated all of the 
problems mentioned above.371 
 
OQMG Objections to Prefabrication 
As the above examples show, the OQMG objected to factory fabrication of permanent 
and temporary housing on numerous grounds.  Some factors were specific to Army construction 
or to mobilization conditions.  For instance, the Army policy dictated that construction contracts 
were to be awarded to the lowest bidder.  This made it impossible to adopt a proprietary design 
except on a project by project basis.  In addition, OQMG staff worried about the prevalence in 
prefabrication systems of steel, which was rationed in wartime. 
                                            
369 Fine and Remington, The Corps of Engineers, 232-233; The contract, incidentally, was the subject of a Supreme 
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 But others among the Army’s concerns regarding prefabrication applied to civilian 
housing as well.  Three were paramount.  First, OQMG architects and engineers worried because 
the majority of the products being advertised in the late 1930s and early 1940s were relatively 
untested.  In particular, the durability of prefabricated housing was still in question, because few 
examples had been in use for more than a few months or years.  In cases involving new 
materials, even theoretical calculations were difficult due to a lack of data. 
The cost of prefabricated construction was also a concern.  The purchase price of 
individual units tended not to be much lower than the cost of construction of a conventionally-
built structure.  The OQMG staff speculated that some designs would carry high maintenance 
costs as well, due to the materials used and their method of combination.  Finally, all 
prefabrication systems confronted the problem of distribution:  shipping large sections of 
structures from the factory to the site, whether by rail or by truck, was technically trickier and 
thus more expensive than was transporting raw materials.  And the purchase price for the final 
product had to cover not one but two rounds of transportation:  of the raw materials, from their 
origin to the factory; and of the house parts, from the factory to the job site. 
Third, and perhaps most crucially, most available prefabrication systems required on-site 
finishing.  In many cases the finishing was done by skilled laborers using traditional methods.  
This duplication of labor brought the cost of factory-fabricated housing further up.  But it also 
meant that two sets of workers were required to complete one job:  one gang of skilled or 
unskilled laborers at the factory; and a second, usually skilled, crew at the worksite.  This 
method was wildly inefficient, especially when compared to the alternative:  the application of 
mass-production methods on-site to traditional wood-frame construction. 
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The Conventional Construction Alternative 
As the war in Europe intensified, Army officials began to outline a program for 
emergency construction.  But prefabrication, in many ways unappealing to OQMG, was not the 
Army’s only option.  The Quartermaster Corps could continue building temporary housing as it 
had for decades:  in wood frame, using orthodox building methods. 
The OQMG’s choice was made easier by recent developments in large-scale construction.  
Since at least World War I the Army as well as private builders had been experimenting with the 
application of factory techniques on the site of large jobs.  Rather than build structures in a 
factory and ship them to a site, these innovators turned the sites themselves into factories, 
organizing materials and workers according to the logic of the assembly line. 
Some of the contractors that built the Great War cantonments, for instance, set up 
sawmills on site and divided each task into multiple simple steps, each to be completed by a 
different worker.  In July of 1917 a reporter for the Christian Science Monitor described the 
scene at Camp Devens’s rail yard: 
[Lumber] is taken off the car and cut with but two men required as passers, one to lift the 
boards from the stack and372 the other to place the timber under the hand of the man who 
manipulates the saw with a foot lever.  A fourth man marks the specification symbols on 
the cut pieces and tosses them out of the shed to a fifth who catches and piles them.  
Seldom does more than a single pile accumulate at each shed, so frequent are the trips of 
the motor trucks and delivery wagons to the dozens of spots where the buildings are 
going up simultaneously. 
 
The camp’s contractor planned to bring in an automatic wood cutter and sorter, to sit on 
its own railroad siding.  “Lumber will be thrown off the cars directly upon the endless belts, 
which will carry the timbers up into the machine, where they will be cut, sorted, and tossed out 
into piles on the other side,” the reporter explained.  The same reporter also observed a team of 
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men laying a wooden floor in a drill hall.  There were thirty workers nailing simultaneously, each 
responsible for only a small section of the floor.  A separate group of ten men carried boards 
back and forth from the stockpile to the nailers, so that the latter could remain in one place, 
hammer in hand (see figure 4.3).373 
 
Figure 4.3:  Construction of World War I Barracks Using Mass-Production Methods.  
Published in National Army Cantonments: Plans and Photographs, June 1918 (U.S.A.: 
Construction Division, War Department, 1918) 
 
                                            
373 Ibid. 
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For the OQMG, success stories like Camp Devens's made the bulk savings offered by 
prefabricators less attractive.  “It appears that prefabricated housing is economical only when 
great volume is considered, the Chief of the OQMG’s Engineering & Design division wrote in 
January of 1941.  “However, where large camps are constructed, contractors are setting up their 
own mills on the site thereby going into mass production of the various units needed for the 
construction, in accordance with standard plans.”  Not only did this method, too, save money, but 
it also eliminated the distribution problem prefabricators faced.374 
When it came time to actually build American camps for the Second World War, speed, 
and not savings, reigned supreme.  The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 had specified 
that adequate stateside accommodations had to be available before draftees were sworn in.  And 
while the OQMG had failed to come to any consensus regarding prefabrication, it had in the 
meantime spent months revising the World War I cantonment plans for reuse.375 
The plans first developed by the OQMG, known as the 700 Series and approved in June 
of 1940, were similar in many ways to the 600 Series used during World War I.  They did 
incorporate technological upgrades, including indoor latrines and showers, termite shields, and 
central heating.  The 700 Series also specified concrete foundations instead of the wooden piers 
used during World War I.376 
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The 700 Series plans were reviewed by Chicago architects Halberd & Root, following 
accusations of Army favoritism towards the lumber industry.  Holabird & Root found little to 
criticize, and notably did not suggest factory-fabricating any of the building’s components.  The 
firm did, however, suggest reconsidering the use of steel or tile in place of wood.  Faced with the 
prospect of changing materials on the hundreds of projects underway, the Quartermaster Corps 
elected to put the proposal on hold until the next construction push.377  In December 1940 the 
plans were revised by Los Angeles architect George Edwin Bergstrom, with the result known as 
the 800 Series.  Bergstrom’s plans, though superior in structural strength, still utilized wood and 
were highly similar to the 700 Series plans; one of the criticisms directed against the 800 Series 
was that its major innovations had already been integrated into the structures recently built under 
the 700 series plans.378 
The preexistence of the 700 Series (later, 800 Series) plans combined with the OQMG’s 
reluctance to embrace prefabrication to determine that the major training camps of World War II 
would be built on site, in wood.  In keeping with tradition, the Quartermaster Corps and its 
civilian contractors utilized mass-production methods wherever possible to save both money and 
time.  For example, the OQMG adjusted its specifications to take advantage of surpluses.  In one 
case, the office reworked the mobilization plans to accommodate a surfeit of 10’-0’’ boards.  
When the surplus lapsed, the plans were changed back.379 
The private firms responsible for on-site construction introduced further innovations on 
the ground.  Foremen divided their men into teams, each responsible for a particular aspect of the 
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work. This human assembly line would move from building to building throughout the side, 
performing the same particular job each time. 
Workers at Camp Blanding and at five other cantonments set up mills for cutting lumber on site; 
the Camp Blanding crew also experimented with partial prefabrication, building each structure in 
sections. The W. E. Kier Construction Company mechanized its operation, delivering materials 
and tools by truck to each building site.380 
Thus the Army soldiers who went abroad to fight Germany and Japan left not from 
factory-built training camps, but from a more familiar landscape:  soldier-cities of wooden 
buildings put together by hand, with the help of mass-production methods transferred to the job 
site.  And many of the men and women who were lucky enough return home settled in similar 
environments, massive developments of wooden buildings constructed using a combination of 
traditional methods and assembly-line techniques.  But the latter were not training camps; they 
were, rather, one of the most significant architectural inventions of the postwar period:  the large-
scale suburbs of the late 1940s and early 1950s.381 
 
Mass Production and the Mid-Century Suburb 
That the mid-century suburbs resembled the Army camps of the Second World War is not 
an accident.  At least one of the builders behind the postwar suburban boom honed his skills in 
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military construction.  William Levitt of Levitt & Sons built Navy housing both in Norfolk (in 
1942, with the family firm) and overseas, after he joined the Seabees, the Navy’s engineering 
corps.382 
Little is known about Levitt’s tenure with the Seabees (1943-1945), but Levitt & Sons 
built its Virginia development, Oakdale Farms, using mass-production methods.  The project 
represented a departure for the firm, which before the war had specialized in medium and large 
homes on Long Island and in Westchester County383, building no more than 200 in a single 
subdivision.384  At Oakdale Farms, in contrast, the Levitts built 2,350 homes.  They used precut 
lumber to minimize labor, and distilled the process of building each house into 27 discrete tasks, 
each to be performed by a single laborer.385 
When William Levitt and his brother, Alfred, unveiled their first massive subdivision, 
Levittown, New York, in 1947, contemporaries hailed the builders’ use of mass-production 
techniques.  Though the Levitts had opted for on-site construction over factory fabrication, they 
created an assembly line of workers on the home lots, churning out one house every sixteen 
minutes.  The Levitts’ key to speed was taken directly from their Norfolk experience:  they again 
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divided the construction of each house into 27 jobs, each performed—house after house after 
house—by a single worker386 
Historians have attributed the Levitts’ mass-production system to their admiration of  
automobile manufacturers; William himself called Levitt & Sons the “GM of the Building 
Industry.”387  But while Fordist production may have indeed been an inspiration, the most direct 
influence on the Levitts’ methods seems to have been much more banal.  Levitt & Sons’ first 
large homebuilding project, Oakdale Farms, was born of the same circumstances that shaped 
Army construction:  uncertainty about the usefulness of factory fabrication methods; the need to 
reduce costs to fit a government budget; a labor shortage that made streamlining essential; and, 
most of all, a pressing need for speed.  The system worked.  So well, in fact, that the Levitts 
transferred the system to the private market just a few years later. 
The Army’s rejection of factory-fabricated housing thus helps to explain a larger puzzle:  
the failure of prefabrication to noticeably impact the mass housing market.  Problems with 
quality, cost, and labor plagued early-twentieth century efforts at prefabrication to the extent that 
no one method was tried on any large scale before World War II.  When the war ushered in a 
housing crisis—first in the Army and around war plants, and afterwards in the civilian cities and 
towns to which veterans flocked in droves—builders turned to tried-and-true techniques rather 
than take a risk on the unknown.  The factory-built home was relegated to historical curiosity; 
the built-in-place tract house, on the other hand, would become the central symbol of late-
twentieth century middle-class culture. 
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Conclusion 
Histories of prefabricated housing in the United States have tended to focus on the 
success stories rather than the failures.  And, indeed, there were successes.  Sears, Roebuck and 
Company, which introduced its first book of house plans in 1908, was the most profitable of 
dozens of early-twentieth century kit house manufacturers.  Customers chose from a variety of 
house sizes and styles, and upon payment received everything needed for the house’s 
construction, from precut boards to nails, finished millwork, paint, shingles, and windows.  
Modeling itself on the Ford Motor Company, Sears, Roebuck vertically integrated its kit-house 
production, buying facilities to manufacture the house parts rather than hiring other firms to cut 
the lumber and produce the finishings.388 
In the strictest sense, Sears’ and other firms’ kit houses were not prefabricated.  Rather 
than being assembled in a factory and shipped to the site, or even—except in a few cases—
relying on panelized construction to minimize on-site labor, the kit houses were shipped in 
pieces by rail and put together by the homeowner or a local carpenter.  The savings effected by 
the Sears, Roebuck system nevertheless indicated to many the promise of factory fabrication. 
The hope that prefabrication would reduce the cost and construction time of housing 
persisted into mid-century.  Nearly 200,000 Quonset huts, the semi-cylindrical steel and wood389 
structures developed by the United States Navy in 1941, sprung up at home and overseas.  The 
shed-like buildings used for everything from military hospitals to chapels.  Many of the Quonsets 
located abroad were shipped home after the war for recycling as emergency housing.390 
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While Levitt & Sons opted for built-in-place wood-frame houses, other war-housing 
contractors experimented with prefabrication. Vernon DeMars, who designed housing and 
community buildings for workers at Vallejo, California, had worked before the war for the Farm 
Security Administration (FSA).  In at least one of his FSA projects, at Yuba City, California 
(1940), he experimented with Cemesto-brand composition boards as an alternative to traditional 
sheathing materials.  At Vallejo, he made further use of prefabricated house parts, building with 
factory-made glued plywood panels that were shipped to the site, then assembled horizontally 
before being levered into place.391 
Numerous prefabrication companies also contributed to the war effort.  The Architectural 
Forum’s “Directory of Wartime Prefabricators”392 listed twenty-two manufacturers as having 
produced either war-worker or military housing.  A sampling of the companies represented is as 
follows:  Alladin Co. of Bay City, Michigan, a kit-house manufacturer, had shipped buildings for 
military use to Alaska, the Southwest Pacific, Iceland and Africa.  Celotex Corp of Chicago, the 
holder of the Cemesto patent, had seen its product used to build dormitories, Coast Guard 
barracks, and officers’ quarters.  Green Lumber Company of Laurel, Mississippi, a CCC 
contractor, was said to be producing 20,000 square feet of barracks per day.  Gunnison Housing 
Corporation, of New Albany, Indiana, had been busy making plywood airplane wings as well as 
stressed-skin hutments.  The John A. Johns Contracting Corporation of Brooklyn had produced 
at least 5,000 houses for war workers, and had supplied various building parts including 
prefabricated trusses to the Army.  Toledo, Ohio’s Libbey-Owens Ford Glass Company had 
converted one of its factories to the manufacture of plywood-panel houses for war housing.  T. 
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C. King Company of Anniston, Alabama, another CCC contractor, had built 2,000 units of war-
worker housing, and had 500 more on order.  Plywood Structures, of Los Angeles, had built 
6,400 units of War-Worker housing plus prefabricated dormitories and barracks. 
The Army made widespread use of factory-fabricated housing at its Manhattan Project 
installations, including Oak Ridge, Tennessee (see chapter 5).  The 9,360 units still standing at 
Oak Ridge in 1948 included 3050 in single- and four-family houses built of Cemesto board (see 
figure 4.4); 113 in fiberboard apartment houses; 3365 in flattop sectional plywood houses first 
developed by the TVA (see figure 4.5); 740 in prefabricated-plywood duplexes known as 
“Victory Cottages”; and 435 plywood hutments.393 
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Figure 4.4:  John B. Pierce Foundation/SOM Prefabricated Cemesto House.  Published in  
“Houses: John B. Pierce Foundation,” Architectural Record 89 (May 1941): 63. 
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Figure 4.5:  Prefabricated Houses Designed by the Tennessee Valley Authority.  Published 
in “TVA ‘Sectional’ Houses,” Architectural Forum 80 (March 1944): 75. 
 
Experiments with prefabricated housing continued after the war, as architectural historian 
Peter S. Reed details in his article on World War II and modern architecture.394  Just after 
Japan’s surrender, architect R. Buckminster Fuller modified his cylindrical Dymaxion 
Deployment unit, modeled on steel grain bins, for use as a civilian home.  The Dymaxion 
Wichita house was manufactured by Kansas’s Beech Aircraft, which during the war had built 
bombers for the military.  It failed to gain popularity with suburban home-seekers.395  Factory-
fabricated house parts also made an appearance in Charles and Ray Eames’s Case Study house 
#8 (1949), a steel-frame structure with Cemesto wall panels and Ferroboard ceilings.396  
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Probably the best known of the prefabrication systems debuting after the war was the enameled-
steel Lustron home, of which 2500 were built in the United States and South America between 
1948 and 1950.397 
But despite the participation by prefabricators in housing production both during and after 
the war, the postwar housing boom was in the main characterized by mass production on site 
rather than in the factory.  The story of the Army’s rejection of prefabrication in favor of built-in 
place housing helps to explain why. 
Before and during the war, OQMG studied a number of factory-fabricated housing 
systems.  But despite pressure from prefabricators and the General Staff to adopt one or more 
such designs, OQMG architects and engineers opted to go ahead with conventional construction 
for both permanent and temporary housing needs.  The disadvantages of prefabricated housing 
were many; the most important included questions about the structural integrity and durability of 
factory-fabricated designs, elevated construction costs, and the duplication of labor in the factory 
and on site. 
The first housing developments of the postwar period went up in conditions similar to 
those under which the Army operated:  a severe housing shortage meant that the most successful 
builders would be those who could construct high-quality houses in a short amount of time at 
minimum cost.  As merchant builders like William Levitt perfected the application of assembly-
line processes to the building site, the gap in quality and capacity between conventional builders 
and prefabricators widened.  Companies entering the home-building market in the 1950s and 
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later shied away from prefabricated construction exactly because the most profitable among their 
forerunners had proven the ability of conventional methods to adapt to changing conditions.398 
The results of the Army’s experiments in prefabrication thus predicted a later rejection of 
factory fabrication by the suburban builders of the postwar era.  Though the Levittowns and 
other developments that characterized the American built environment of the 1950s through 
1980s did not on the surface resemble wartime Army barracks, their logical foundation was the 
same. 
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Chapter 5:  The Atomic City is a Suburb: Antiurbanism and the Master Plan 
for Oak Ridge 
 
Introduction 
In 1942, the Army Corps of Engineers—the Quartermaster Corps’ successor in Army 
construction oversight—embarked on a community-building project that, while unprecedented, 
nevertheless drew on decades of experience constructing Army posts.  The Engineers’ charge 
was to create, as quickly as possible, an entire secret city in the hills of northeastern Tennessee.  
The purpose of the city was the development of an atomic bomb; as such, it would contain both 
the technical facilities for atomic research and production, and housing and community services 
to support the thousands of civilian employees involved in the project. 
To accomplish the building of Oak Ridge, the Manhattan Engineer District followed a 
familiar pattern.  It brought in a civilian architectural and city-planning firm, Skidmore, Owings 
& Merrill, to design a town just nice enough to recruit and retain the necessary atomic workers at 
minimal cost.  The planners transformed what for the Corps of Engineers was a military 
necessity into an opportunity to realize certain theoretical planning principles, particularly the 
Garden City model of low-density development first popularized in England at the turn of the 
twentieth century. 
Upon the war’s end, the Corps of Engineers transferred responsibility for the town’s 
management, as well as ownership of all its property, to the civilian Atomic Energy Commission 
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(AEC).  The AEC, in turn, embarked on a project to dispose of all of the town’s non-plant 
property, and to support Oak Ridge’s residents in achieving self-government.  As a part of this 
postwar mission, the AEC hired Skidmore, Owings & Merrill to re-plan an Oak Ridge whose 
physical arrangement had been confused and compromised by wartime exigencies. 
Skidmore, Owings & Merrill published its Master Plan for Oak Ridge in December 1948.  
The document epitomizes the anti-urban sentiment that pervaded American culture during the 
immediate postwar period.  Specifically, two aspects of the Master Plan embodied an anti-city 
attitude.  First was the design itself, which in its basis in Ebenezer Howard’s Garden City model 
rejected industrial urbanism in favor of decentralized, low-density development.  Second were 
the controls proposed by Skidmore, Owings & Merrill to insure planned growth during the 
transition from government to private ownership.  Embracing a strategy common among 
suburban developers of the previous decades, Skidmore, Owings & Merrill recommended that 
the AEC attach deed or lease restrictions to all residential and commercial properties prior to 
disposal.  Deed restrictions can be understood as being anti-urban on two fronts.  First, deed or 
lease restrictions were designed to preserve the status quo at a time when continual and 
unstoppable change was understood to be a defining characteristic of the urban environment.  
Second, the particulars of the deed restrictions proposed by Skidmore, Owings & Merrill, like 
those of their forebears in suburban development, defined acceptable use against urban qualities 
such as density and heterogeneity (of land uses and populations both). 
This chapter begins with a brief examination of American anti-urbanism at midcentury 
before turning to the case of Oak Ridge in particular and outlining the situation of the atomic 
town under AEC control.  It describes the Skidmore, Owings & Merrill Master Plan within the 
context of Ebenezer Howard’s Garden City movement and more recent manifestations thereof, 
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including the greenbelt towns of the New Deal.  It next considers the environmental controls 
proposed by Skidmore, Owings & Merrill, examining the firm’s rationale for advocating deed or 
lease restrictions and tying that choice to earlier developments in suburban history.  Finally, the 
chapter looks briefly at the American New Town of Columbia, Maryland (1967) as the logical 
successor of the Master Plan for Oak Ridge. 
 
The Suburbanization of the United States, 1945-1970 
By the late 1940s, the movement of Americans from the cities to the suburbs, a 
movement that had begun in the 1800s as a trickle, then become a steady flow by the 1920s, 
appeared as an unstoppable tidal wave.  World War II served as a kind of pressure cooker for the 
suburban dream, a time during which, though private building had ceased and families were 
separated by entire continents, the federal government and the home-building industry alike 
encouraged Americans to focus on the single-family suburban home as the prize awaiting them 
at the end of the conflict.399  When that time arrived, FHA and VA insurance combined with 
innovations in the construction industry (see chapters 3 and 4) to catalyze an explosion of large-
scale suburban developments aimed at the middle class, particularly returning vets.400  By 1950, 
the suburban growth rate was ten times that of the urban rate nationwide401; in the three decades 
to follow, the suburbs would see a population gain of over 60 million.402 
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But the postwar period was not marked just by an acceleration of existing trends.  The 
character of the suburbs changed, too.  Most notably, other land uses—retailing, manufacturing, 
and corporate offices—joined housing in its exodus from the urban core.403  As the historical 
functions of the city center moved to the periphery, the suburb no longer depended upon the 
cultural and economic resources of the city.  With the development during the 1950s of 
decentralized highways like those cross-hatching Los Angeles and Orange County,404 the suburb 
lost even its physical connection to the urban center.  American suburbia became an independent 
entity with its own logic of physical growth, one that prized dispersion and horizontal movement 
over concentration and verticality. 
Historians and cultural critics have invented a new lexicon to describe the postwar 
suburban environment.  Ada Louise Huxtable called the postwar suburbs “slurbs.”405  Lewis 
Mumford titled a section of his book, The City in History, “Mass suburbia as anti-city.”406  
Robert Fishman called them “technoburbs.”407  Joel Garreau popularized the term “edge city” in 
1991.408  The particular terminology in play matters less than the conclusion shared by all these 
observers:  that in the period after 1945, the American built environment changed in a way that 
rendered the old conceptual triad of rural/suburban/urban meaningless. 
 
Oak Ridge in Transition 
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Oak Ridge was unusual among the suburbs built in the immediate postwar years in that it, 
first, began as a military installation, and, second, was planned not by a real-estate developer but 
by a professional design firm.  It nonetheless is an instructive example of postwar antiurbanism, 
in part exactly because of its status as a community planned on behalf of the federal government.  
For the Atomic Energy Commission, eager to privatize Oak Ridge and thus relinquish its 
responsibilities as town landlord and governor, consciously shaped Oak Ridge in the suburban 
image it believed was most likely to be embraced by current and future residents. 
Oak Ridge was first planned during the war, when it was a secret, gated, Army Corps of 
Engineers-run installation focused on the development of an atomic weapons system.  The Corps 
of Engineers originally selected the Boston contracting firm of Stone & Webster to design and 
manage construction of all of Oak Ridge’s facilities.  Stone & Webster had been regularly 
involved in military post construction since World War I, when the company oversaw building at 
Camps Travis and MacArthur, and at Kelly Field #2 and Rich Field.409  Dissatisfied with the 
firm’s initial plan for a town of 13,000 and a trailer camp of 1,000, the Engineers turned to the 
John B. Pierce Foundation. 
The John B. Pierce Foundation, a private foundation that funded housing research (see 
chapter 4), in turn recommended the architectural firm of Skidmore, Owings & Merrill (SOM), 
with which the Pierce Foundation had collaborated in the past.410  In February of 1943, the Corps 
of Engineers decided in favor of the SOM design411.  The plan called for the grouping of 
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residential housing into size-limited neighborhoods, each with its own elementary school and 
shopping center.  A larger town center, surrounded by apartment buildings and dormitories for 
childless couples or single workers, would include additional shopping and cultural facilities.412 
SOM’s design was soon torn apart by the exigencies of the atomic weaponry program.  
The wartime Oak Ridge was in fact built in three phases, each one more hurried and thus less 
carefully coordinated than the last.  “[T]he requirements grew and ink was scarcely dry on one 
set of plans before they had to be reopened and extended,” recalled SOM designers in their 1948 
Master Plan for the city’s re-planning.413  The first phase of construction, comprising the plan 
approved in February 1943, included 3,050 Cemesto houses, three apartment buildings, 14 
dormitories, 980 hutments, and 1,071 trailers, as well as one high school, three elementary 
schools, a hospital, four shopping centers, and various service buildings.414 
By the end of summer 1943, plant operators realized they needed far more employees 
than they had first anticipated.  SOM accordingly expanded its plans to accommodate 42,000 
total residents.  The second phase of construction added 4,793 family units (including 
prefabricated single-family houses, panelized duplex houses, demountable multi-family houses), 
55 dormitories, 2,089 trailers, and 391 hutments to the housing mix.  A separate cantonment area 
included 84 hutments, 42 barracks and service buildings, and 52 units’ worth of hutment 
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apartments.  In addition to the extra housing, construction crews doubled the size of the high 
school, built two additional elementary schools and expanded others, expanded the hospital 
building, and built new or added to existing commercial and service facilities.415  The expansion 
of the townsite area defeated even some of the settlement’s most basic design principles; the 
Gamble Valley trailer park, for instance, was located in what was meant to be an empty buffer 
zone between the Y-12 plant and workers’ housing.416 
One year later, in late 1944, the Corps of Engineers grew Oak Ridge yet again.  The third, 
and final, wartime construction phase was again a response to plant expansion and revised 
personnel estimates.  Workmen built an additional 1,300 prefabricated family units and 20 
dormitories, and brought in 744 more trailers.  The town’s schools were again built out, and 
crews added onto the hospital one more time.  Other service buildings were constructed, and 
many streets were repaved or otherwise improved.417  SOM’s organizing principle of expansion 
by self-contained neighborhoods dissolved under such pressure.  And while  the Army and SOM 
did their best to beautify the new developments, providing for landscaping and building 
ornamental pavilions and bridges,418 the physical chaos of the later building phases was soon 
echoed by social unrest.  Historian Peter Bacon Hales writes this about all three of the atomic 
cities, including Oak Ridge:  “As plans became realities, and blueprints turned into communities, 
the messy stuff of American community life—everything from noisy town meetings at Los 
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Alamos to strikes, rapes, and murders at Hanford and Oak Ridge—came increasingly to 
dominate the attention of District officials and occupants alike.”419 
SOM had originally planned for a population of 13,000, but in June of 1945 the city of 
Oak Ridge reached a peak five times that—75,000.  Some 28,834 of the residents were housed in 
single- and multi-family houses, including apartment buildings; 1,054 Oak Ridgers lived in pre-
Manhattan Project farmhouses; 13,786 employees lived in the dorms; and 31,257 residents were 
installed in barracks, hutments, and trailers.420  Oak Ridge had grown to become Tennessee’s 
fifth largest town, and the second largest single customer of the TVA.421  The physical coherence 
of the small city suffered accordingly.  As historians Charles Johnson and Charles Jackson write, 
the town’s “overall planned unity had largely disappeared in favor of a rag-tag mixture” of 
housing types.422  SOM designers put the result in urban-planning terms:  while the areas first 
built upon “have an individual neighborly kind of personality” resembling idealized small-town 
life, they wrote, in later phases “the usual jumbling of land uses of the average city occurred and 
the boom town or war-time physical aspect became evident.”423 
The population of Oak Ridge dropped after war’s end, dipping to 42,465 by the end of 
1946.  But the town’s spatial disarray persisted, and solving the planning problem became a 
high-priority item for the Atomic Energy Commission, to which the Corps of Engineers 
transferred control over the atomic energy program on January 1, 1947.  Bringing the built 
environment of Oak Ridge up to the standard first set by SOM was one major aspect of the 
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AEC’s postwar agenda:  to enable the communities it controlled to become as “normal” as 
possible without disrupting atomic production.  For the AEC, making Oak Ridge normal meant 
relinquishing ownership of residential and commercial property; aiding Oak Ridgers in a bid to 
incorporate the town and, thereafter, become financially self-sufficient; and replacing the helter-
skelter residential settlements of Phases 2 and 3 with well-planned, permanent neighborhoods. 
Thus as one part of a larger transition program, which involved drafting disposal 
legislation, surveying residents, and commissioning reports on the future of Oak Ridge, the AEC 
asked SOM to prepare a new Master Plan for Oak Ridge assuming a conversion to private 
property ownership and self-government.  Like the firm’s 1943 plan for Oak Ridge, the 1948 
scheme envisioned the Tennessee atomic town not as an industrial city, but as a Garden City 
planned according to principles first articulated by Englishman Ebenezer Howard in 1898. 
 
The Garden City and the New Deal Greenbelt Towns 
The Garden City was profoundly anti-urban.  Like contemporary planners including 
Frank Lloyd Wright and Le Corbusier, Ebenezer Howard feared the unchecked development of 
the industrial city and its accompanying social problems, including extremes of wealth and 
poverty and cultural conflicts.  While he was not a pure environmental determinist, as the 
political and economic program that accompanied his description of the Garden City’s built 
environment makes clear, Howard believed that reconfiguring the spaces of industrial capitalism 
was a necessary component of, in his words, “a peaceful path to real reform.”424 
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Howard came of age in the English Radical movement of the 1870s and 1880s, which 
prized democracy and cooperation as solutions to contemporary society’s ills.  The Radicals 
were suspicious of both big government and big capital, and instead favored voluntary 
cooperation among individual citizens.425  Howard was also influenced by Edward Bellamy’s 
Looking Backward, published in 1888, which pictured the city of Boston in 2000 as a socialist 
paradise in which private property had been nationalized and inequality abolished.  The city’s 
built environment had also been reformulated to support the new politico-economic order.426 
But while Howard embraced Nationalism, the American political movement spawned by 
Bellamy’s book, he took issue with its advocacy of state ownership of industry and private 
property, as well as with the centralized urban form pictured in Looking Backward.427  Urban 
historian Robert Fishman writes:  “The Garden City was not the simple result of Bellamy’s 
influence on Howard.  Rather, it grew out of Howard’s attempt to correct Bellamy’s authoritarian 
bias and to devise a community in which social order and individual initiative would be properly 
balanced.”428 
Thus Howard’s Garden City, which he published in 1898 and again in 1902, was not a 
city per se, but nor did it represent a nostalgic return to a pre-capitalist rural lifestyle.  Instead, 
Howard proposed combining the best features of urban and rural communities into a town-
country hybrid, as pictured in his Three Magnets analogy (see figure 5.1).  Howard diagrammed 
the Garden City as a circle (see figure 5.2), with a civic center at its heart (comprising a 
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community park, cultural institutions, and a shopping mall), outside of which were residences, 
then industrial properties, then an agricultural greenbelt that would protect against sprawl.  But 
while the circular diagram implied a centralization of social and economic life along the lines of 
the contemporary industrial city, Howard in fact intended for the real center of life in the Garden 
City to be the neighborhood or ward. 
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Figure 5.1:  Ebenezer Howard, Three Magnets Diagram.  Published in Garden Cities of 
Tomorrow, http://www.library.cornell.edu/Reps/DOCS/howard.htm 
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Figure 5.2:  Ebenezer Howard, Garden City Diagram.  Published in Garden Cities of 
Tomorrow. 
 
Howard divided the Garden city into six wedges he called wards.  Contained within each 
ward were all the functions required for daily life:  industries and office buildings, houses, 
segments of the Crystal Palace shopping area and the town’s Central Park, and—at the center of 
it all—a school.  Thus the Garden City had not one but seven centers:  the town’s common civic 
center, plus the center of each ward, which was not a commercial or government space, but a 
public school.429 
                                            
429 Ibid., 42-4. 
   216 
Howard envisioned the creation of not a single Garden City, but of an entire network of 
Garden Cities, each limited in population and with agricultural land separating it from the 
surrounding communities.  On the one hand, as Howard noted, the proximity of the various 
Garden Cities, when connected by an efficient railway system, would give residents easy access 
to whatever cultural or commercial opportunities their own hometown lacked.  On the other 
hand, the networked nature of the Garden City scheme reduced the importance of the Central 
City, which was to be less than twice as large as the surrounding Garden Cities (see figure 5.3).  
Instead of the centralized built environment of industrial capitalism, in which a few large cities’ 
insatiable demand for manpower and natural resources left their rural hinterlands impoverished, 
Howard envisioned a decentralized web of Garden Cities in which no one place or person was 
sacrificed to the desires of another.  
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Figure 5.3:  Ebenezer Howard, Growth Diagram.  Published in Garden Cities of Tomorrow. 
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The Garden City diagram was only one portion of Howard’s program for revolution.  
Equally important was the economic basis on which the Garden City was to operate.  Private 
property ownership would be eliminated entirely; instead, the land of the Garden City would be 
held in trust by a group of investors who would turn it over to the community at large once rents 
collected by residents totaled the purchase price plus a modest return for the trustees.  Eschewing 
government ownership of industry but equally uncertain that collectivization was the solution to 
every problem, Howard proposed that each industry or commercial pursuit could be either 
operated by a collective or privately owned.430 
Thus Howard’s Garden City subverted both the economic and the physical structures of 
the contemporary industrial city.  For Howard, the redistribution of wealth among the populace 
was not enough to permanently remake society.  The space of that society, too, had to be 
decentralized in order for “real reform” to take hold. 
The failure of the Garden City movement to build actual Garden Cities during Howard’s 
lifetime is almost as famous as the Garden City concept itself.  Howard saw only two Garden 
Cities, Letchworth (1903) and Welwyn Garden City (1920), go up during his lifetime, and even 
these only partially fulfilled the Garden City mission.  As Fishman details, rents in Letchworth 
proved too high for any but skilled laborers to live within the town’s limits.  And Welwyn’s 
supporters ratcheted down their revolutionary rhetoric, and instead focused on building a 
pleasant, affordable community without the expectation of any broader social change.431 
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 Despite its lack of success as a revolutionary program, Howard’s treatise on the Garden 
City has “done more than any other single book to guide the modern town planning movement 
and to alter its objectives,” wrote Lewis Mumford.432  Among the inheritors of the Garden City 
as a model for community design were the greenbelt towns of FDR’s New Deal.  Though the 
greenbelt program was itself incomplete, with only three towns partly built, it, too, would have a 
powerful legacy for American city planners, particularly during the postwar period. 
The greenbelt town program was the brainchild of Rexford Tugwell, an agricultural 
economist and head of the new Resettlement Administration.  Among the Resettlement 
Administration’s aims was to relocate low-income residents of urban slums or failing farms to 
healthy, economically-viable communities.433  The greenbelt towns were to be those 
communities. 
The greenbelt town concept—the idea of building entire new towns rather than isolated 
projects to house poor Americans—attracted the attention of prominent architects including 
Frank Lloyd Wright, who suggested the federal government adopt his Broadacre City scheme in 
place of some other planning model.434  Henry Wright and Clarence Stein, the planners of the 
garden suburb of Radburn, New Jersey (1929), signed on to the project as advisors.435 
Though designs for the greenbelt cities varied according to the preferences of their 
planning teams, all shared a commitment three crucial characteristics of the Garden City.  First, 
the greenbelt towns’ planners were united in their commitment to keeping residential densities 
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low.  According to historian Joseph L. Arnold, the three greenbelt towns actually built had 
densities ranging from four families per acre to 8.5 families per acre; compare these to the 
PWA’s Harlem River Houses, which accommodated 82 units per acre.436 
Second, each town was to be surrounded by a protected strip of open land, the greenbelt 
from which the program took its name.437  As in Howard’s Garden City scheme, the greenbelt 
would limit each town’s physical growth and, in combination with prescribed residential 
densities, its population.  In the case of the New Deal towns, the Resettlement Administration 
planners expected no more than 30,000 residents per town (at Greenbelt, Maryland), in some 
cases much fewer.438 
Finally, at least two of the greenbelt towns would be organized around multiple 
neighborhood centers in addition to a single town center.  Planners at Greenbrook (New Jersey, 
not built) and Greenbelt, taking a page out of the Radburn book, grouped houses into 
superblocks, at the center of which was a shared open space.439  Multiple superblocks would 
combine into neighborhoods, which in turn came together to form the town as a whole.  The 
purpose of the greenbelt towns’ town centers, meanwhile, was to provide shopping and cultural 
facilities that would eliminate the need for travel to outside communities and serve as a focus for 
local pride.  The facilities included in each center was determined according to surveys of area 
residents.440 
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As Howard had imagined for his Garden City, the greenbelt towns were progressive 
socially as well as in terms of physical planning.  The Resettlement Administration encouraged 
residents of the built greenbelt towns to engage in various cooperative enterprises, which 
included a nonprofit newspaper, a credit union, a cooperative health association, a cooperative 
nursery school, and cooperative food and drug stores.  Some of these were successful, for a 
while, though most if not all dissolved over time.441 
The three built greenbelt towns—Greenbelt, Greenhills, Ohio, and Greendale, 
Wisconsin—were eventually sold and integrated into the surrounding economic and urban 
fabrics, their greenbelts lost to private development.  Despite their failure to persist according to 
the Resettlement Administration’s vision, the greenbelt towns as first planned have had an 
afterlife as models for later Garden City designs, including SOM’s plans for Oak Ridge. 
 
Oak Ridge as Garden City 
Even in their earliest (1943) plan for Oak Ridge, the members of the SOM design team 
looked to the Garden City for inspiration.  They planned three separate neighborhoods north of 
the Oak Ridge Turnpike, each with about 1,000 houses, and each with its own elementary school 
and shopping center.  Apartment buildings and dormitories would provide for small families and 
single workers, respectively, and a central shopping district and recreation halls would be built to 
serve needs not met by the neighborhood centers.442 
As at earlier manifestations of the Garden City idea, including Letchworth, Welwyn, and 
the greenbelt town of Greendale, Wisconsin, at Oak Ridge SOM tempered the plan’s radical 
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social implications with references to conventional suburban architecture and planning.  
Manhattan Engineer District head Colonel James C. Marshall had encouraged a conservative 
approach to the town’s residential areas by citing Norris, Tennessee, as an example of successful 
new-town building.  At Norris, a Tennessee Valley Authority town, planners had successfully 
combined modern technology with architectural and planning references to the historic American 
built environment.443  In their 1943 plan for Oak Ridge, in keeping with Marshall’s wishes, SOM 
designers rejected the modernist grid in favor of what Owings called “safety devices”444:  
curving streets, culs-de-sac, and residential neighborhoods arranged around small-scale 
commercial centers.  In addition, though the single-family houses at Oak Ridge would 
incorporate the materials innovations and new construction techniques for which the Pierce 
Foundation was known, they were also marked by traditional domestic cues including porches, 
fireplaces, and a separate bedroom wing.445 
When SOM returned to Oak Ridge after the war, it proposed a housing replacement 
program coupled with a return to the planning principles espoused in the 1943 plan to remedy 
Oak Ridge’s troubling architectural and urban-planning situation.  The backbone of the 
Preliminary and final Master Plans was, again, the neighborhood or cluster model of community 
growth:  Oak Ridge would expand not by densification, but by the addition of population-
controlled neighborhoods with their own commercial and educational facilities.  Though he was 
writing with reference to the re-planning of large cities, what Oak Ridge planner Tracy Augur 
wrote in a 1944 article entitled, “Objectives of Neighborhood Planning” is consistent with 
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SOM’s ideas about the social implications of cluster development as stated in the Preliminary 
Master Plan.  “The basic idea of the neighborhood unit is that it is a unit of something else,” 
Augur explained.  “It is a device for organizing big cities into manageable parts in which the 
citizens may have a practical voice in determining the conditions in which they live.  A 
neighborhood meeting is a good place to air opinions on . . . close-to-home subjects . . . .  It can 
also serve the political purpose of the New England town meeting, for neighborhood opinion that 
has been well crystallized and organized can have a potent effect on municipal 
administration.”446 
Per the Garden City model, neighborhood planning as employed by SOM at Oak Ridge 
was in turn based on another design principle:  the grouping of the city’s basic functions—living, 
working, service, recreation, and traffic—into separate zones.  These functions, wrote the authors 
of the Preliminary Master Plan should be in “relationship to each other, yet separated or buffered 
against the intrusion of one use on the other.”  At stake were two qualities the SOM team 
emphasized throughout the Preliminary and final Master Plans:  efficiency and beauty, or 
“pleasantness.”  “The functions of producing and distributing goods and services must be 
separated from those which provide the amenities of living, if the city is to be made a more 
efficient place for the performance of its economic functions and also a more pleasant place in 
which to live,” the Preliminary Master Plan explained.447 
In mobilizing the separation of functions as a major organizing principle of the Oak 
Ridge plan, the SOM team did not just look to the Garden City, in which Howard had proposed a 
strict segregation of city administration, commerce, residence, industry, and agriculture.  The 
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planners were more than likely also responding to a more recent trend in European Modernist 
city planning, as exemplified by the 1933 Athens Charter of the Congres International 
d’Architecture Modern (CIAM), published by Le Corbusier in 1943.  The Athens Charter 
proposed the re-planning of overly-dense city centers according to a hierarchy of four functions:  
dwelling, leisure, work, and circulation.448  SOM’s list of five functions for the city of Oak Ridge 
was nearly identical, with the addition of “service,” i.e. city infrastructure including the central 
steam plant. 
Le Corbusier and the SOM planning team agreed that the most important of a city’s 
multiple functions was its residential one.  In the section of the Athens Charter on dwelling, Le 
Corbusier first railed against the unhealthy, overcrowded conditions of residential areas in city 
centers; the segregation of dwellings by class; and the lack of planning in suburban outgrowths.  
In the future, he wrote, “Residential areas should occupy the best places in the city from the 
point of view of typography, climate, sunlight, and availability of green space.”449  Similarly, the 
SOM team wrote in the Preliminary Master Plan:  “In Oak Ridge, as elsewhere, the most 
important objective will be to improve the living areas of the city.”450 
The neighborhood planning principle, wrote the authors of the Preliminary Master Plan, 
would ensure that the various functions of the town in Oak Ridge would retain their proper 
relationship to one another.  (Le Corbusier also advocated a type of neighborhood-unit planning:  
“The point of departure for all town planning should be the single dwelling, or cell, and its 
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grouping into neighborhood units of suitable size,” he wrote in the Athens Charter.)451  The city 
would be nothing more or less than an aggregation of bounded and population-limited 
neighborhoods, each “self-contained in every respect with regard to the normal every day 
activities of the residents,” plus a town center dedicated to those services that were best 
accommodated on the city level.452  Re-planning Oak Ridge according to the neighborhood 
principle, the designers concluded, would be relatively easy, as the 1943 plan had begun that 
way, “and the remainder of the existing development lends itself well to such organization.”453 
According to the Preliminary Master Plan issued in March 1948, the future Oak Ridge 
would comprise thirteen neighborhoods (see figure 5.4), twelve for white and one for nonwhite 
residents.  Eight neighborhoods were located north of the Oak Ridge Turnpike, four, including 
the neighborhood for African-American Oak Ridgers, south of the highway.  Each neighborhood 
would center on an elementary school and a shopping area and would contain land dedicated to 
parks and playgrounds.  The size of a neighborhood was limited by the maximum size of its 
elementary school, determined by SOM to be 500 students.  Five hundred students translated to 
approximately 3500 people, to occupy—depending on the neighborhood—a mixture of single-
family homes, apartments, and dormitories.454 
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Figure 5.4:  Diagram of Oak Ridge Neighborhoods.  Created by Author. 
 
Per the Preliminary Master Plan, neighborhoods 1 through 8 would stretch from east to 
west along the northern side of the Oak Ridge Turnpike.  None of these was an entirely new 
development; in fact, SOM’s housing replacement program called for a total reduction in the 
number of housing units north of the turnpike from 9,000 to 7,500.  Nevertheless, a considerable 
amount of building would take place within each area.  In neighborhood 1, the Preliminary 
Master Plan called for expanded playground facilities in the southeastern corner of the 
neighborhood, plus a new group of multi-family housing in the southwestern corner.  
Neighborhood 2 would also see enlarged playground facilities in its southeastern corner.  A new 
shopping center would go up at the northwestern edge of neighborhood 3, while neighborhood 4 
would get a new elementary school and playground at its center.  A new shopping center would 
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be build in the southern area of neighborhood 5, and the playground facilities to the north would 
be enlarged.  The plan also suggested a new elementary school and playground at the center of 
neighborhood 6.  Neighborhoods 7 and 8 would see the most new construction north of the Oak 
Ridge Turnpike.  A new multi-family housing area was to be built at the southern end of the 
neighborhood, and a new group of single-family homes would go up at the northwestern corner.  
The neighborhood’s central playground facilities would also be expanded.  In neighborhood 8, a 
new group of single-family homes would be built along its northwestern boundary; a new 
elementary school and playground would be installed to the south. 
The four neighborhoods located south of the turnpike were entirely new.  Neighborhood 
9, directly across the freeway from neighborhood six, would stretch along the proposed city 
administrative center.  Neighborhood 10, the area designated for nonwhite residents, was located 
to the southwest of neighborhood 9.  Neighborhood 11 lay to the east, on the opposite side of the 
central shopping district from neighborhood 9.  Neighborhoods 12 and 13 were east of 
neighborhood 11, along the south side of Oak Ridge turnpike. 
Though each neighborhood was to have some mix of housing types, the particular ratio 
varied.  The SOM planners sketched out some of the variations in the Preliminary Master Plan, 
leaving the details to their final report.  Single-family homes and duplexes would be most 
numerous housing type in every neighborhood except neighborhood 9.  Neighborhoods 9 and 11, 
which lay next to the town’s cultural, administrative, and commercial center, would have the 
most apartments.  Dormitories or efficiency apartments would accommodate single workers in 
the existing dormitory area, along Oak Ridge Turnpike between neighborhoods 2 and 3.  
Additional dorms or efficiency apartments would be built to the east of neighborhood 9.  Again, 
each of these areas was relatively close to the town’s shopping centers.  In addition, the flatter 
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land nearer the Turnpike (and thus the city center) would more easily accommodate these larger 
structures.  Neighborhood 10, for the African-American workers and their families, would 
contain every type of housing.455 
In total, the Preliminary Master Plan estimated that 60% of Oak Ridge’s future family 
housing would consist of single-family houses.  Fifteen percent would be two-family houses, and 
25 % would be in buildings with more than two apartments.  This would require construction 
crews to build approximately 5,000 additional single-family homes, 1,751 duplexes, and 2,025 
apartment buildings.456 
The Preliminary Master Plan also contemplated the construction of new non-residential 
facilities.  The SOM team, keeping to the principal of functional separation, privileged shopping 
centers or strip malls over isolated commercial facilities.  These commercial groups would 
include eleven neighborhood centers, of which only six existed prior to the preparation of the 
Preliminary Master Plan.  There were, in addition, two existing secondary town centers, at 
Jackson Square (the main shopping center for the original town of 3,000 houses) and Jefferson 
Center.  Jackson Square was located between neighborhoods 2 and 3, north of the existing 
dormitories area.  Jefferson Center lay just off Oak Ridge Turnpike between neighborhood 6 and 
7.  Finally, the designers proposed the building of a new main town center across Oak Ridge 
Turnpike from neighborhood 5.  The downtown shopping center was to contain approximately 
26.75 acres of stores on 108.48 acres of land.457 
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In addition to tabulating the total commercial space required by the city, the SOM team 
also made an effort to predict how much of each kind of retail space would be needed.  In 
making these estimates, the designers used the same formulae applied by Clarence Stein and 
Catherine Bauer in their planning of Radburn.458  Thus Oak Ridge did not just mimic the Garden 
City model in its spatial arrangements, but reflected the use of the same technical planning 
methods as had earlier proponents of Howard’s ideas. 
Though in 1948 the AEC’s administrative facilities were scattered throughout Oak Ridge, 
in the Preliminary Master Plan the SOM team proposed consolidating them into a single center 
adjacent to the main shopping center just south of Oak Ridge Turnpike.  The administrative 
buildings of the incorporated city, too, should be located next to the AEC facilities.  The land 
designated for the two administrative clusters was plenty large enough to allow for expansion, an 
important factor given the uncertainty surround both incorporation and the future of the atomic 
energy project. 
The administrative facilities were the only structures whose architectural treatment the 
SOM team discussed at any length in the Preliminary Master Plan.  The AEC and city-
government buildings were to be “architecturally related in a design similar to the civic centers 
of many cities.”  This would likely mean a Beaux-Arts treatment, as in Burnham’s 1909 Chicago 
plan, and as utilized to various extents on the permanent Army bases built during the 1920s and 
1930s.  But while the two administrative groups would be thus related, the designers proposed 
“that precedence should be given to the A. E. C. Administration Building in the consideration of 
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location and setting selected because of the special import that this building connotes to Oak 
Ridge . . . .  The building should stand as a symbol of the reason and existence of the town.”459 
Oak Ridge’s planners had accordingly already picked out a site for the AEC building, 
more or less in the center of the shared administration area.  The building would be erected on a 
rise, thus making it easily visible to people visiting the town and giving its occupants spectacular 
views.  A large lot surrounding the building was to be preserved, both to safeguard those views 
and to allow enough room for roadways and parking. 
The one land-use type the SOM team had added to Le Corbusier’s list of four (dwelling, 
leisure, work, circulation) was “service,” by which the designers meant both the city’s utilities 
infrastructure and its light-industrial facilities.  (All of the heavy industry associated with Oak 
Ridge was located outside of the city limits and thus not addressed in the Preliminary Master 
Plan.)460  In 1948 most of Oak Ridge’s light industries were scattered around the town, 
occupying buildings not purpose-built for those uses.  The town’s bus terminal and associated 
buildings, with a physical life ranging between 5 and 15 years, were located near Jackson Square 
and Jefferson Center.  The city maintenance operations were, like the light industry facilities, 
scattered throughout the city in temporary buildings.  The major utilities, including the steam 
plant, the water treatment plant, and the power plants, occupied more permanent facilities.461 
As it had with the town’s administrative structures, SOM proposed consolidating the 
light-industrial and service buildings.  In the Preliminary Master Plan, these uses were assigned 
to two areas:  the existing warehouse area just south of Oak Ridge Turnpike across from 
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neighborhood 1.  This particular region of the city had enough space to allow for an expansion of 
industrial facilities, and was well-located with respect to roads and rail lines.  The designers 
proposed screen planting to protect neighborhood 13, to the west, from the sounds and smells of 
the area.  The second industrial-service center, which would house the majority of the city 
maintenance structures, was to be located to the south, inside the U created by the boundaries of 
neighborhoods 11, 12, and 13.  Existing forest would segregate the industrial from the residential 
areas.  Several industrial facilities would remain scattered throughout the city for the physical 
life of their buildings, as the amount of investment already made into their physical plants 
precluded an immediate move.462 
Oak Ridge’s schools were its most important non-residential facilities, at least as far as 
physical organization went.  Each neighborhood was designed around an elementary school, to 
be located so that it was no more than 1/2 mile from any house whose children it served, and 
away from any major street crossing.  The schools would be built on enough land to provide 
parkland and playgrounds not just for attendees, but for the neighborhood as a whole.  Its 
aesthetics were important, too:  “Well-designed school buildings in an attractively landscaped 
area will go far toward setting the pattern of an attractive neighborhood,” the authors of the 
Preliminary Master Plan wrote.463 
Oak Ridge’s two Junior High Schools were to serve a function parallel to that of the 
secondary shopping centers:  as gathering places, below the level of the entire town, for adult 
social and political activities.  One Junior High School, serving students living in neighborhoods 
1, 2, 3, 12, 13, was to be located in the existing Senior High School building, adjacent to the 
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Jackson Square shopping center.  The other Junior High School, for neighborhoods 4-9 and 11, 
would be at the western edge of the new cultural center north of the city’s administrative center, 
between neighborhoods 5 and 6.  Again, the Junior High Schools would host town-wide 
recreational activities, though the old Senior High School was on a smaller-than-optimal lot.464 
The Senior High School was to be built at the opposite end of the new cultural center 
from the second Junior High School, adjacent to neighborhood 4.  Its ample lot would 
accommodate the town’s central athletics facilities as well as those required by the students.465 
The remainder of the Preliminary Master Plan was given over to a discussion of the 
town’s circulation pattern, and to special uses including churches and transportation facilities.  
As for the former, SOM noted that the existing street pattern north of the Oak Ridge Turnpike, 
constructed according to the firm’s 1943, would largely remain unchanged.  The street pattern 
south of the highway, on the other hand, would need re-planning.  The most important 
consideration in arranging the primary and secondary roads was to avoid bisecting any of the 
thirteen neighborhoods; instead, the intra-neighborhood streets would serve local traffic only, 
and consist largely of dead-end lands and culs-de-sac.466  With respect to churches, club 
buildings, and other land uses not addressed above, the Preliminary Master Plan designers left 
most of the site selection for the final plan.  The planning team also discussed the location of the 
various transportation terminals and what railroad lines would need extension or redirection.467 
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In the nine months between SOM’s Preliminary Master Plan and the final Master Plan, 
dated December 1948, the design principles underlying the scheme changed little.  As had the 
Preliminary Master Plan, the final Master Plan made it clear that SOM’s plan for Oak Ridge was 
based on two interrelated design principles.  First, the town as a whole was composed of 
multiple, largely self-sufficient, neighborhoods, gathered around a single commercial, civic, and 
cultural center.  “Neighborhood” and “community” were, for the authors of the Master Plan, 
nearly synonymous.  The original three neighborhoods planned in 1943 were “well-planned, 
attractive, and already have taken on the character of a mature and desirable residential 
community,” they wrote.  “The job of rebuilding the housing starts with a nucleus of these three 
neighborhood units complete with schools and other community facilities.”468 
Second, the SOM design team argued that the best city plans separated the community’s 
different functions and protected each from incursions by the others.  In their Master Plan, the 
designers offered an extended analogy between a city and a single-family home.  “A house for so 
large a family must be arranged carefully if life within it is to be pleasant, housekeeping easy, 
and the budget kept within reasonable bounds,” the authors of the Master Plan wrote.  “There 
must be living rooms and sleeping rooms, work rooms and service rooms, business offices, 
connecting corridors, systems . . . .  The rooms must be of the right number and size for their 
respective purposes; they must be conveniently arranged in relation to one another; corridors 
must be adequate; and utility lines must have the right capacity and be in the right locations.”  In 
the Master Plan, the SOM team explained, the thirteen neighborhoods were the equivalents of the 
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house’s living and bedrooms; the central shopping area and service centers were the work rooms; 
the central administrative district was the office; the streets were the corridors; and so on.469 
Like in the Preliminary Master Plan—and as in CIAM’s concept of The Functional 
City—, in the final Master Plan the SOM planners insisted that the primary function of the town 
of Oak Ridge was its residential one.  Thus the plan began and ended with the thirteen “living 
rooms” or neighborhoods, and only after locating and laying out these sought to arrange the 
city’s “work rooms,” “offices,” and “corridors” to best relate to one another, and to protect the 
particular character of the neighborhoods against their transformation into multi-purpose 
spaces.470 
The layout presented in the final Master Plan, with eight neighborhoods to the north of 
the Oak Ridge Turnpike, four neighborhoods to the south, and the central commercial, cultural, 
and administrative groups at the town’s geographical center, was almost identical to that 
included in the Preliminary Master Plan.  The only physical difference between the two was a 
slightly different street pattern in neighborhoods 10 or 11, explained by the fact that these would 
be entirely new developments, not dependent on existing roads and thus readily alterable. 
What did change between the Preliminary and final Master Plans was the way the SOM 
team explained certain features of the town’s design.  One such feature was the need to build, 
from the ground up, so many additional facilities for commercial and community activities.  
While the scarcity of non-residential land uses in Oak Ridge went unremarked in the Preliminary 
Master Plan, in the Master Plan the SOM designers tied this condition to the town’s unique 
history.  While government ownership had brought the city some benefits, they explained, it had 
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“discouraged the adequate development of many needed community facilities, such as adequate 
shopping, church, and recreation facilities.  The government did not supply more than a 
minimum of such facilities, and their development by private enterprise so far, has been 
restricted to short-term concessions” due to the security restrictions under which all of Oak 
Ridge labored.471 
But diversifying the town’s commercial and cultural resources was not as simple as 
tearing down the fence surrounding Oak Ridge, the SOM team explained.  Instead, the AEC—
which would continue to have a major role in life at Oak Ridge, no matter the status of the 
disposal and incorporation programs—had to make a conscious decision to change the town’s 
character.  This meant relinquishing some of the housing currently reserved for workers in the 
atomic energy program to outsiders.  Until the AEC located housing for some of its employees 
elsewhere, perhaps by developing residential communities between Oak Ridge and Knoxville, 
“Oak Ridge must remain primarily a service center for the atomic energy installations, and the 
admission of activities not related to such service must necessarily be limited.”472  Thus, no 
matter how much SOM’s Master Plan resembled and idealized “normal” American small town, 
and no matter whether residents elected to buy their homes and incorporate as a self-governed 
city, the question of whether Oak Ridge remained a company town depended upon the actions of 
the AEC. 
The SOM team also expanded its explanation of the 50,000 limit on Oak Ridge’s future 
population in the Master Plan.  In the Preliminary Master Plan, the designers had tied the number 
to physical limitations.  The authors of the Master Plan reiterated these, citing “desirable 
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densities” and utilities demands.  “An automobile manufacturer cannot design an economical car 
for five people that will serve ten people just as well,” the planners wrote.  “Likewise a city 
planner cannot design an economical city for 50,000 population that will serve that number just 
as well.”473  But in the final Master Plan, the SOM team added a second consideration:  national 
security.  Prefiguring the arguments Oak Ridge planning consultant Augur and others would 
make in the following years,474 the Master Plan’s authors suggested that in the future population 
increases should be accommodated by the building of additional, low-density cities in dispersed 
locations, rather than through the densification of existing urban developments.  Thus even at 
Oak Ridge, cradle of the atomic bomb, safety from aerial attack was used as a justification for 
low-density, extra-urban development. 
SOM’s Master Plan for Oak Ridge, as an incarnation of Ebenezer Howard’s Garden City 
scheme first published exactly fifty years earlier, was inherently anti-urban.  The Oak Ridge 
design team, like Garden City planners before them, rejected the centralization and high density 
of the industrial city in favor of a multi-centered, low-density, and size-limited development.  
They organized the town according to neighborhoods centered on an elementary school, in an 
attempt to foster a sense of community among transplants from different cultures and 
geographical regions.  They provided a full range of commercial and cultural services for Oak 
Ridge’s inhabitants, hoping to minimize the need for trips to Knoxville and other urban centers. 
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Controlled Development at Oak Ridge 
The Master Plan was also anti-urban in its description of how the development of Oak 
Ridge according to the Garden City model might be achieved, regardless of the town’s 
ownership and government status.  Zoning, subdivision regulations, and building codes 
constituted only a partial solution to the problem of controlled development, the SOM design 
team argued.  The authors of the Master Plan suggested that the AEC use its status as the sole 
owner of Oak Ridge’s property to attach restrictions to the sale or lease of residential and 
commercial land.  As voluntary agreements between seller and buyer, deed and lease restrictions 
could be far more specific than could zoning and other controls based on the police power. 
In advocating the use of deed and lease restrictions, the SOM design team echoed the 
tactics of contemporary suburban builders, who used such controls in an attempt to stabilize 
property values and therefore increase interest in their developments.  In the case of Oak Ridge, 
the purpose of deed and lease restrictions would be somewhat different:  while they would be 
used to stabilize property values, they would also insure development according to the Master 
Plan with a greater degree of  certainty than would other types of controls.  The implications of 
restrictive covenants as used in the suburbs and at Oak Ridge were, however, the same.  First, no 
matter their content, deed and lease restrictions implied a critique of typical urban development, 
wherein property owners converted their holdings to the most profitable use, no matter the effect 
on their surroundings.  Second, the specifics of restrictive covenants including those envisioned 
for Oak Ridge placed a high value on qualities understood to be anathema to the industrial city, 
including homogeneity and low-density land uses. 
Deed restrictions, otherwise known as protective or restrictive covenants, had been en 
vogue for only a few decades by the time SOM published its Master Plan for Oak Ridge.  
   238 
According to urban historian Robert Fogelson, before the 1890s suburban developers had been 
hesitant to attach restrictions to the properties they sold, fearing prospective purchasers would 
walk away from a deal that dictated how they could or could not use land that they owned 
outright.  But by the 1910s and 1920s restrictive covenants appeared highly attractive to both 
builders and buyers, in part because the suburban ideal had evolved to value permanence over 
the individual freedom of property owners.475 
But restrictions offered more than just the promise that one’s neighbors would be using 
their land the same way in fifty years as they were now.  In Fogelson’s analysis, restrictive 
covenants were manifestations of contemporary fears—the fear of others; the fear of one’s own 
inner profit-seeker.476  These fears were the same ones that had begun the suburban exodus 
nearly a century prior, as those who could left the city to escape noisy or smelly industries 
operating close by; neighbors of different classes or races; discordant or just plain ugly 
architecture; or the presence of property owners more interested in making a profit than in 
making a home.  Restrictive covenants formalized the identity of the suburb as the anti-city. 
According to the authors of the Master Plan, deed restrictions were the best legal 
instruments by which to guarantee that Oak Ridge remained a Garden City, instead of morphing 
into an urban mess.  In the forward to the Master Plan, entitled, “Why a Master Plan for Oak 
Ridge,” the SOM design team articulated the need for planning in terms that echoed 
contemporary critiques of America’s industrial cities.  There were many parties already or soon 
to be involved in Oak Ridge’s development, the planners wrote, including the AEC, the future 
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municipality, the town’s residents, and businessmen and industrialists.  “If everyone concerned 
with this process went his own way in his own time,” they continued, 
the result would be a hodge-podge of buildings, streets and utilities either getting in each 
other’s way or lacking where most needed.  The result would not be a smooth-running, 
economical city and certainly not a pleasant one to live in.  It would fail to serve the basic 
purpose for which Oak Ridge exists, to provide good living for people who are depended 
upon to do good work.477 
 
To prevent such uncoordinated development, the authors of the Master Plan proposed a 
series of controls on future development.  The first category of controls was based on the police 
powers.  That is, these were limits on the actions on private property owners protected by the 
Constitution on the grounds that they guaranteed minimum standards of public safety.478 
The first police-power control considered by the SOM team was zoning.  The designers 
had prepared a zoning map for Oak Ridge as well as draft zoning regulations for use by a town 
planning commission.  In these documents, each region of the town was assigned an intended 
land use, as well as limits on building location, height, bulk, and size.  But while the SOM design 
team recommended zoning Oak Ridge, it noted that zoning as a device encompassed only a few 
aspects of the built environment.  “It is not a complete device in itself, but is used in conjunction 
with other means of control,” the Master Plan’s authors wrote.479 
The SOM team further recommended establishing subdivision regulations for the city of 
Oak Ridge.  A draft document of this type was also included with the master plan.  Because in 
Tennessee a town had first to submit a major road plan in order to adopt subdivision regulation, 
the SOM team also published such a map with their report.  Subdivision regulations, according 
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to Oak Ridge’s designers, “establish minimum standards of design and construction for all new 
land development, including both private and public improvements.”  As such, subdivision 
regulations aided both a city’s planning commission, which had an objective bar by which to 
judge new building projects, and potential developers, who would know up front what was 
expected of them.  Subdivision regulations, by eliminating unsafe or poorly-designed structures 
from consideration by Oak Ridge’s planning commission, would insure good living conditions 
for residents and stabilize property values, the SOM team argued.480 
The third and final category of police-power controls examined by the authors of the 
Master Plan was municipal codes, including building, plumbing, and electrical codes.  Like 
subdivision regulations, these codes set minimum standards to protect against unsafe building 
practices.  The same standards would apply to every building in the entire city.  In addition, the 
codes would require building permits and inspections.481 
Together, zoning, subdivision regulations, and municipal codes “will enforce the 
minimum standards of the Master Plan,” the SOM team wrote.  “They state the minimum 
requirements for what is to be [built], where it is to be built, and how it is to be built.”482  But 
police-power controls were by definition limited; involuntary restrictions on the actions of 
private individuals had to be justifiable in terms of public welfare in order to be legally 
permissible.  “Although these controls are the most effective that are available to the average city 
today,” the authors of the Master Plan noted, “it should be recognized that they are predicated on 
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the minimums required for the health, welfare, and safety of the community and are restrictive 
and therefore negative rather than positive in character.483 
But Oak Ridge was not an “average city.”  It more closely resembled a modern suburban 
development in that all of the town’s property was in the hands of a single owner (the federal 
government), the same entity responsible for directing the early stages of the community’s 
physical development.  Thus, the AEC could follow the lead of private suburban builders and 
attach deed or lease restrictions to each piece of property transferred, “so that maximum rather 
than minimum standards may be required.”484 
Unlike zoning and other police-power controls, deed and lease restrictions were voluntary 
agreements between seller or landlord (in this case the AEC) and purchaser or lessee.  Thus the 
details of the restrictions did not need to be rationalized in terms of public safety, and in fact 
were often quite specific.  The SOM team gave as an example the requirement that a city 
architectural board of review approve any new structures built on a particular property.485 
Though deed and lease restrictions were typically used only for residential property, the 
authors of the Master Plan pointed out, in Oak Ridge they might be attached to every parcel of 
land, including those for commercial, industrial, or city use.  “Restrictions could be utilized for 
the general welfare of the entire population,” the SOM team argued.  “They could be 
administered by a representative citizen body operating on democratic principles.”486 
                                            
483 Ibid., 26. 
484 Ibid. 
485 Ibid., 27. 
486 Ibid. 
   242 
One potential drawback to deed or lease restrictions was their rigidity.  The more specific 
the restrictions attached to a particular parcel of land, the more difficult it would be to adapt that 
property to the town’s changing needs.  Thus the authors of the Master Plan urged careful 
consideration of each property’s potential future use in order to determine how flexible or not the 
restrictions on a particular parcel should be.  But despite this issue, the report’s authors remained 
enthusiastic about the application of restrictive covenants to Oak Ridge, noting that “[m]any of 
the most successful large suburban developments in the country have been built and 
administered under this method, using deed and lease restrictions adopted specifically to regulate 
the use of each parcel of land.”487 
In addition to deed and lease restrictions, land dedication was available to the AEC as a 
means of insuring the execution of the Master Plan.  Land dedication was essentially a restrictive 
covenant attached to municipal property:  the AEC would turn over land marked in the Master 
Plan for roads, schools, parks, etc. on the condition that the city of Oak Ridge use it only as such.  
Like deed restrictions, land dedication was voluntary, though the SOM team thought “it is 
inconceivable that the city would reject such an offer.”  After all, the land would come at no 
monetary cost.  The AEC, too, would benefit, as it “would be making an invaluable contribution 
toward the development of Oak Ridge in accordance with the Master Plan.”488 
As did restrictive covenants contemporary suburban communities, the deed and lease 
restrictions proposed by the SOM team carried within them a rejection of the industrial city.  The 
built environment of the industrial city was the product of decisions made by numerous 
independent property owners over time, usually on the basis of personal profit rather than 
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community welfare.  Reformers, including city planners, had been struggling for over a century 
to make sense of urban growth, but so far had managed to intervene only in cases where basic 
public safety was at stake.  Part of the mid-century suburban ideal, on the other hand, equated the 
newness of the extra-urban built environment with the ability to control present and future 
growth, to guard against indiscriminate action by individual property holders in the name of 
protecting the property values of all.  The argument in favor of restrictive covenants was thus 
highly contradictory, in that it justified the arrest of short-term profit-seeking on the grounds that 
property values would be guaranteed in the long run.  But whatever its logical flaws, it was 
convincing to many mid-century Americans, including the planners at SOM. 
Though the SOM designers did not specify exactly what the AEC’s deed or lease 
restrictions might contain, they did indicate that these would serve to insure development 
according to the Master Plan.  That is, deed and lease restrictions would protect the vision of Oak 
Ridge as a Garden rather than an Industrial City.  For example, deed and lease restrictions, in 
combination with zoning, could be used to protect the neighborhood basis of Oak Ridge against 
the centripetal pull of the city center.  Controls might put limits on the size of the central 
commercial areas while simultaneously preserving the central section of each neighborhood for 
commercial and institutional use.  Similarly, the overall size and shape of the city would be 
limited not just by the topographical barriers surrounding Oak Ridge, but also by the land 
dedication or restriction of certain properties for recreational or agricultural use. 
Zoning and deed and lease restrictions could also be used to prevent the densification of 
residential areas.  Controls might specify not just setbacks and building heights but also housing 
types—single-family homes only in one location, no more than two families per house in 
another. 
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Finally, deed and lease restrictions might be used at Oak Ridge to prevent heterogeneity 
of all kinds—of land uses; of people of different classes; of residents of different races.  
Suburban developers, for instance, had been known to specify minimum house prices so that 
only people of certain income levels could live in a particular neighborhood or subdivision.489  
At Oak Ridge, the desirability and rental rates of particular house types—the Cemesto single-
family homes cost more than the prefab houses, for example—had already sorted the town’s 
scientists from the unskilled atomic workers.  Deed and lease restrictions could be used to 
replicate or modify existing socioeconomic settlement patterns, whatever the status of the 
housing replacement program.  Similarly, one can imagine the AEC attaching race restrictions to 
the properties in the neighborhoods intended for white workers (all except neighborhood 10).  
(While the recent Supreme Court decision in Shelley v. Kraemer (May 3, 1948) had determined 
the enforcement by the state of restrictions based on race to be unconstitutional, it did not 
preclude voluntary adherence to the same.)490 
Thus the Master Plan for Oak Ridge manifested contemporary anti-urban sentiment not 
just in its design content, but also in the means by which the SOM team recommended the 
scheme be carried out.  The Master Plan’s embrace of deed and lease restrictions implied a desire 
for exactly those qualities observers found to be lacking in the modern industrial city—
particularly permanence and homogeneity. 
The situation of Oak Ridge in 1948 was in many ways unique.  As the AEC contemplated 
turning control of the town and its property over to residents, it faced the unusual challenge of 
converting a secure, hastily-constructed, one-industry town into a community that Americans of 
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various professional backgrounds would choose to live in.  At the same time, the goal of the 
SOM design team—to build a Garden City that combined the best of American urban and rural 
life without the faults of either—represented an apparent solution to a variety of physical and 
social ills.  Twenty years later, the federal government would again return to the promise of the 
Garden City, this time with financial support for private developers of suburban New Towns. 
 
Columbia, Maryland: A 1960s Garden City 
The New Towns program of the late 1960s and early 1970s reiterated the themes of 
earlier Garden-City projects, including Radburn, New Jersey; the greenbelt towns of the New 
Deal; and the postwar redevelopment of Oak Ridge.  The New Towns, their promoters claimed, 
presented an alternative to both congested center-city living and residence on the unplanned 
suburban fringe.  Federal support of New-Town development followed a last-ditch effort to save 
the industrial city through “urban renewal,” or slum clearance followed by massive 
redevelopment, often to the ultimate benefit of the city’s suburban neighbors.491 
Home sales at Columbia, Maryland began in 1967, one year before passage of the New 
Communities Act of 1968, which urged private builders to consider building large-scale mixed-
use communities, and three years before the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1970, 
which offered financial assistance to New-Town builders.  The project is nevertheless considered 
the archetypal American New Town, per a 1976 National Science Foundation report.492  
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Columbia epitomized the Garden City-based plan that would characterize later Title VII projects, 
including Woodlands, Texas. 
Columbia was developed by James Rouse, an outspoken proponent of urban renewal and 
former Eisenhower appointee to the President’s Advisory Committee on Government Housing 
Policies and Programs.493  Rouse understood his New Town, which followed a foray into 
suburban shopping-mall development, not as a renunciation of his earlier concern for the center 
city, but rather as an extension of his commitment to urban revitalization.494 
Columbia’s planners looked to Howard’s Garden City and its built manifestations as 
precedents.  The chief architect-planner for the New Town recalled in 1990:  “Our gurus in 
planning Columbia were Ebenezer Howard, Clarence Stein, and Frederick Law Olmsted . . . .  
Clarence Stein’s New Towns For America was our bible.”  Specific models for the development 
included the usual suspects:  Letchworth, Welwyn, Radburn, New Jersey, and the New Deal 
greenbelt towns, in addition to Roland Park (in Baltimore) and Tapiola, Finland.495  The 
diagrams prepared by Columbia’s planners may as well have been drawn by Howard, showing as 
they do nine “villages” (analogues of Howard’s wards) orbiting a Town Center; at the heart of 
each “village” was a commercial center (see figure 5.5).  In a variation on Howard’s theme, each 
village was further subdivided into “neighborhoods,” each centered on an elementary school.  
(Columbia had an additional organizational layer in part because it was intended to be three 
times as large as Howard’s Garden City, with a projected population of 110,000).496  As SOM 
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had proposed for Oak Ridge, the town’s growth and aesthetic development are controlled by 
stringent architectural and land-use covenants.497 
 
Figure 5.5:  Diagram of Columbia, Maryland Neighborhoods.  Published in Howard 
Gillette, Jr., “Assessing James Rouse’s Role in American City Planning,” APA Journal 
(Spring 1999): 159. 
 
Columbia has been applauded for its ethnic and social diversity.  Its residents have largely 
agreed that it is a pleasant place to live.  Its population density is higher than conventional 
suburban developments, and its example likely shaped its home county’s flexible support of 
large-scale development projects.  Columbia did not, however, save the city—or at least not 
nearby Baltimore.  Baltimore would have to wait another decade for its downtown renaissance.  
In 1978 Rouse returned to the inner city, this time to build a “Festival Marketplace”—a shopping 
mall—as the centerpiece of the Inner Harbor redevelopment scheme.498 
 
Conclusion 
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Oak Ridge, which predated Columbia by more than two decades, was the Army Corps of 
Engineers’s New Town.  The planning and re-planning of Oak Ridge according to the Garden 
City model brought Army-post design full circle.  The cantonments of World War I were 
conceived by their civilian planners as soldier-cities.  The War Department Housing Program of 
the 1920s and 1930s transformed the residential portions of Army posts into picturesque suburbs.  
At Oak Ridge, SOM and the Army Corps of Engineers rejected both earlier models, opting 
instead for a third way, a decentralized yet self-sufficient Garden City. 
SOM’s 1948 Master Plan for Oak Ridge encapsulates the anti-urban attitude shared by 
many Americans in the years following World War II.  The design team’s use of the Garden City 
model was not just aesthetic; it was also ideological.  Since 1898, when Ebenezer Howard 
published his first book on the subject, the Garden City had stood for the eradication of the 
industrial city in favor of something resembling small-town life.  Though the Garden City also 
differed physically and socially from sprawling, decentered, often unplanned suburban 
developments, it shared with the latter a common sense that the industrial city posed a profound 
threat to traditional American cultural values. 
The Master Plan for Oak Ridge was also anti-urban in its embrace of deed and lease 
restrictions.  SOM’s design team, like early suburban developers, favored restrictive covenants 
for the increased specificity and scope they offered over police-power controls like zoning.  
Deed and lease restrictions could be used to eliminate urban problems including the free mixing 
of land uses, classes, and races before they even began. 
Oak Ridge was not the last of America’s experiments with Garden City planning.  Rather, 
the New Towns of the 1960s and 1970s turned contemporary dissatisfaction with both cities and 
suburbs into a market for community development.  The federal government’s support of New 
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Town development echoed its advocacy of the Garden City model in the greenbelt towns of the 
New Deal as well as at Oak Ridge. 
Oak Ridge is known as the hometown of the atomic bomb, the site of the most 
consequential government-sponsored scientific-research program in American history.  But it is 
also holds significance, as this chapter has shown, as an early site of the postwar breaking-apart 
of the historical relationships between city and country, suburb and city.   
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Epilogue: Base Realignment and Closure, 1988-2005 
 
Oak Ridge’s legacy extended beyond SOM’s Master Plan for the community.  It also 
foreshadowed the large-scale civilianization of military bases following the Cold War, under the 
federal government’s Base Realignment and Closure program, or BRAC.  BRAC opened a new 
chapter in the history of the relationship between military and civilian spaces in the United 
States:  Where for the seven decades between the start of World War I and the first round of base 
closures in 1988 military officials had formed their installations in the image of civilian cities 
and suburbs, now local communities would be confronted with the question of how to un-make 
the military posts in their midst.  Before BRAC, the transmission of ideas about architecture and 
planning between civilian communities and Army posts had largely been accomplished through 
the involvement of civilian design experts in the building of military installations.  After BRAC, 
affected communities had to grapple with the Army post itself, deciding whether and how to 
reuse or replace the airfields, ammunition depots, administrative buildings, barracks, and 
officers’ housing left behind by the military. 
Much of the literature on the redevelopment of bases closed under BRAC is celebratory.  
In part this is because the BRAC program prioritized military concerns over the economic and 
environmental impacts of post closures:  BRAC commissioners defined the success of a round of 
closures in terms of its potential to effect efficiencies and savings within the Department of 
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Defense (DoD), rather than in terms of the bases’ redevelopment by community groups.499  But 
in addition, according to DoD and observers including a research team from MIT, the shuttering 
of military posts under BRAC had a much less negative impact on civilian economies than initial 
assessments had predicted.500 
For one thing, appraisers of the BRAC program have noted, base closure resulted in less-
than-anticipated net job loss to local communities, and in some cases actually raised employment 
numbers.  A document published by DoD’s Office of Economic Adjustment, an agency charged 
with supporting communities affected by post closures, indicates that as of 2004, “taken together, 
more than half of the civilian jobs lost [under BRAC] have been replaced.”  It went on to list 
thirteen locales that had experienced net employment growth after BRAC, the most dramatic of 
which was Pease Air Force Base, in New Hampshire.  After losing 400 civilian jobs in the 1991 
BRAC, the community saw the creation of 5,124 new positions, for a change of 1,181%.501 
Some observers have argued, moreover, that the redevelopment prompted by BRAC has 
benefited the built environment of some affected communities, as the remaking of a former 
military base offers an opportunity for urban renewal or revitalization on a scale unavailable 
under normal circumstances.  Redevelopment inevitably improves the sites of rundown, 
abandoned military structures, the authors of a 2004 Economic Development Journal article on 
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BRAC suggest.  They illustrated their study of the community impacts of base closure with 
photographs of military buildings in disrepair, adding suggestive captions including, “Old 
barracks fallen into ruin.  Note vandalism.”502  Beyond simply replacing old structures with new 
ones, the unique characteristics of military reservations presented civilian communities affected 
by BRAC with opportunities to undertake major building projects.  In particular, MIT 
researchers Bernard J. Frieden and Christie I. Baxter point out in their report on post reuse, 
military properties are typically well-located and large in land area, two features that make 
redevelopment attractive.503 
The Lowry neighborhood of Denver is often cited as an example of urban revitalization 
via post-BRAC redevelopment.  The 1,866-acre site was formerly the home of Lowry Air Force 
Base, which closed in 1994.  As of 2008, the neighborhood boasted over 8,300 residents living in 
apartments and houses valued up to $2 million.  Over 125 companies employing 7,000 people 
had also moved to Lowry.  The community, with 800 acres of open space and 20,000 newly-
planted trees, was known for its greenery.504  Embracing the principles of “new urbanism,” 
Lowry’s planners established land-use controls to encourage the deployment of architectural 
details, including brickwork and front porches, common to older Denver neighborhoods.  They 
eschewed newer commercial models including strip or indoor malls in favor of a Main Street-
style town center, with benches for pedestrians and sidewalk space for outdoor dining.505 
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Of course, base redevelopment—including at Lowry and other vaunted examples—is not 
without its problems.  One of the most significant among these has to do with environmental 
contamination; as of 2008, over 10% of the nation’s Superfund sites were DoD properties.  
“When [former military bases] are turned over to the civilian community and redeveloped into 
neighborhoods, parks, and shops,” write the authors of an article on environmental cleanup at 
Lowry, “they become everybody’s problem.”506  Other complications in base reuse include 
unexploded ordinance, underdeveloped roads systems and utilities, and existing buildings that 
fail to meet local codes.507 
But while the literature on base redevelopment is explicit about the possibilities and 
problems associated with the BRAC program, it also reveals a less-examined theme in the recent 
history of American military space:  the extent to which the past use of a particular site by the 
armed forces tends to shape its future development, even after its conversion to private 
ownership.  The MIT study of post-BRAC communities in particular highlights the tendency of 
Local Redevelopment Agencies (LRAs) to privilege the reuse of existing military facilities for 
civilian ends over the wholesale redevelopment of a former base to meet community needs, both 
in the short and long terms.  As a consequence, communities are likely to remain embedded 
within the Military-Industrial Complex long after a military post itself has closed. 
Frieden and Baxter, the authors of the MIT report on base redevelopment, point out that 
“prior use has not necessarily dictated reuse” at the former military posts they studied, citing 
cases such as Orlando, Florida, Stratford, Connecticut, and Long Beach, California in which 
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LRAs opted to demolish military facilities to start redevelopment from scratch.508  Yet these 
examples seem to be the exceptions to the rule.  Many Air Force and Navy reservations, for 
instance, were taken over by LRAs largely as-is, and used as aviation and shipping centers, 
respectively.509 
Because reuse costs less up front than does redevelopment, many LRAs sought lessees 
who could make immediate use of existing facilities, at least in the short run.  The extent to 
which reuse activities mirrored prior military uses depended upon the extent to which the 
facilities themselves were specialized.  “If the assets are generic rather than specialized—such as 
classroom buildings rather than engine repair facilities—they may lend themselves to a wide 
variety of reuse possibilities,” Frieden and Baxter write.  “If they are more specialized, they may 
prompt LRA staff to consider bringing in businesses that can use them.”510  Planners at Kelly 
Field in Texas, for instance, kept existing aircraft maintenance and modification shops open, 
with many of the same employees, and staked the economic future of the site on contract work 
for both the Air Force and civilian airlines.511 
Some LRAs leased existing military facilities to raise money for future redevelopment.  
At Lowry, for example, the LRA’s head had leased over 450 former Air Force housing units at 
an average of $700 per month by 1996.  Having barely been touched since the BRAC turnover, 
“[t]he houses were not elegant,” Frieden and Baxter write, “but they had large rooms and 
hardwood floors, and tenants were getting twice the amount of space for the same price they 
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would pay in the city.”  Reuse worked for the tenants, and it worked for the LRA, which applied 
the rental income to major infrastructure improvements.512 
Yet in some cases, the success of a supposedly “temporary” reuse program impeded 
redevelopment according to an LRA’s long-term plan.  Frieden and Baxter point to the example 
of Alameda Naval Air Station, located on an island across from Oakland in the San Francisco 
Bay.  The city of Alameda appointed a nine-member temporary LRA to manage short-term reuse 
of the naval base beginning in 1993; the city itself would take over long-term redevelopment 
beginning in 1999.513  Though the interim LRA initially target short-term lessees, it eventually 
offered longer-term leases to companies willing to perform their own renovations in exchange 
for below market rents.  An Oakland manufacturer of industrial valves, for instance, opted to 
relocate to a hangar on the island under these terms, and spent $470,000 on a new sprinkler 
system, new heating and electrical systems, installing office space, and rendering the building 
handicap-accessible.  Such investments posed an obvious conflict with the city’s plan to sell the 
entire former naval station to one or more private developers in the early 2000s.514 
Ironically, even those communities who opted for reuse over extensive redevelopment 
felt compelled to camouflage their properties’ identities as former military reservations.  At Fort 
Ord, for example, the state of California planned a new university campus, California State 
University, Monterey Bay.  The first students arrived in 1995, and lived and studied in lightly-
renovated one-story military buildings.  Developers, according to the MIT researchers, “creat[ed] 
a cosmetic architectural treatment that made the utilitarian buildings look contemporary.  In most 
                                            
512 Ibid., 48. 
513 Ibid., 80. 
514 Ibid., 82-3. 
   256 
cases, this involved the use of color, murals, and canopies to lead the eye around the stark basic 
forms.”515  While the university’s president expressed a desire to retain a sense of Fort Ord’s 
history on campus, one planner argued that a successful reuse program would eliminate the 
“military persona” of the site.  He asked:  “What kind of picture should CSUMB graduates have 
on their diploma?”516 
Planners at Lowry similarly decided that the neighborhood’s history as an Air Force base 
wouldn’t help it sell.  To prepare for a Denver builders’ association’s 1998 Parade of Homes, 
which the Lowry LRA hosted, the site’s developers removed military markers including sentry 
posts, fences, and Air Force signage.  The LRA’s exhibits on Lowry carefully avoided military 
language and references to BRAC.  When they did acknowledge the Air Force connection, 
Frieden and Baxter write, “they went back to World War II and Jimmy Stewart, to recall the time 
when people felt warm and fuzzy about the military.”517 
The history of base redevelopment under BRAC thus reveals two things about the legacy 
of American military space.  First, the economics of base redevelopment make reuse more 
attractive than replacement to many communities in charge of former military properties, at least 
in the short run.  The uses to which military reservations were put therefore tend to carry over 
into their afterlives as civilian landholdings.  This is especially true when more specialized 
facilities—for aviation, naval operations, or weapons production—are involved.  Post-BRAC 
communities, in other words, sometimes choose to retain economic ties to the Military-Industrial 
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Complex because of the built environment they have been left with, rather than after a measured 
consideration of multiple development opportunities. 
Second, civilian developers understand a former base’s association with the military to 
detract from its value within private real estate markets.  Thus even as they look to a base’s past 
uses as a guide for future economic development, they might wish to distinguish the site 
aesthetically from reservations currently owned by the armed services.  As the above examples 
show, the aesthetic re-imagination of a former post often goes only skin-deep; just because a site 
appears to have been transformed from “military” into “civilian” property does not mean that its 
relationship to the political economy of war-making has changed. 
These two features of military space after BRAC—the tendency of military use to shape 
future, “civilian,” use, and the desire on the part of developers to camouflage a former post’s 
military history—are the logical by-products of the circumstances under which twentieth-century 
American military posts were first developed, circumstances explored in detail earlier in this 
dissertation.  For decades, civilian and military spaces had mutually shaped one another, thanks 
largely to the engagement of civilian design practitioners in post-building projects.  The 
involvement of civilian architects and city planners was in turn prompted, at least in part, by the 
peculiar political conditions of the American armed forces.  The United States military 
increasingly modeled its bases on civilian communities to serve two purposes:  to help justify the 
existence of a standing Army within a decentralized democracy; and to attract volunteers, and 
particularly officer candidates, away from private-sector employment.  The architecture and 
planning of the twentieth-century military post, this dissertation argues, helped insure the 
survival of the Regular Army, as it domesticated the image of the American military, and served 
as an inducement to Army recruits. 
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Though the first implementation of BRAC in 1988 marked a reversal of decades of 
military expansion, it did not break the ties between military and civilian spaces in the United 
States.  Rather, responsibility for camouflaging the nation’s war machinery simply shifted from 
the armed forces to civilian communities.  Like the military-post designers before them, LRAs 
and private developers grappled with how to make military bases look as un-military as possible, 
often while retaining economic ties to the armed forces.  In the process, they used the peculiar 
circumstances of the military built environment—large landholdings in prime locations—to 
experiment with new civilian design ideals, including the “new urbanist” answer to widespread 
disillusionment with the American suburbs. 
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, the situation of the 
United States military changed radically; so did BRAC.  The first round of BRAC, in 1988, had 
been motivated largely by budgetary concerns.518  The subsequent three rounds, in 1991, 1993, 
and 1995, upped the money-saving ante, as the dissolution of the Soviet Union drastically 
reduced the overseas responsibilities of American troops519.  DoD officials used BRAC to reap a 
“peace dividend” offered by the quietened international scene.520  The next and latest BRAC 
round, in 2005, reflected the United States’s involvement in two major wars abroad, in that it 
marked a shift in the program’s focus from economy to military modernization.  “Secretary [of 
Defense Donald] Rumsfeld was very clear that his primary goal for the BRAC process was 
military transformation,” wrote the 2005 commissioners in their report.  “ . . . While 
acknowledging the importance of savings as a BRAC goal, the Commission went beyond a 
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business model analysis of DoD’s recommendations and weighed the strategic environment 
within which recommendations would be implemented and their affect on the DoD’s 
transformational goals.”521 
The 2005 round of BRAC was the largest and most complicated in the program’s history.  
Commissioners considered a total of 190 DoD recommendations, more than the sum of all 
recommendations put forward in previous rounds.522  As a result, the 2005 BRAC Commission 
report, which proposed changes at 800 installations, also included an unprecedented number and 
scale of base expansions.523  At some of the 13 bases targeted for major expansions, according to 
a 2006 article in Planning, population growth over the six years between the Commission’s 
findings and the 2011 deadline would surpass that seen in ten or twenty years under ordinary 
circumstances.  Tim Ford, the executive director of the Association of Defense Communities 
explained, “In many instances, you’re building and populating entire cities with these 
changes.”524 
Thus, after almost two decades of contraction under BRAC—before the latest round DoD 
facilities had been reduced by 20%—in 2005 the armed services turned their attention back to 
the building of military bases.  The story of the creation of American military space is far from 
over.  Though much has changed in the century since the Army constructed its Great War 
training camps, the position of the military vis a vis American society remains largely the same.  
It is likely, then, that military leaders will continue to look to civilian architects and city planners 
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for assistance in building the bases of the twenty-first century.  And it is also likely that the 
nation’s “military” and “civilian” architectures, like their economies, will remain intertwined, 
even though their very interdependence renders that relationship, at times, invisible. 
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